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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. OBJECTIVE 
As a rule, operational planners do not have the luxury of time to identify 
inefficiencies, uncover the source of apparent policy contradictions, or innovate 
methods for mission planning. Rather, their taxing workload forces them to seek 
the path of least resistance, which frequently prioritizes clarity over correctness 
and acceptability over opportunity. Operational planners find themselves 
burdened with the imminency of conflict and a labyrinth of domestic and 
international legislation that can be paradoxically both coherent and confusing.1 
In this environment, taking the time to ask the right questions and to discover and 
follow relevant lines of inquiry are likely to result in missed deadlines and may fail 
to generate admiration from superiors. This is not a criticism but a depiction of 
the dilemma that faces the majority of planners because, at some point, the time 
for questions and reexaminations must end and deliverables must be created. In 
the rapidly expanding field of cyberspace, cyber planners have more red tape,2 
                                                 
1 See generally CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS. International and Operational Law 
Department, “Operational Law Handbook,” David H. Lee, ed. (The Judge Advocate General’s 
Legal Center and School, U.S. Army, 2015): 145–50, https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/ 
pdf/operational-law-handbook_2015.pdf. The Operational Law Handbook (OLH) states that 
although “no international treaty or domestic statute comprehensively governs U.S. military 
activities in cyberspace, a number of policy and regulatory documents—both classified and 
unclassified—provide guidance to legal advisors on applying existing laws to [Cyber Operations 
(CO)].” See also Carlos Jose Gutierrez, “Conflicts Between Domestic and International Law,” The 
American University Law Review 30, no. 1 (Fall 1980): 153. When “we are not dealing with 
isolated acts, but rather, with systematic policies maintained by governments, we no longer can 
speak in terms of simple violations but must recognize a real conflict between the domestic legal 
order and the international instrument that establishes duties that the state does not intend to 
fulfill.” See also Michael J. Glennon, The Fog of Law (Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center 
Press, 2010), 81–84. In the international and domestic legal systems, there are significant 
differences in the ways and means by which laws are created, enacted, and repealed. In the 
domestic system, “laws are made by legislators or […] someone other than the person on the 
street. The actions of a bank robber therefore do not affect the validity of the law that prohibits 
bank robbery. In the international system, however, states are the participants and lawmakers, 
and “their actions have direct juridical effects. Repeated state actions that are at odds with an 
existing customary rule have the effect of modifying or eliminating the rule” altogether. 
2 See FULL DEFINITION OF RED TAPE. Merriam Webster Online Dictionary, s.v. “red tape,” 
accessed January 13, 2016, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/red%20tape. Merriam-
Webster defines red tape as “official routine or procedure marked by excessive complexity which 
results in delay or inaction.” 
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less clarity,3 and higher expectations4 than almost any other kind of planner. It is 
within this paradigm that this thesis seeks to expose possibilities and provide 
conclusive options for planners—cyber planners in particular—which they might 
otherwise not have the time to ponder or pursue. 
Stated simply, the objective of this thesis is to develop a framework that 
addresses the statutory authorities contained in the United States Code. It 
incorporates the corresponding oversight and compliance requirements, as well 
as fiscal controls in a way that will enable military and other government 
agencies to utilize it to support multiple title authorities working cooperatively and 
seamlessly to effectively plan and execute cyberspace operations. This is no 
easy task, as the sheer volume of legislation, continual fluctuations in legal 
opinion, and modifications to law and legal implementation threaten to contradict 
or make obsolete the conclusions of this work before the ink is dry, as it were. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Amid these endeavors, a fundamental question is this: How can the 
government enable integrated cyberspace operations? Answering this is difficult 
enough when restricting factors and considerations to the armed forces5 alone, 
but it can develop into an unmanageable task when attempting to fold in the 
myriad of additional state and federal actors who are already operating in 
                                                 
3 See generally, Mark A. Gallagher and Michael Horta, “Cyber Joint Munitions Effectiveness 
Manual (JMEM),” M&S Journal (Summer 2013): 5–14. Though not conclusive, one example of 
the disjointed nature of cyber planning is the lack of a Joint Munitions Effectiveness Manual 
(JMEM) for cyber, the absence of which makes it extremely difficult to assess the effects of using 
cyber munitions during and leading up to hostilities. More than that, it is almost impossible for 
Unified Combatant Commanders in the Department of Defense (DOD) to fold Offensive Cyber 
Operations (OCO) into a Joint Integrated Prioritized Target List (JIPTL). 
4 Among many notable cyber-influenced changes to law as well as state and federal 
organizational structures, the last decade has seen over 350 instances of the word, “cyber” being 
added to the U.S. Code, the DOD’s release of Joint Publication 3-12 (Cyberspace Operations), 
and the signing into law of the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act (CISA) on December 18, 
2015. This increase in requirements has hardly been complimented by consensus on the nature 
of cyber conflicts, the creation of uniform cyber planning models, or even a shared cyber lexicon. 
5 Those services created under U.S. Code, 10 USC §§ 3001,5001,8001 to include relevant 
sections governing the employment of the Coast Guard subject to 10 USC § 5013a and 14 USC 
§ 3. 
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cyberspace. This is because the previous question is not merely concerned with 
breaking down cultural barriers in order to enable one agency to extend an olive 
branch to another. As such, a more substantive question is this: 
What allowances are available and what concerns must be 
addressed to allow U.S. federal and state governments to include 
subordinate militaries and agencies in conducting integrated 
planning and execution of cyberspace operations? 
In order to answer this question, however, many secondary questions 
require answers, as well. 
1. Is there a legal precedent for mutually supportive operational 
interaction between U.S.C. title authorities? 
2. What are the advantages and disadvantages of operating under 
multiple U.S.C. title authorities? 
3. What (if any) legal restrictions exist that govern or limit action of 
U.S.C. title authorities operating in cyberspace? 
4. What are the oversight and compliance requirements, and fiscal 
controls that govern each of the U.S.C. title authorities? 
5. Where should authorities be delegated for approving and 
disapproving cyberspace plans and operations? 
6. What changes (if any) must be made to the U.S.C. in order to 
enable cyberspace operations? 
This thesis will consolidate relevant conclusions and much of the work that 
has been invested into answering these questions and the previously stated 
primary question. Many of the ensuing discussions will focus on providing an 
overarching context from which the final framework will emerge. 
C. DISCUSSION 
To frame the pursuit of answers to these critical questions, it is important 
to acknowledge the many agencies and military organizations with active U.S. 
charters to operate in cyberspace. These groups continue to be levied with 
growing expectations and compounding restrictions that are doled out by a host 
of governing authorities through disparate systems of dissemination. Some of 
  4 
this is simply organizational policy while other demands become binding through 
public law. In either case, they tend to be linked to a swell of oversight and 
compliance measures imposed by the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial 
branches of the federal government. Tensions between these branches along 
with recent and dramatic shifts in public trust have put the United States Code 
front and center in a debate that is greatly focused on assuaging political 
pressures rather than addressing pragmatic concerns. 
This debate is nowhere more heated than the often referred to “Title-
10/Title-50” debate6 but has more recently grown to include Title 6 (Homeland 
Defense), Title 14 (Coast Guard), Title 18 (Crimes and Criminal Procedure), Title 
28 (Judiciary and Judicial Procedure), and Title 32 (National Guard). Although 
there are organizations operating in cyberspace under additional U.S. Codes,7 
these receive the majority of scrutiny due to their frequently overlapping 
agendas, perceived public impact, and similarities in operational procedure. As a 
result, there is disagreement as to what constitutes appropriate interactions 
within and between these entities as they operate under distinct title authorities 
and sections within the United States Code. Members of agencies and 
organizations operating in cyberspace may reach out to one another under an 
approved memorandum of agreement (MOA). They may also coordinate efforts 
under the information sharing mandates that came as a result of 
recommendations from the 9/11 Commission.8 However, without an agreed upon 
framework and in the absence of tacit approval, they do so at their own peril. 
                                                 
6 Title 10 (Armed Forces) outlines the role of the military. Title 50 (War and National Defense) 
is significantly more diverse. It not only governs espionage and makes provision for intelligence 
agencies (e.g., CIA and NSA), but it also outlines authorities for and governs instances of 
insurrection and national emergency among others. 
7 Most notably, Title 15 (Commerce and Trade) and Title 42 (The Public Health and Welfare) 
of the U.S.C. have numerous stipulations related to responsibilities for managing and responding 
to cybersecurity requirements and cyber-threats. The majority of actors, however, are covered 
under the U.S.C. Title authorities addressed here. 
8 See generally “Information Sharing,” U.S. Department of Homeland Security, last modified 
August 26, 2015, http://www.dhs.gov/topic/information-sharing. 
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Many critics remark that current methods for planning and execution are 
not possible within the paradigm shift presented by cyberspace. One of the major 
sources of this tension derives from the highly technical and oft-misunderstood 
nature of cyberspace.9 Its composition of both logical and physical components 
presents complications to executing operations that are seen by some critics as 
insurmountable under the current legal framework.10 It is important to note here 
that inter-title cooperation is not, nor should it be interpreted as, an attempt to 
circumvent international law. In many countries, the security forces responsible 
for enforcing domestic law are nearly indistinguishable from those responsible for 
subduing international conflicts. The United States has a long history of 
separating international forces from domestic ones, but regardless of force 
composition, inter-title cooperation is about effectiveness and efficiency, and not 
intended to alleviate the weight of legal responsibility. 
Certainly, there are unique challenges posed by the cyberspace domain, 
for which new legislation could bring some clarity, but an overhaul of the United 
States Code and inter-title interactions is likely unnecessary. The National 
Security Strategies produced by both the George W. Bush administration (2002, 
2006) and the Barak Obama administration (2010, 2015) placed heavy emphasis 
on the need for government agencies—not exclusively the military—to disrupt 
and neutralize terrorist networks. Even just a small sample of the well-
documented use of cyberspace by terrorist networks11 can lead to reasonable 
                                                 
9 See generally Martha S. H. VanDriel, “Bridging the Planning Gap: Incorporating 
Cyberspace Into Operational Planning,” Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, May 
4, 2015, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/index.cfm/articles/Bridging-the-planning-
gap/2015/05/04. VanDriel enumerates numerous obstacles to cyberspace planning. Widespread 
ignorance on capabilities, command, and planning structures lead to unsuccessful attempts to 
incorporate cyberspace into overall operational planning.  
10 Michael J. Glennon, “The Road Ahead: Gaps, Leaks and Drips,” International Law Studies 
89, (2013): 367–69. While Glennon correctly exposes the incompleteness of international law in 
addressing cyber conflict, the current legal frameworks may still support inter-title cooperation.  
11 See generally Stuart Macdonald and David Mair, “Terrorism Online: A New Strategic 
Environment,” in Terrorism Online: Politics, Law and Technology, eds. Lee Jarvis, Stuart 
Macdonald, and Thomas M. Chen, (New York: Routledge, 2015), 10–24. Macdonald and Mair 
broadly enumerate terrorist groups’ use cyberspace to conduct outreach, enable logistics, and 
conduct physical, psychological, and cyber-based attacks. 
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conclusions about how multiple title authorities are likely to be operating in 
cyberspace in similar and mutually supportive ways to achieve these national 
security objectives. 
D. BENEFITS 
As cyberspace becomes more pervasive, adversaries of the United States 
will continue to leverage its power to undermine national security. As such, it is 
imperative that a framework be developed for understanding how to best enable 
cooperation and synthesize cyberspace operations between the many 
organizations operating under various title authorities. Developing this framework 
can not only effect planning and operations but also lead to greater fiscal 
efficiency. A recurring theme in cyberspace discussions is the need for a robust 
information technology (IT) infrastructure that is capable of providing for national 
security and advancing national interests. In an era where budgetary constraints 
and austerity measures are becoming increasingly more common, a framework 
that allows for greater coordination and enables diffused resources to be focused 
toward a common goal should lead to increased sustainment in supporting 
broad-spectrum cyberspace operations. 
E. THESIS OUTLINE 
To address these challenges and concerns in a coherent way, this thesis 
is divided into six chapters. This chapter provides the introductory material to the 
thesis, its objectives, benefits, methodologies, and the scope of the study. 
As alluded to earlier, one of the major challenges with this subject is the 
belief that there is something unethical or even illegal about coopting two or more 
title-authorities into the same operation. Therefore, the second chapter provides 
a summary of concerns over the United States Code. It explores the lengthy 
discourse that has accompanied interpretations and employment of the United 
States Code throughout its history. This chapter also makes initial progress in 
isolating significant elements of the proposed framework by identifying relevant 
authorities, agencies, and organizations within the U.S. Code. It further 
  7 
addresses the perceptions and controversies in the context of relevant 
legislation. 
Based on the findings outlined in the second chapter, the third chapter 
outlines applicable statutes for enabling inter-title operations. Discussions in this 
chapter focus on historical examples and ongoing operations that are primarily 
characterized by inter-title support. Conclusions will contextualize statutory 
authorities to either enable or preclude aspects of inter-title cooperation amidst 
the unique dilemmas presented by the cyberspace domain. 
The fourth chapter presents the culmination of previous work by outlining 
statutory requirements and suggesting a framework that will enable planners to 
appropriately understand the requirements, constraints, and opportunities for 
inter-title interactions as they are supported by the United States Code. 
The fifth chapter utilizes this framework to present two scenarios for 
possible inter-title cooperation. The first scenario, “Inter-Title Cyberspace 
Support to Counterproliferation Operations,” explores oversight and compliance, 
and fiscal concerns related to inter-title cooperation in a counterproliferation 
environment. This scenario explores authorities governed primarily by 10 USC, 
14 USC, 18 USC, and 50 USC. The second scenario, “Inter-Title Cyberspace 
Support to Defense of Critical Infrastructure,” explores possibilities for enabling 
cooperation in the defense of critical infrastructure under 6 USC, 10 USC, 32 
USC, and 50 USC. These types of interactions are neither new nor innovative. In 
many cases, they are simply not understood by those who participate in them. 
The framework and the scenarios, therefore, are simply designed to make 
explicit for policy makers, operational planners, and even legislators what has 
already been made possible by law. 
The sixth chapter is concerned with the findings and recommendations for 
future work. This chapter consolidates conclusions drawn from the research and 
provides a summary of the most essential elements of the thesis and its 
suggested framework. It addresses some of the perceived dilemmas created by 
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applying the U.S.C. to the cyberspace domain, and exposes the benefits of inter-
title cooperation as well as possible costs associated with gaining greater 
efficiencies. Additionally, it highlights issues that are beyond the scope of this 
thesis but in need of further research. 
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II. CURRENT AND HISTORICAL CONCERNS OVER THE 
UNITED STATES CODE 
A. EIGHTY YEARS OF WAR AND THE NATION STATE 
Though statecraft has progressed through numerous iterations over the 
course of human history, in the current post-colonial era, the success12 of the 
nation state is largely linked to its sovereign ability to establish and exercise law 
within its territorial borders.13 The failure of fascism—made permanent by the 
decisive conclusion to WWII--and the near-extinction of communism by the turn 
of the 21st century14 led to the broad establishment of parliamentarian rule—
most commonly referred to as democracy—as the most prolific form of state 
governance.15, World Wars I and II, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and even 
the Soviet-Afghan War were arguably most significantly influenced by competing 
identities of nation-state governance. With the resolution of these and other 
conflicts of the Cold-War era,16 the world has seen democratic rule firmly 
established as the most popular form of governance. This development is 
                                                 
12 See generally “Indicators,” Fund for Peace, accessed September 25, 2015, 
http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/indicators. The Fund for Peace is an independent research 
organization that defines 12 indicators of state stability. While they fall into the three general 
categories of Social, Economic, and Political-Military, they are all highly dependent on a robust 
and equitable legal framework from which the nation can provide reliable governance and 
security. 
13 Philip Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace, and the Course of History (New York: 
Anchor Books, 2003), xxii. 
14 Archie Brown, The Rise and Fall of Communism (London: The Bodley Head, 2009), 606. 
As of 2009, only five nations claimed a form of Communist governance and Brown asserts that 
most influential of these—China—had discarded enough of its Communist indicators by 2000 to 
be, at best, a hybridized socialist government.  
15 See generally Max Roser, “Democratisation,” Our World in Data, accessed November 4, 
2015, http://ourworldindata.org/data/political-regimes/democratisation. Max Roser, an Oxford 
University researcher, estimates that in 2015, approximately 70% of the world population lived in 
countries with a significant degree of democratization. See also Economist Intelligence Unit, 
“Democracy Index 2014,” Economist, accessed November 4, 2015, available through 
http://www.eiu.com/democracy2014. Report indicates that in 2014, over 60% of all countries had 
implemented significant democratic processes for its citizens. 
16 See generally Wikipedia, s.v. "Cold War," last modified March 8, 2016, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cold_War. Circa 1947–1991 is a generally agreed-upon timeframe 
for the Cold War.  
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significant because, while parliamentarian rule has emerged as the most 
dominant form of the nation state, its advantages are accompanied by unique 
susceptibilities to global threats that exist within and yet extend beyond each 
nation’s borders. Although conflicts and threats to rule have admittedly traversed 
regional boundaries for thousands of years, the global threats that have emerged 
from the conflict of the 20th century stand out as unique, not only in their sheer 
breadth but also in how they are perceived by the nation state. They are 
distinctive from past threats in that they are common to each nation yet beyond 
the capacity of any to individually address on its own. While nearly 80 years of 
war17 saw many course changes for the nation state to reach its final and 
nominally unchallenged status, this time period had also ushered in a new era of 
unique vulnerabilities and challenges that currently threaten to destabilize 
parliamentarian rule as a governmental hegemon.  
To begin with, the conflicts of the 20th century gave rise to global 
organizations like the United Nations18 and North Atlantic Treaty Organization,19 
which instituted international mandates on human rights20 and a system for 
international law,21 and which developed increasingly pejorative views on 
                                                 
17 The 77-year period of conflict from 1914 (start of WWI) to 1991 (ending in the dissolution 
of the Soviet Union). 
18 See generally “History of the United Nations,” United Nations, accessed December 10, 
2015, http://www.un.org/en/sections/history/history-united-nations. See also United Nations, 
Charter of The United Nations, October 24, 1945, Ch. I, Art. 1, accessed December 10, 2015, 
http://www.un.org/en/ sections/un-charter/chapter-i/index.html. The United Nations was formed 
amidst the conflict of WWII in order to combat the axis powers and with the expressed purpose 
“to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace”. 
19 See generally North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “A Short History of NATO,” accessed 
December 10, 2015, http://www.nato.int/history/nato-history.html. The creation of NATO was 
founded in “deterring Soviet expansionism, forbidding the revival of nationalist militarism in 
Europe through a strong North American presence on the continent, and encouraging European 
political integration.” 
20 See generally United Nations, General Assembly, International Bill of Human Rights, 
December 10, 1948, A/RES/217(III), accessed November 8, 2015, http://www.undocs.org/A/RES/ 
217(III). 
21 See generally Glennon, The Fog of Law, 30–36. International Law has seen a great deal of 
controversy since its outset. Its effectiveness and legitimacy have been called into question by 
disagreement over the permanency of consent given by its participants, its dependency on states 
to impose the obligation of law upon themselves, and the complex motives that govern states’ 
participation which occlude identifying a standard causation for constituting a norm. 
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unilateral action of nation states acting in their own self-interest.22 In addition, the 
development of global trade networks has created new and powerful efficiencies 
in the manufacturing and commodities markets,23 but, in the absence of global 
consensus between nations, has also created labor and manufacturing 
dependencies that have remained largely under auspices of international 
companies and corporations to manage. The expansion of international travel 
and trade has resulted in softer borders, increased human migration, and 
increased global exposure to a multitude of communicable diseases like cholera, 
HIV/AIDS, Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), and influenza.24 
Increased awareness of global ecological dependencies and the transnational 
effects of industrial pollution, famine, and overfishing have placed many countries 
at the center of international criticism and contributed to growing tensions 
between economic allies and competitors alike.25 Lastly, and probably most 
significantly, is the creation of global communications networks—of which the 
Internet26 is likely the most prominent. These networks have enabled the 
communication of ideas and information at near-instantaneous speeds, which 
has led to rapid and effective coordination between previously inaccessible or 
disparate parties. Despite the obvious benefits of network communications for 
supporting and advancing national interests, they are being increasingly 
leveraged to consolidate the interests of transnational populations within, across, 
                                                 
22 See INTRODUCTION. Diane F. Orentilicher, “Unilateral Multilateralism: United States 
Policy Toward the International Criminal Court,” Cornell International Law Journal 36, no. 3, 
Article 1 (2004): 415–17, http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1526& 
context=cilj. While the United States has long advocated for increased multilateral action, their 
commitment historically favors unilateral action when multilateral authority threatens to exercise 
jurisdiction over U.S. citizens and U.S. interests.  
23 Thomas L. Friedman, The World is Flat 3.0: A Brief History of the 21st Century (New York: 
Picador, 2007), 573. 
24 See generally Andrew J. Tatem, Simon I. Hays, and David J. Rogers, “Global Traffic and 
Disease Vector Dispersal,” Advances in Parasitology 62 (April 18, 2006): 6242–47, 
doi:10.1073/pnas.0508391103. 
25 See generally Manfred B. Steger, Globalization: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013) 91–95. 
26 See generally Wikipedia, s.v. "Internet," last modified March 8, 2016, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet. 
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and beyond national borders. These transnational constituencies are able to 
operate with an agility and agenda that often undermines a nation’s interests and 
even its national security. For the purposes of this thesis, this latter subject is the 
primary concern, namely cyberspace,27 though, for at least two major reasons, 
the former observations are by no means irrelevant. 
First, since most of the ensuing discussions are concerned with questions 
of a legal and ethical nature, it is important to understand the statutory legacy 
within the historical context that has produced the current corpus juris. A 
pragmatic approach28 to cyberspace operations demands that these laws—no 
less the approaches to implementing and enforcing them—should be freshly 
examined, as nations progress in their understanding and use of information 
technology. This is by no means a new concept. Prior to the outbreak of WWII, 
gangs in the United States were becoming a major threat to law enforcement. 
Based on the increasingly violent nature of criminal activity, it became clear that 
members of these gangs were exercising their Second Amendment right in ways 
that served to destabilize state and municipal governments instead of in 
protection of them.29 The result, and the first of many to follow, was the National 
Firearms Act of 1934. This example does not lead to a conclusion that the rule of 
law becomes irrelevant as soon as societal perspectives shift but suggests 
                                                 
27 See generally Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Cyberspace Operations, Joint 
Publication 3-12 (R) (Washington DC: CJCS, February 5, 2013): v. Cyberspace is defined by 
Department of Defense Joint Doctrine as a “global domain within the information environment 
consisting of the interdependent network of information technology infrastructures and resident 
data, including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded 
processors and controllers.” 
28 See generally Glennon, The Fog of Law, 1–22. A pragmatic approach to Law is not strictly 
governed by practical and common sense concerns. It most patently differs from the idealistic 
approach—among others—in that it is primarily focused on the real-world consequences of ideas 
that lead to the creation and implementation of laws. 
29 See generally Clayton E. Cramer, For the Defense of Themselves and the State: The 
Original Intent and Judicial Interpretation of the Right to Keep and Bear Arms (Westport, CT: 
Praeger, 1994) 59–73. C.f. with Bliss v. Commonwealth of Kentucky in 2 Littell 90, 13 Am. Dec. 
251 (1822). One of the earliest interpretations of the Second Amendment came in 1822 when the 
Kentucky Supreme Court ruled that the federal intent of the constitutional amendment (as ratified 
in the Commonwealth of Kentucky’s constitution) was “the right to bear arms in defense of 
themselves and the state.” The interpretation concerning the common defense of the state was 
ratified in the Constitutions of 18 different states by 1845 (15 of those states included clauses for 
individual ownership rights). 
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instead that legislation necessarily leads to systems of de facto policy and 
procedure—like the concealment or unchecked purchasing of firearms—that 
many, whether through simple repetition or unawareness, believe to be de jure. It 
is the former that should be summarily scrutinized while the latter more often 
clarified.30 
The second major reason is owed to the social context in which these 
discussions are taking place. Many who experienced the fallout from the 9/11 
attacks will remember that cyberspace was not perceived to have played a 
pivotal role in enabling the physical attacks that took place, though it was 
certainly recognized as a key asset in identifying, tracking, and apprehending 
those responsible. In the years following 9/11, however, fewer and fewer terrorist 
attacks have taken place without a cyber element.31 These are important points 
for a number of reasons. First, it shows that holistic perspectives on cyberspace 
are relatively new and so, it should come as no surprise that legislation and its 
accompanying policy are likely to lag behind not only the threat but also societal 
perspectives. Second, it rejects the notion that cyberspace has somehow given 
rise to terrorist networks or transnational criminal organizations (TCO) or that it is 
the only medium in which they can effectively employ their power to undermine 
                                                 
30 In some cases, major societal shifts demand a complete reexamination of de facto and de 
jure practices. Jim Crow laws of “The South” were subject to such scrutiny during the American 
Civil Rights Movement. See generally, Wikipedia, s.v. "Jim Crow laws," last modified March 6, 
2016, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jim_Crow_laws. The Jim Crow laws of the 19th century are an 
example of racial de facto practices of antebellum America becoming de jure following the 
conclusion of the Civil War. It does not take imagination to comprehend that federal and state 
legislators will often write de facto practices into law in response to challenges against their 
authority. 
31 See generally Lorraine Bowman-Grieve, “Cyberterrorism and Moral Panics: A Reflection 
On the Discourse of Cyberterrorism,” in Terrorism Online: Politics, Law and Technology, eds. Lee 
Jarvis, Stuart Macdonald, and Thomas M. Chen, (New York: Routledge, 2015), 86–87. 
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national security.32 Even under a preponderance that suggests effectiveness for 
these transnational networks that predates global communications networks, it is 
still difficult to deny that cyberspace has provided an unprecedented increase to 
their capability. The migration of processes to networked architecture has 
enabled TCOs, terrorists, and even nation states to stabilize and advance 
organizational goals that, at best, would have been only nominally effective in the 
years predating the proliferation of networks and information technology.33 
As nation states, criminal organizations, and even corporations seek to 
maximize their equities in global markets, they can hardly do so without the use 
of cyberspace. Many of these entities are operating in cyberspace in positive 
ways that lead to improved innovation, increased access, and stability. Others, 
however, seek to build and leverage transnational networks through cyberspace 
with destructive inclinations that are criminal in nature.34 It is addressing these 
latter groups that is the primary concern of this thesis. Among the malicious 
entities operating in cyberspace, two of the most recognizable are international 
terrorist networks like Al Qaeda and the Islamic State, and transnational criminal 
organizations like the Russian organized crime syndicates or the Mexican drug 
cartels. Hacker groups, sometimes referred to as hacktivists, while just as 
recognizable as TCOs and terrorists, tend to operate within a limited scope and 
                                                 
32 See generally “Timeline,” National Counterterrorism Center, accessed January 10, 2016, 
http://www.nctc.gov/site/timeline.html. Some examples of terrorist activities carried out without the 
assistance of cyberspace include, among others: Washington DC, March 9, 1977, a Hanafi 
Muslim group took control of three buildings and over 150 hostages. Lebanon, April 18 and 
October 23, 1983, a car bomb exploded outside the U.S. embassy and Marine barracks, 
respectively. Casualties totaled more than 350 killed or wounded. See also “Methods & Tactics,” 
id., accessed January 10, 2016, http://www.nctc.gov/site/methods.html#sarin. Sixteen deaths in 
the United States over the years spanning 1972–1990 are classified as “terrorist-associated 
assassination incidents.” 
33 See CONCLUSION. Macdonald and Mair, “Terrorism Online: A New Strategic 
Environment,” 28. “The terrorists of today may not be new in terms of their organisational 
structure, but… the Internet has given them far greater reach than ever before.” 
34 See generally Pew Research, “Cyber Attacks Likely to Increase,” October 29, 2014, 
http://www.pewinternet.org/files/2014/10/PI_ FutureofCyberattacks_102914_pdf.pdf. 
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duration35 unless they are being coopted by these criminal organizations or 
possibly a nation state.36 A rise in independent cyber-criminal organizations that 
are detached from traditional TCOs,37 accompanied by an increase in covert 
action by nation states38 makes a simple characterization of cyberspace actors 
nearly impossible. As such, and for the purposes of simplification, when 
examples are necessary for inter-title discussions, they will primarily be drawn 
from organizations and situations that are common and shared—even among 
diverse audiences. It is also worth noting that even though international 
constituencies like global corporations and human rights groups can profoundly 
affect the interests of a nation, they are mostly viewed as a positive expression of 
democratic rule and are not deemed appropriate targets, especially of U.S. 
cyberspace operations. 
                                                 
35 See DEFINING HACKTIVISM AND ANONYMOUS’S [sic] PLACE WITHIN THE 
MOVEMENT. Brian B. Kelly, "Investing in a Centralized Cybersecurity Infrastructure: Why 
'Hacktivism' Can and Should Influence Cybersecurity Reform,” Boston University Law Review 92, 
no. 5 (March 2012): 1663–82, http://www.bu.edu/law/journals-
archive/bulr/volume92n4/documents/kelly.pdf. Hacktivist group, Anonymous, is often presented 
as a significant exception to this statement. Their place within the “hacktivist movement,” 
however, is questionable since their “penchant for disaggregation has given way to what some 
investigators believe is a coherent structure with ad hoc leaders who delegate tasks, select 
targets, and reprimand disobedient members.” This organizational structure, sustained political 
objectives, and threats to target U.S. infrastructure may place them in a category where they 
have more in common with cyberterrorism and TCOs than with protestors and political activists. 
36 See OPENING STATEMENT by Dana Rohrabacher. U.S. Congress, House, Committee 
On Foreign Affairs, Cyber Attacks: An Unprecedented Threat to U.S. National Security: Hearing 
Before the Subcommittee On Europe, Eurasia, And Emerging Threats of the Committee On 
Foreign Affairs, 113th Cong., 1st sess., 2013, 3–4, http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA14/ 
20130321/100547/HHRG-113-FA14-20130321-SD002.pdf. Specifically, there is no clear 
international consensus on how to identify, classify, and respond to individual hackers and groups 
who are being used as proxy forces by various nation states. Adding to this dilemma is the 
difficulty associated with attribution. See also Mandiant Intelligence Center, "APT1: Exposing One 
of China’s Cyber Espionage Units,” Mandiant Corporation (2013) 
http://intelreport.mandiant.com/Mandiant_APT1_ Report.pdf. 
37 See generally Megan Penn, “Organized Cyber Crime: Comparison of Criminal Groups in 
Cyberspace,” Cyber Defense Review, Policy & Law Blog, April 7, 2015, 
http://www.cyberdefensereview.org/2015/04/07/organized-cyber-crime. 
38 See COMPUTER NETWORK ATTACK. Walter Gary Sharp, Sr., CyberSpace and the Use 
of Force (Falls Church, VA: Aegis Research Corporation, 1999), 132–33. “Just as with computer 
espionage, the difficulty in responding to a computer network attack in self defense is determining 
the identity of the attacking state.” 
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Another factor that receives significantly less attention amid the cloak-and-
dagger activities of cyberspace, is the place of inter-title cyberspace operations in 
support of relief efforts for emergencies and national disasters. The 21st century 
has introduced the idea of Hastily Formed Networks (HFN) in response to the 
enormous advantage of networks and the growing societal dependencies upon 
them.39 Coordination of relief efforts like food distribution or the reconstitution of 
banking or ATMs is often as essential as power restoration during long term or 
widespread emergencies. Federal agencies already provide network 
infrastructure for services like banking.40 It is therefore not a significant leap to 
imagine federal relief workers rapidly constituting ad hoc networks to ensure the 
restoration of critical sectors. This is an important consideration for inter-title 
operations and represents an important conversation that must recognize 
appropriate distinctions between both federal and state jurisdictions. 
For all the complex factors that go into the analysis, the simple fact 
remains that if the United States intends to establish itself equitably within 
cyberspace, it must do so in a way that legally combats threats that do not tend 
to operate within the boundaries of domestic and international law. 
                                                 
39 See generally Peter J. Denning, “Hastily Formed Networks,” Communications of the ACM 
49, no. 4 (April 2006): 15–20, http://denninginstitute.com/pjd/PUBS/CACMcols/cacmApr06.pdf. 
See also Catherine B. Nelson, Jeannie A. Stamberger, and Brian D. Steckler, “The Evolution of 
Hastily Formed Networks for Disaster Response: Technologies, Case Studies, and Future 
Trends,” (Conference Paper, IEEE Global Humanitarian Technology Conference, 2011). 
http://www.cisco.com/c/dam/en_us/about/doing_business/business_continuity/Paper_124_MSW_
USltr_format.pdf. 
40 Fedwire, which is operated by the Federal Reserve Banks and authorized by the Federal 
Reserve Act, is just one example of this (legal authorities drawn primarily from 12 USC §§ 
248(i),(j),248a,248-1,342). See LEGAL AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK. Federal Reserve 
Banks, Fedwire® Funds Service Disclosure (Washington DC: WPO, December 24, 2015), 8–14, 
https://www.frbservices.org/ files/serviceofferings/pdf/fedwire-funds-service-disclosure.pdf. “U.S. 
law provides a comprehensive, well-established, and publicly disclosed legal framework for funds 
transfers made over the Fedwire Funds Service. The statutes, regulations, and contractual 
provisions that constitute the legal framework for the Fedwire Funds Service clearly define the 
rights and obligations of each party to Fedwire funds transfers. The legal framework provides 
participants a high degree of legal assurance of the settlement and finality of funds transfers 
made over the Fedwire Funds Service.” 
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B. THE UNITED STATES AND CYBERSPACE 
It is probable that, more than any other technological development over 
the last 100 years, the prolific spread of communications networks and 
information technology has presented an extraordinary number of challenges to a 
variety of prominent nation states,41 and most especially the United States.42 
These more recent technological advances cannot be divorced nor entirely 
isolated from the crisis facing the nation state as a whole. Arguably, the 
emergence of cyberspace in the 1980s did not penetrate popular culture until the 
1990s when the Internet grew into a household phenomenon,43 but this did not 
stem the growth of cyber threats. For decades, cyber-attacks have consistently 
paralleled network advancements. All the while governing bodies have remained 
                                                 
41 Sebastian Anthony, “France Looking at Banning TOR and Public WiFi,” ArsTechnica, 
December 7, 2015, http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/12/france-looking-at-banning-tor-
blocking-public-wi-fi. “According to leaked documents France's Ministry of Interior is considering 
two new proposals: a ban on free and shared Wi-Fi connections during a state of emergency, and 
measures to block Tor being used inside France. […] These proposals are presumably in 
response to the attacks in Paris [in November 2015] where 130 people were murdered.” See also 
Keir Giles, “Russia’s Public Stance on Cyberspace Issues,” in Proceedings of 2012 International 
Conference on Cyber Conflict, eds. Christian Czosseck, Rain Ottis, and Katharina Ziolkowski 
(Tallinn, Estonia: NATO CCD COE, June 5–8, 2012), 63–75, https://ccdcoe.org/publications/ 
2012proceedings/CyCon_2012_Proceedings.pdf. “Russia has deep concerns on the principle of 
uncontrolled exchange of information in cyberspace.” See also Hauke Johannes Gierow, “Cyber 
Security in China: New Political Leadership Focuses on Boosting National Security,” China 
Monitor of the Mercator Institute for China Studies 20 (December 2014) 
http://www.merics.org/fileadmin/templates/download/china-monitor/China_Monitor_No_20_ 
eng.pdf. “[China’s cybersecurity] strategy defines a relatively broad range of objectives [which 
includes] tightening control of the internet to ‘uphold good morals in the Net.’” See also Wikipedia, 
s.v. "Censorship of Wikipedia," last modified March 2, 2016, https://en.wikipedia.org/ 
wiki/Censorship_of_Wikipedia. 
42 John Matherly, Twitter post, August 28, 2014, 10:49 a.m., https://twitter.com/achillean. 
Matherly (@achillean) posted an file created by web crawler SHODAN (https://www.shodan.io) 
that attempts to show all IPv4 devices connected to the internet for August 2, 2014. The data 
shows extremely high densities of devices for the United States and Europe though, interestingly, 
it is thought to have been inconclusive for China (due possibly to China’s “Golden Shield 
Project”—a.k.a. the Great Firewall of China). The difficulty in comprehending, characterizing, and 
responding to threats in cyberspace is made more clear when glimpsing the sheer number of 
devices and vectors associated with the Internet. For further discussions on the Golden Shield 
Project, see generally Wikipedia, s.v. "Golden Shield Project," last modified February 28, 2016, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Golden_Shield_Project. 
43 See generally Daniel Ventre, “Conclusion,” in Cyber Conflict: Competing National 
Perspectives, ed. Daniel Ventre (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2012), 297. 
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relatively slow to respond—at least when compared to the pace of technological 
advancements and network proliferation.44 
In light of this, it might surprise many that cyberspace has only recently 
emerged as a priority in discussions on national security. Its prevalence in 
discussions on security is another example of the increased awareness of 
national susceptibility and dependency on networks and information technology. 
Take, for example, the following descriptions coming from different organizations 
within the federal government, all addressing 21st century cyberspace threats: 
The 21st century brings with it entirely new challenges, in which 
criminal and national security threats strike from afar through 
computer networks, with potentially devastating consequences.45 
—Federal Bureau of Investigation 
Potential state and non-state adversaries conduct malicious cyber 
activities against U.S. interests globally and in a manner intended 
to test the limits of what the United States and the international 
community will tolerate.46 
—Department of Defense  
                                                 
44 See INTERNET USERS IN THE WORLD. “Internet Users,” Internet Live Stats, accessed 
January 20, 2016, http://www.internetlivestats.com/internet-users. Data provided by the 
International Telecommunication Union (ITU) suggests that there were just over 14-million 
internet users (or 0.3% of the world’s population) in 1993. By the start of 2016, there are 
estimated to be over 3-billion users (or 40.5% of the world’s population). 
45 See generally “Addressing Threats to the Nation’s Cybersecurity,” National Cyber 
Investigative Task Force, Federal Bureau of Investigation, accessed January 12, 2016, 
https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/cyber/addressing-threats-to-the-nations-cybersecurity-1. 
46 U.S. Department of Defense, The Department of Defense Cyber Strategy (Washington 
DC: DOD, 2015) http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/2015/0415_cyber-
strategy/Final_2015_DoD_CYBER_STRATEGY_for_web.pdf. 
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Cybersecurity is one of the most serious economic and national 
security challenges we face as a nation. Government systems—
including Coast Guard systems—face a mounting array of 
emerging cyber threats that could severely compromise and limit 
our Service’s ability to perform our essential missions.47 
—U.S. Coast Guard 
Securing cyberspace is an extraordinarily difficult strategic 
challenge that requires a coordinated and focused effort from our 
entire society—the federal government, state and local 
governments, the private sector, and the American people.48 
—President George W. Bush 
This recent emphasis by strategists and government leaders is unsettling 
and long overdue. Whether this awareness has appeared slowly due to the 
perceived “recent” nature of cyberspace is not entirely clear since cyber-attacks 
have a well-documented history as a dominant and disruptive force.49 While the 
prominence of cybercrime50 and espionage51 has led to modestly effective 
                                                 
47 See INTRODUCTION. Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard, United States Coast Guard 
Cyber Strategy (Washington DC: DHS, June, 2015), 9, https://www.uscg.mil/seniorleadership/ 
DOCS/cyber.pdf. 
48 See Introductory Letter by President George W. Bush. U.S. White House, The National 
Strategy to Secure Cyberspace (Washington DC: White House 2003), https://www.us-
cert.gov/sites/default/files/publications/cyberspace_strategy.pdf. 
49 See generally Wikipedia, s.v. "Timeline of Computer Security Hacker History," last 
modified February 28, 2016, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_of_computer_security_ 
hacker_history. 
50 See generally Internet Crime Complaint Center, 2014 Internet Crime Report, Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (Washington DC: DOJ 2014) https://www.fbi.gov/news/ news_blog/2014-
ic3-annual-report. See also Center for Strategic and International Studies, Net Losses: Estimating 
the Global Cost of Cybercrime. Economic Impact of Cybercrime II (McAfee, June 2014), 
http://www.mcafee.com/hk/resources/reports/rp-economic-impact-cybercrime2.pdf. In 2014, the 
FBI’s Internet Crime Center (IC3) reported losses of over $800-million due cybercrime or 
cybercrime related incidences. This represents just a fraction of the more than $400 billion in 
costs incurred by the global economy due to cybercrime. 
51 See generally Ellen Nakashima, “Chinese Hack Of Federal Personnel Files Included 
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 judicial and legislative measures,52 technology continues to outpace holistic 
federal responses to the problem.53 Regardless, the increasing pace of cyber-
legislation communicates the prevailing view that cyberspace requires policies 
and laws that are unique from those constructed in the decades preceding it. 
It is not only judicial and legislative procedures that have lagged behind in 
their response to cyberspace threats. Events of the last century continue to 
impose a dominant lens through which current policies are created, strategic 
priorities are set, and contemporary legal interpretation is adapted. From among 
the emerging voices of cyber-inclined philosophers and legal pundits, many 
predispose themselves toward successful 20th century strategies like 
deterrence54 and consequently attempt to craft templates that are inspired—and 
sometimes restricted—by preconceived notions of how conflicts ought to 
progress and conclude.55 Masked as the journey toward a new form of 
deterrence, it more often appears that its most commonly shared attribute is its 
                                                 
52 See REGULATORY STRUCTURE. Christopher H. Sterling, Phyllis W. Bernt, and Martin 
B.H. Weiss, Shaping American Telecommunications: A History of Technology, Policy, and 
Economics (New York: Routledge, 2005), 30–33. “The reactive and ad hoc nature of court 
proceedings makes them a poor vehicle for formulating coherent regulatory policies. Relying on 
legislation to regulate industry […] also proved ineffective. The legislative process is notoriously 
slow and inflexible. Laws passed to regulate firms are difficult to change when the need arises. 
The fact that it took Congress years to substantially amend the Communication Act of 1934 is 
proof of the slowness of the legislative process.” 
53 Daniel Ventre “Conclusion,” 297–301. Specifically, Ventre hypothesizes that “delays 
between the emergence of cyberspace, the appearance of threats, and the introduction of 
cyberspace into defense policies highlights the contrast between aggressor and victim models 
[…] The victim’s reaction time is incompatible with the attacker’s pace […] The State […] requires 
hierarchy, planning, and organization […] The attacker […] [has] no hierarchy [which enables] 
rapidity, reactivity and capacity for surprise action.” 
54 Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966). 
55 For emerging views on cyber deterrence, see generally Richard L. Kugler, “Deterrence of 
Cyber Attacks,” in Cyberpower and National Security, eds. Franklin D. Kramer, et al. (Dulles, VA: 
National Defense University Press, 2009), 309. See also Will Goodman, “Cyber Deterrence: 
Tougher in Theory than in Practice,” Strategic Studies Quarterly 4, no. 3 (Fall 2010): 103. See 
also Patrick M. Morgan, “Applicability of Traditional Deterrence Concepts and Theory to the 
Cyber Realm,” Proceedings of a Workshop on Deterring Cyberattacks: Informing Strategies and 
Developing Options for U.S. Policy (Washington D.C.: The National Academies Press, 2010), 55–
57. See also Jon R. Lindsay, “Tipping the Scales: The Attribution Problem and The Feasibility of 
Deterrence Against Cyberattack,” Journal of Cybersecurity (2015): 1–15, doi: 
10.1093/cybsec/tyv003. 
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end goal—namely, conflict avoidance.56 Theories on conflict avoidance, 
however, are steeped in approaches stemming from nuclear deterrence, but 
there is no clear indication that the critical elements of such theories have a one-
to-one correspondence in cyberspace.57 This strategic mismatch has not 
prevented the adaptation of outmoded methodologies and may be a significant 
contributor to operational ineffectiveness.58 Shifting the focus to the desired 
outcome—namely conflict avoidance—can also cause policy makers and 
legislators to characterize cyberspace events inconsistently. Malicious activity in 
this domain is often upgraded or downgraded in order to substantiate the current 
strategy and claim that success has been achieved so long as conflict has been 
effectively avoided.59 In these cases, however, combatting the underlying 
causality is disputable and one resulting phenomenon is the deluge of opinion, 
                                                 
56 See THEORETICAL AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS. Vesna Danilovic, When Stakes Are 
High: Deterrence and Conflict Among Major Powers (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 
2002), 163–65. Conflict avoidance is, “for the most part, logically and empirically inseparable 
from” deterrence stability.” 
57 See BARRIERS TO CYBERSPACE DETERRENCE. Clorinda Trujillo, “The Limits of 
Cyberspace Deterrence,” Joint Force Quarterly 75 (4th Qtr., 2014), 47–49. See also Mark 
Pomerleau, “In Cyber Defense, Can Cold War-Style Deterrence Work?” Defense Systems (April 
20, 2015) https://defensesystems.com/articles/2015/04/20/dod-cyber-deterrence.aspx. A 
successful deterrence strategy should necessarily produce an outcome that minimizes conflict or 
avoids it altogether. While cyberspace can almost certainly be folded into a broad strategy of 
deterrence, it is unclear whether brandishing or the use of cyberspace munitions can directly lead 
to this with the same hegemonic influence as nuclear weapons. 
58 See generally Michael Hayden, Jeffrey Eisenach and Mike Daniels, “America’s Strategy 
for Cyberspace: Is it Working?” (lecture, American Enterprise Institute Global Internet Strategy 
event, Washington DC, October 27, 2015), https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
2015/10/Transcript1.pdf. 
59 See generally Barack Obama, interview by Candy Crowley, CNN, December 21, 2014 
http://cnnpressroom.blogs.cnn.com/2014/12/21/cnns-candy-crowley-interviews-president-barack-
obama. President Barak Obama denied that the North Korean data intrusion against Sony 
Pictures constituted an act of war and recast the incident as “an act of cybervandalism.” But see 
generally Office of Infrastructure Protection, 2015 Commercial Facilities Sector-Specific Plan 
(Washington DC: DHS, 2015), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/nipp-ssp-
commercial-facilities-2015-508.pdf. The Entertainment and Media subsector is considered critical 
infrastructure and includes motion picture studios and broadcast media. 
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legislation, and policy that have yet to adequately address cyberspace operations 
in a way that makes it predictable and effective.60 
Within this 20th century paradigm, technological advancements continue 
to pose significant difficulties to modern military operations and law enforcement. 
To complicate matters, they have also proved to be exceptionally challenging on 
the legislative front. The advances experienced by information technology over 
the past four decades have been fraught with as many illuminating successes as 
missteps. The last decade, in particular, has seen the U.S. government come 
under significant and increased scrutiny from the American public, U.S. 
government officials, the global media, and the international community for its 
participation and conduct in cyberspace.61  
There are numerous events that stand as exemplars for this type of 
scrutiny. Atypical events like the Electronic Disobedience Theater (EDT) cyber 
counter-offensive—conducted by the Department of Defense (DOD)—
demonstrated the degree to which the absence of cyberspace policy could lead 
to violations of federal law.62 Criminal prosecutions like those against the founder 
of the Silk Road online anonymous marketplace called into question the extent 
and transparency with which federal agencies could cooperate in criminal 
                                                 
60 See ONLINE DISINHIBITION EFFECT. Jose R. Agustina, “Understanding Cyber 
Victimization: Digital Architectures and the Disinhibition Effect,” International Journal of Cyber 
Criminology 9, no. 1, (January-June, 2015): 42–43, doi: 10.5281/zenodo.22239. Deterrence 
strategies, which rely heavily on rational actors, fail to adequately address non-nation states, 
“lone-wolf” actors, and the emergence of cyber disinhibition. This statement is consistent with the 
scale and scope of cyberspace that allows for high gains at relatively low risks. Cf. supra note 36. 
61 See REACTION. Wikipedia, s.v. “Edward Snowden,” last modified March 6, 2016, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Edward_Snowden. See also “Wyden Slams Latest, Worse Version of 
Cybersecurity Bill,” Ron Wyden press release, December 16, 2015, accessed March 9, 2016, 
https://www.wyden.senate.gov/news/press-releases/wyden-slams-latest-worse-version-of-
cybersecurity-bill. Senator Ron Wyden (D-OR) has been outspoken in his criticism of CISA and 
the government’s approval of, what he calls a “surveillance bill by another name.” 
62 Chris Hables Gray, Cyborg Citizen: Politics in the Posthuman Age (New York: Routledge, 
2002) 42–43. 
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investigations.63 These examples are complemented by watershed events like 
the Edward Snowden media leaks64 and have each called into question whether 
the government’s role in conducting cyberspace operations falls ethically within 
the constraints of its legal framework. 
While cyberspace challenges are admittedly unique, and while there is no 
clear consensus on what the role of government in cyberspace should be, the 
reality is that the threats from cyberspace continue to grow. In the absence of 
radical amendments to the powers of Congress and the president, a response to 
these mounting threats to national security cannot be abdicated and, from an 
authorities standpoint, must be addressed by the federal government as provided 
for in the United States Code.65  
It is the contention of this thesis that since the United States Code was 
designed to provide a framework for federal conduct, embedded title authorities 
can be used in a mutually supportive way to responsibly execute the laws 
governing the functioning of the federal government. Supporting this is a long 
and well-established history of inter-title interactions that are focused on 
advancing the objectives of the United States through mutual cooperation. While 
there are a host of policies and procedures established by each organization to 
operate within their specific charter, the authorities delegated under the U.S.C. 
                                                 
63 See generally United States of America v. Ross William Ulbricht, in Criminal Complaint of 
S.D.C. NY (2015), https://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb/UlbrichtCriminalComplaint.pdf. Ross 
Ulbricht was charged with violations of 18 USC §§ 1030,1956 and 21 USC § 846 based on 
investigations that heavily relied upon cyberspace operations. See generally, id. in Court 
Transcripts of S.D.C. NY (2015), 679–758, https://archive.org/stream/pdfy-6s57o3H70B1vH6bF/ 
253361725-USA-v-Ulbricht-transcript-1-20_djvu.txt. Transcripts show that defense lawyers were 
critical of the means and methods—presently undisclosed to the public—used to identify the 
defendant as the online persona, “Dread Pirate Roberts”. Additionally, there were insinuations 
that this multi-department effort, which included the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), 
Department of Justice (DOJ), and the Department of the Treasury (Treasury), did not possess the 
capacity for such operations and would have been required to receive assistance from 
government agencies whose charter may not have jurisdiction in the realm of domestic criminal 
activity. On May 29, 2015, Ulbricht was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. 
64 See GLOBAL SURVEILLANCE DISCLOSURES. Wikipedia s.v. “Edward Snowden.”  
65 This statement is not intended to diminish nor exclude the powers or authorities of 
individual states—including tribal territories and others—to make provision for the security of their 
territories. 
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are primarily concerned with oversight and compliance requirements and fiscal 
controls to authorize operations by federal (and some state) organizations. As 
such, the creation of a cohesive framework that accounts for these stipulations 
would likely enable the effective consolidation of planning and execution 
requirements. An increased understanding of the operational compatibilities 
would better enable federal and state organizations to adjust, modify, and the 
create policies that are better suited to address their own interests and 
limitations. 
C. THE UNITED STATES CODE 
1. The U.S.C. and Relevant Authorities
For the purposes of supporting the proposed framework of Chapter IV, it is 
essential to introduce the main title authorities that are considered for inter-title 
cooperation. This section is not exhaustive, but provides appropriate boundaries 
for further development in later sections. The seven federal title codes and one 
state statute represent the main thrust for all subsequent inter-title discussions 
and they provide a limited—though substantial—subset of all title authorities 
leveraged by federal entities operating in cyberspace. 
a. Title 6: Domestic Security
Title 6 of the United States Code is responsible for creating the 
Department of Homeland Security and assigning it the primary responsibility for 
preventing, investigating, and prosecuting terrorism within the United States. To 
do this, DHS is additionally tasked with reducing U.S. vulnerability to terrorism, 
which includes minimizing damage from and assisting in recovery efforts for any 
terrorist attacks that do occur.66 Aside from terrorism concerns, it is charged with 
coordinating response efforts for national emergencies. In the course of carrying 
out its duties, it is responsible for ensuring that its efforts do not economically 
impair the United States nor violate the civil rights and civil liberties of U.S. 
66 6 USC § 111 
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citizens. Though it is not specifically charged with heading up counterdrug efforts, 
its focus on counterterrorism makes it responsible for monitoring “connections 
between illegal drug trafficking and terrorism.”67  
b. Title 10: Armed Forces
Title 10 describes the role of U.S. armed forces and provides the legal 
framework for their roles, missions, organizational structure, and the unique laws 
that govern them. Interestingly, most crimes committed by members of the 
United States military are subject to the Uniformed Code of Military Justice where 
commanding officers are given substantial leeway in administering justice and 
the burden of proof is often based on a preponderance of the evidence.68 For 
those concerned that inter-title operations may allow certain organizations to 
operate outside the purview of the U.S. federal court, this is not often an issue as 
the doctrine of dual sovereigns69 provides some allowances for military members 
to be tried under both court systems. Within its legal framework, the title code 
also identifies each component of the armed services and outlines the roles and 
responsibilities of each service—excepting the Coast Guard, who have additional 
statutory functions under 6 USC and 14 USC. Title 10 also contains the 
Insurrection Act, which provides limited authorization for the president to deploy 
members of the armed forces and militia (i.e., the National Guard) to prevent 
revolts that threaten the sovereignty of an individual state or the United States as 
a whole. 
67 Id. at (1)(H) 
68 In the case of a trial by court-martial, the burden of proof is based on evidence that 
establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt pursuant to 10 USC § 851(c). 
69 See generally Adam J. Adler, “Dual Sovereignty, Due Process, and Duplicative 
Punishment: A New Solution to an Old Problem,” The Yale Law Journal 124, no. 2 (November 
2014) http://www.yalelawjournal.org/note/dual-sovereignty-due-process-and-duplicative-
punishment-a-new-solution-to-an-old-problem. See also discussions on court systems, infra at 
Ch. 4 s. (C). See also TABLE 4. INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC COURT SYSTEMS. Infra at 
Ibid. 
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c. Title 14: Coast Guard
The unique nature of the United States Coast Guard (USCG) led to their 
exclusive codification under Title 14. Relevant sections of this code grant broad 
authorities to the Coast Guard that allow them to perform foreign and domestic 
missions with limited authorities from a myriad of other title codes. They a critical 
part of homeland security efforts and are levied with authorities from both 6 USC 
and 14 USC in this role. Generally speaking, the Coast Guard is also a member 
of the armed forces, which justifies their use of 10 USC and 50 USC. They are 
also the enforcement arm for customs and border protection for the waterways 
and approaches to the United States, which necessitates additional authorities 
under 19 USC, 33 USC, 46 USC, and 49 USC. A consolidated list of the 
aforementioned title codes still falls short of complete as the Coast Guard is 
regularly concerned with at least 12 title authorities in the daily execution of their 
duties.  
d. Title 18: Crimes and Criminal Procedure
Title 18 is divided into five major parts. The first is concerned with the 
nature and type of crime that constitutes federal crime. The statutes are wide-
ranging over its more-than 120 chapters, which cover everything from illegal 
hunting to terrorism. The second part outlines criminal procedure, which includes 
relevant sections governing the rights of the accused, arrests, the conduct of 
trials, and the limitations of federal jurisdiction. The remaining three sections 
cover the federal prison system, juvenile affairs, and immunity considerations for 
federal witnesses. Succeeding discussions will primarily concern themselves with 
the first two parts of this specific code. 
e. Title 28: Judiciary and Judicial Procedure
Seeing the need for enforcing federal statutory law and the decisions of 
the court, Title 28 details the organization of the courts and establishes the 
Department of Justice (DOJ). Within the DOJ, there are a number of federal 
enforcement agencies, including the U.S. Marshals and the Federal Bureau of 
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Investigation (FBI). The FBI has been chartered to respond to varying forms of 
cyber-crime as it pertains to federal law and even hosts an updated online listing 
of “Cyber’s Most Wanted” criminals.70 To do this, the FBI primarily uses 
authorities outlined in 18 USC and 28 USC. 
f. Title 32: National Guard
Though the National Guard is a simple concept in theory, it is legislatively 
a more difficult organization to manage and account for. Under 10 USC § 311, it 
is considered the state’s “militia” and its existence fulfills the constitutional 
requirements of the Second Amendment.71 Each state has its own National 
Guard unit, which receives federal funding to retain personnel, and to train and 
equip them in behalf of the security of the state. These personnel can be 
activated along three lines of authority. The first is at the behest of the state 
governor who can call member of the National Guard into a State Active Duty 
(SAD) status. This can be done for various reasons, including disaster relief and 
Homeland Defense, but all activities are subject to state statutes and state 
funding. The second is activation under Full-time National Guard Duty. This 
status covers training, but the governor is also able to use these authorities, 
subject to presidential or Secretary of Defense approval, to use federal funding to 
activate these forces under limited instances under Title 32 authorities.72 It is 
worth noting that in both previous examples, there are statutory exemptions to 
the Posse Comitatus Act73 that are granted for activated forces so long as they 
remain under the control of the state governor. The last example is the activation 
70 See generally “Cyber’s Most Wanted,” Federal Bureau of Investigation, accessed 
February 12, 2016, https://www.fbi.gov/wanted/cyber. 
71 See generally U.S. Constitution, Amend. 2. “A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to 
the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” 
See also 2ND AMENDMENT. Edward F. Cooke, A Detailed Analysis of the Constitution, 7th ed. 
(Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002), 100. The state has the right to maintain an armed 
militia, which is presently fulfilled by the National Guard. 
72 Primarily pursuant to 32 USC §§ 502(f), 901, 902. 
73 For an examination of the Posse Comitatus Act (18 USC § 1385) see infra at Ch. 2 s. 
(C)(4)(c). 
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of the National Guard under Title 10 authorities.74 This active duty status places 
National Guard elements under the control of the Department of Defense in 
support of federal operations. Forces activated placed on active duty are subject 
to restrictions imposed by Posse Comitatus and are able to be deployed to 
foreign theaters with fewer restrictions, but are extremely constrained in their 
domestic employment. Discussions in Chapter III will show that while these same 
forces respond to both state and federal requirements, the title authorities that 
govern them—SAD, 10 USC, and 32 USC—are designed to be mutually 
supportive. 
g. Title 50: War and National Defense
Boasting 43 chapters and complemented by a nigh-as-lengthy appendix, 
Title 50 provides governing legislation for U.S. conduct in times of war and in 
matters pertaining to National Defense. Of the many issues addressed in Title 
50, espionage, national security, emergency powers, nuclear weapons, and 
intelligence activities draw the most attention. More appropriate to current 
discussions, Title 50 legislation is responsible for creating the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA)75 and the National Security Agency (NSA).76 The statutory nature 
of stipulations surrounding foreign intelligence77—to include electronic 
surveillance—is of particular importance when considering the extent to which 
the aforementioned agencies can cooperate with agencies operating under other 
title authorities. 
2. The U.S.C.: Perceptions and Controversy
Sanctioned inter-title cooperation in support of operations—cyberspace or 
otherwise—has tended to converge along the lines of information and 
intelligence. The most dramatic of these convergences stem from the findings of 
74 10 USC §§ 331,332,333,334,12301(d),12302,12304,12406. 
75 50 USC §§ 3035, et seq. 
76 50 USC §§ 3601, et seq. 
77 50 USC §§ 1801, et seq. 
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the 9/11 Commission78 even though inter-title cooperation was by no means a 
novelty prior to the release of the report. Intelligence gathering and information 
sharing have been foundational to every significant government operation in 
recent history and do not appear to fluctuate based on the foreign or domestic 
nature of the threat. Almost as a necessary consequence, the United States has 
become increasingly familiar with inter-title reforms that challenge previously held 
norms in light of new and present contexts. The reason that inter-title reforms 
and inter-title operations appear locked in perpetual contention are many. The 
course of legislation, however, generally conveys a twofold purpose. On the one 
hand, legislation appears to fulfill national desires for effectiveness in responding 
to issues of national security and advancing national interests,79 for example, the 
USA PATRIOT Act.80. On the other hand, it is necessary to assure the American 
people that the tenets of their democratic rule are being equitably preserved 
through the limitation of power, reasonable accountability, and an 
uncompromising adherence to law. The War Powers Resolution of 197381 is one 
of the most recent examples of this—excluding presently the vast quantity of 
Presidential Policy Directives (PPD), Executive Orders (EO), and the like.82 
Whether this balance achieves a reasonable foothold in the past, present, 
or future conduct of our government operations is a tangential matter. It is, 
however, significant in one aspect in that it generates a great deal of controversy 
and skews perceptions with regard to the course and conduct—even the 
78 Thomas H. Kean and Lee Hamilton, Executive Summary of The 9/11 Commission Report: 
Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (Washington DC: GPO, 2004), 10–11. 
Among other things, the Commission found that “management should have ensured that 
information was shared and duties were clearly assigned across agencies, and across the 
foreign-domestic divide.” Ultimately these findings would lead to the creation of the Intelligence 
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004. 
79 See generally, U.S. White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States, 
2002 (Washington DC: White House, 2002). Specifically, the NSS outlines four enduring national 
interests: 1. “The security of the United States, […] allies and partners” 2. [The] U.S. economy.” 3. 
“Universal values.” And 4. International order […] that promotes peace, security, and opportunity.” 
80 Pub. L. 107-56 
81 Pub. L. 93-148 
82 See THE PLACE OF POLICY. Infra at Ch. 3 s. (A)(1). 
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existence—of inter-title operations. Some misinterpretations are simply 
misdiagnoses that stem from confusing policy restrictions, like organizational 
charters or Executive Orders, for the title authorities themselves. For example, it 
is possible—especially in light of the Snowden media leaks—to examine the form 
and function of intelligence organizations and incorrectly assume that the 
restrictions that govern one agency are restrictions that govern all activities under 
Title 50. The NSA, CIA, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and other federal 
organizations have unique capabilities and restrictions that are all leveraged 
under 50 USC to advance national interests. 
Other misapplications stem from miscomprehending the extent of 
capabilities that are available under separate title authorities. This most 
commonly occurs when critics point out that organizations like the armed 
forces—governed by 10 USC—should not be conducting covert activities since 
those are authorized only under Title 50. This stance, however, fails to grasp the 
authorization for the military to conduct intelligence and traditional military 
activities that may be covert in nature. This also ignores cooperative agreements 
like those enabled by EO 12333 that promote full partnerships most prominently 
seen in the unified efforts of the National Security Agency/Central Security 
Service (NSA/CSS). 
Feeding into this misinformation are the myriad of analogies that are 
generally intended to clarify narrow features of inter-title cooperation, but are 
often expanded and misapplied to aspects they were never intended to address. 
The oft-used analogy of numerous “operational hats” is commonly associated 
with compartmentalizing responsibilities in a way that arguably does more to 
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confuse than clarify.83 To begin with, a literal conveyance of the analogy incites 
ridicule for the idea of a single person wearing two hats. The legitimacy 
associated with any resolutions originating from this “dual-hatted” authority can 
easily be preempted with skepticism and distrust, even if there is no indication of 
statutory misconduct. In another sense, it is often used to describe an 
expectation of trust, which anticipates that either one or the other will be used 
and that a combination of the two constitutes a conflict of interest. It is doubtful 
that the “multiple hats” analogy is anything but disruptive understanding the 
control, compliance, and fiscal challenges that need to be addressed in order to 
legitimize inter-title cooperation. As such, parallel lines of authority is a preferred 
idiomatic expression over multiple hats. 
These few examples are by no means exhaustive and so the following 
discussions will attempt to identify some of the more commonly perceived 
“incompatibilities” that shape legal discussions and are often said to preclude 
inter-title cooperation. These perceptions and controversies fall along a number 
of lines, but a quick distillation usually reveals that they are rarely concerned with 
actual matters of law. 
a. Organizational Incompatibilities
Some argue that gross disparities in information handling and methods of 
classification, and divergences in the end-goals of the complex consortium of 
83 See generally National Security Agency, Cryptologic Almanac 50th Anniversary Series: 
The Central Security Service, DOCID: 3575724 (Washington DC: DOD, 2002), 
https://www.nsa.gov/public_info/_files/crypto_almanac_50th/The_CSS.pdf (document was 
sanitized and declassified on June 12, 2009). In response to concerns over the uncertainty of 
President Richard Nixon’s instructions to create a new National Cryptologic Command, then 
Secretary of Defense, Melvin Laird, appointed Vice Admiral Noel Gayler as the chief architect of 
what would be called the Central Security Service (CSS). “The phrase ‘dual-hat’ came to be used 
quite a lot at this time. Admiral Gayler now wore two, director of NSA and chief of the Central 
Security Service.” The phrase “Dual-hatted” or “two hats” is attested to in numerous publications. 
E.g. Laurie A. Mulford, “Let Slip the Dogs of (Cyber) War: Progressing Towards a Warfighting 
U.S. Cyber Command,” (master’s thesis, National Defense University, Joint Forces Staff College, 
2013), 56. See also U.S. CYBER COMMAND. Miranda La Bash and Christopher Landis, “Legal, 
Policy, and Organizational Impediments to the Protection of Critical Infrastructure from Cyber 
Threats,” (master’s thesis, Carnegie Mellon University, 2013), 24. 
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federal agencies and organizations will or should prevent their cooperation.84 
This argument is immediately one that appeals to concerns that are outside the 
scope of this paper. It is true that politics, ambitions, and a host of other factors 
may become destructive forces to effective cooperation, but these organizational 
ambitions are matters of policy85 and do not affect cooperation from a legal 
premise. In this same vein, critics will identify restrictions based on the charter of 
a specific organization and expand those restrictions to every authorized 
operation under that same title. For example, the NSA and CIA have, as their 
principle function, the conduct of foreign intelligence and counterintelligence 
activities86 but in practice, the functions given to each are unique. The CIA has 
extensive authorities and capabilities to conduct intelligence gathering, to 
influence and intervene in global events, and to evaluate and disseminate all-
source intelligence.87 The NSA has a distinctly different charter,88 in which the 
CIA is subordinated to them in regards to Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) and the 
cryptography protecting U.S. communications. Both organizations operate under 
unique charters that comply with statutes governing War and National Defense 
(50 USC). Far from mandating that these agencies operate independent of one 
another, their distinctions from law create dependencies that require cooperation. 
84 See generally Morton H. Halperin, Priscilla Clapp, and Arnold Kanter, “Organizational 
Interests,” in Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, 2nd ed. (Washington D.C.: The Brookings 
Institution, 2006), 25–61. 
85 See generally, Steven Aftergood, “Reducing Overclassification Through Accountability,” 
Federation of American Scientists, Secrecy News Blog, October 6, 2011, http://fas.org/blogs/ 
secrecy/2011/10/brennan_ctr_report. See generally Kenneth Lieberthal, “The U.S. Intelligence 
Community and Foreign Policy: Getting Analysis Right,” The John L. Thornton China Center at 
The Brookings Institute (Washington DC: Brookings Institute, 2009), http://www.brookings.edu/~/ 
media/research/files/papers/2009/9/intelligence-community-lieberthal/09_intelligence_community 
_lieberthal.pdf. 
86 EO 12333 s. 1.7 
87 Morton H. Halperin et al, “Organizational Interests,” 34–35. 
88 See SUMMARY. U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service (CRS), P.L. 
110-55, the Protect America Act of 2007: Modifications to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Act, by Elizabeth B. Bazan, RL34143 (2007), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/ RL34143.pdf. 
Domestic wiretaps authorized under FISA are still for the expressed purpose of obtaining 
information pertaining to foreign intelligence. 
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b. Transparent versus Covert
Others contend that an increase in authorities will necessarily make 
certain overt actions covert and vice versa. This may require members of the 
U.S. military, who are uniformed and traditionally seen as the embodiment of 
overt action, to be “forced” into roles where they are conducting clandestine 
operations. Andru Wall, former legal advisor to U.S. Special Operations 
Command, incisively points out that an unacknowledged contributor is “the belief 
that intelligence operatives live in a dark and shadowy world, while military forces 
are the proverbial knights on white horses.”89 As with previously vetted concerns 
of organizational incompatibility, this is a matter of policy and preference that fails 
to affect legal conclusions. The legal authorities granted to the military are 
capable of equally supporting both overt and clandestine operations. The extent 
to which this complies with international law, while a legitimate concern, fails to 
fall within the boundaries of concern as they pertain to title authorities. 
Furthermore, the checks and balances that govern international law do not 
necessarily apply to the federal system of the United States except in instances 
where the government has chosen to subordinate domestic law. The extent to 
which broad subordination of federal law can be achieved under current 
international statutes can is a matter of ongoing debate.90 
This is not to say that international law is ungermane to the discussion. 
Specifically, with respect to Title 10, it can potentially impose another layer of 
legal requirements that alter cyberspace behavior and add concerns that are not 
89 See generally Andru E. Wall, “Demystifying the Title 10-Title 50 Debate: Distinguishing 
Military Operations, Intelligence Activities & Covert Action,” Harvard National Security Journal 85 
(2011): 88, http://harvardnsj.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Vol-3-Wall.pdf. “The U.S. military 
consistently ranks at the apex of most-trusted institutions in the United States. This trust is critical 
to America's all-volunteer military and some even suggest the trust disparity between Congress 
and the military is one reason why Congress is loath to publicly attack military policies. David Hill, 
“Respect for Military Surges,” The Hill (July 18, 2006), http://thehill.com/opinion/columnists/david-
hill/8251-respect-for-military-surges. A 2009 Gallop poll found 82% of Americans have a "great 
deal" or "quite a lot" of respect for the U.S. military, versus only 17% who felt the same way about 
Congress. Lydia Saad, Congress Ranks Last in Confidence in Institutions, GALLOP (July 22, 
2010), http://www.gallup.com/poll/141512/congress-ranks-last-confidence-institutions.aspx.” 
90 Glennon, supra note 21. 
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purely determined by national interests. Arguments stemming from this 
perspective tend to form the rationale that seeks to exclude Title 10 activities 
from all others on grounds that the domestic codifications governing the armed 
services are seen as entirely subordinated to international laws regulating 
conflict. This assertion is entirely hyperbole when taken at face value and is 
excluded under most cursory examinations. 
For example, the parceling of forces and authorities through domestic 
legislation is hardly under the purview of international law, not to mention the fact 
that many countries, as a norm, lack significant distinctions between forces used 
for domestic enforcement and those used for waging or responding to war. This 
and other incorrect assumptions regarding covert and overt activity are founded 
on ill-defined policies and a misconflation of U.S. and international laws that 
govern military responsibilities in conflict. 
In those disputes that point to nebulous policy frameworks, it is first 
important to recognize that the military is not restricted from engaging in 
clandestine and other intelligence related activities as a subset of their traditional 
military authorities granted through Title 10.91 Furthermore, their cooperation with 
other clandestine agencies and participation in covert activities—most notably 
authorized under 50 USC—does not place them outside the purview of legislated 
oversight bodies. Though it may induce uneasiness to the lay observer, there are 
considerable legislative frameworks and oversight committees that are equipped 
and adequate for determining which authorities have been leveraged in a given 
operation. More simply put, similar activities with similar effects can be 
authorized through numerous and different title authorities. In many cases, there 
is no need to need to restrict certain activity types to the confines of a single 
code. 
91 See THE LAW PERMITS WHILE CONGRESS ATTEMPTS TO RESTRICT. Wall, 92–108. 
“A careful analysis of the law and related legislative history shows how the law permits much of 
what Congress attempts to restrict with its stovepiped approach to oversight of the military and 
intelligence community.” See also OVERSIGHT & COMPLIANCE. Infra at Ch. 4 s. (A). 
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Intelligence has frequently been at the center of these heated inter-title 
discussions. In 1991, the U.S. House of Representatives published a conference 
report on intelligence activities92 addressing dilemmas that are common to inter-
title cyberspace operations. As such, it is necessary to understand legal 
corollaries where cyberspace and intelligence activities share distinctions—
namely covert action versus traditional military action. It is equally important to 
recognize that the perpetual struggles for power between executive and 
legislative authorities have led to considerable distrust between the two. The 
report illustrates this by noting the disagreement between executive and 
congressional leaders with regard to the restrictions imposed by reporting 
requirements associated with the carrying out of covert action. Regarding this 
disagreement, President George H.W. Bush wrote 
I am aware of your concerns regarding the provision of notice to 
Congress of covert action and the December 17, 1986 opinion of 
the Office of Legal Counsel of the Department of Justice, with 
which you strongly disagree primarily because of the statement that 
‘a number of factors combine to support the conclusion that the 
'timely notice' language should be read to leave the President with 
virtually unfettered discretion to choose the right moment for 
making the required notification.93 
The disagreements regarding congressional authority in the area of covert 
action have become only more contentious in light of 21st century operations. 
Congress has more recently alleged that the president will redefine “covert 
92 U.S. Congress, House, Conference Report On the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 1991, 102nd Cong., 1st sess., 1991, H. Rep. 102-166,  http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/ 
sites/default/files/publications/102166.pdf. 
93 Id. at 27. 
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action” as “traditional military action” in order to avoid congressional oversight.94 
This alleged circumvention is addressed later,95 but for present discussions, 
these concerns do not adequately account for the numerous examples where 
military intelligence activities—as authorized by Title 10—are nearly identical to 
intelligence activities governed by Title 50. 
Even though these concerns have a legal aspect to them, it is unlikely that 
they are explicitly restricted by the framework of the United States Code. Instead, 
potential clashes along these lines generally constitute perpetual disagreement 
over definitions and categories of actions that characterize legislative and 
executive interactions—often as merely a matter of principle. 
c. International versus Domestic
Other lines of contention are often the result of an error in how key 
aspects of international and domestic law are understood. These disputes 
converge upon seemingly foundational mandates that are nearly impossible to 
account for in cyberspace and are therefore, by default, presumed to be unlawful. 
To begin with, these arguments generally exist beyond the inter-title concerns of 
the United States Code and instead are derived from jus in bello and jus ad bello 
laws governing international conflict.96 A prominent example of this centers on 
those Geneva Conventions requiring military service members to wear distinctive 
94 See generally U.S. Congress, House, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 
Report to Accompany H.R. 2701, ‘The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010,’ 111th 
Cong., 1st sess., 2009, H. Rep. 111-186, at 48–49, https://www.congress.gov/111/crpt/hrpt186/ 
CRPT-111hrpt186.pdf. The committee noted that executive agents would categorize clandestine 
operations as “Operational Preparation of the Environment” (OPE) in order to distinguish them as 
“traditional military activity.” They further note that “overuse of this term has made the distinction 
all but meaningless” and that “there are no clear guidelines or principles for making consistent 
determinations.” They substantiate this claim by advancing comments from the Director of 
National Intelligence (DNI) who “himself has acknowledged that there is no bright line between 
traditional intelligence missions carried out by the military and the operations of the CIA.” 
95 See INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. Infra at Ch. 3 s. (A)(2)(e). 
96 See CYBER OPERATIONS. Office of General Council, “Law of War Manual,” U.S. 
Department of Defense (Washington DC: DOD, June, 2015): 994–1009, 
http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/ Law-of-War-Manual-June-2015.pdf. 
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identifiers when engaged in conflict.97 Upon initial examination, an indiscriminate 
application of this mandate mistakenly overlooks the fact that these laws are 
primarily derived from international humanitarian concerns98—a subject for which 
there is little consensus with regard to cyberspace.99 In the second place, a 
general survey of its application by the United States in the physical domains will 
reveal that military members are authorized by the U.S.C. to conduct overt 
offensive operations and to gather intelligence covertly in support of military 
operations, the latter of which may be done without the need for a uniform. In 
fact, the president and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, who is the 
ultimate authority in these operations, is not required to don a uniform even 
though he can potentially be detained and prosecuted under international laws 
governing war.100 Far from insinuating that international laws are malleable and 
                                                 
97 See generally Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and 
Relative to the General Protection Against Effects of Hostilities, June 8, 1977, art. 48, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 3. 
98 Ibid. Article 48 specifically notes that the purpose of distinctive identifiers is for the 
protection of the civilian population and civilian objects. 
99 See TALLINN 2.0. “Research,” Cooperative Cyber Defence Center of Excellence 
(CCDCOE), North Atlantic Treaty Organization, accessed March 15, 2016, 
https://ccdcoe.org/research.html. The Tallinn Manual 2.0 has an expected publishing date in 2016 
is purported to provide a more adequate examination of “the international legal framework that 
applies to […] cyber operations. The relevant legal regimes include the law of state responsibility, 
the law of the sea, international telecommunications law, space law, diplomatic and consular law, 
and, with respect to individuals, human rights law. Tallinn 2.0 also explores how the general 
principles of international law, such as sovereignty, jurisdiction, due diligence and the prohibition 
of intervention, apply in the cyber context.” 
100 See generally Toni Pfanner, “Military Uniforms and the Rule of Law,” International Review 
of the Red Cross 86, no. 853 (March 2004): 99–110, https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/ 
irrc_853_pfanner.pdf. Geneva Conventions and corresponding uniform regulations for most 
nation states indicate that the law desired to distinguish lawful targets from unlawful targets. 
Specifically, Article 48 of Additional Protocol I states that “in order to ensure respect for and 
protection of the civilian population and civilian objects, the Parties to a conflict are required at all 
times to distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects 
and military objectives and accordingly must conduct their operations only against military 
objectives.” Cf. Karl Rauscher, “It’s Time to Write the Rules of Cyberwar: The world needs a 
Geneva Convention for Cybercombat,” IEEE Spectrum, November 27, 2013 
http://spectrum.ieee.org/telecom/security/its-time-to-write-the-rules-of-cyberwar. See also 
INTRODUCTION. Gary D. Solis, “Cyber Warfare,” Military Law Review 219 (Spring 2014): 1–3, 
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/Military_Law_Review/pdf-files/219-spring-2014.pdf. The 
word “cyber” is not found in the Geneva Conventions and it is doubtful whether those resolutions 
are able to envision the three layers of cyberspace that are susceptible to conflict. It is additionally 
unlikely that it can, in its current form, address the implausibility of effectively conducting warfare 
over and against Information Technology. 
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amorphous, this illustrates a more salient point. The lex lata of cyberspace is 
highly dependent on the extent to which established norms can be adapted to the 
actions and arena of cyberspace. As noted previously, however, there is 
enormous disagreement as to whether cyberspace activity—in part or whole—
possesses adequate real-world referents. This is just one example, but there are 
several alleged mandates for which it is difficult to find a cyber-equivalent. 
The first major comprehensive attempt to adapt norms from physical 
space into cyberspace came with the release of the Tallinn Manual.101 As a 
NATO initiative, it has attempted—mostly unsuccessfully102—to establish norms 
and garner international consensus for cyberspace operations as they pertain to 
international law. In light of its limited acceptance, it should come as no surprise 
that most of its critics assert that it is broadly inadequate for generating standards 
that nation states can practically apply.103 
There is undoubtedly significant progress being made in this area,104 but 
even with these discussions present, the argument a fortiori is found in the fact 
that actions conducted in war are not the exclusive concern of those authorities 
delegated by 10 USC. Conversely, not all actions conducted under 10 USC are 
                                                 
101 Michael N. Schmitt, ed., Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber 
Warfare (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013). 
102 CCDCOE, supra note 99. In contrast to the original Tallinn manual, which merely 
addresses the infrequent cyberspace actions that rise to the level of armed attack, Tallinn 2.0 
purports to address the significantly more common “malevolent cyber operations that do not rise 
to the aforementioned levels.” 
103 See generally Noah Simmons, “A Brave New World: Applying International Law of War to 
Cyber-Attacks,” Journal of Law & Cyber Warfare 4, no. 1 (Winter 2014): 63–65. See also CYBER 
ATTACKS AND NON-STATE ACTORS. Solis, 19–22. 
104 See generally United Nations, Developments in the Field of Information and 
Telecommunications in the Context of International Security Resolution, June 26, 2015, A/70/172, 
accessed March 9, 2016, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/70/172. This 
resolution establishes broad norms in the “field of information and telecommunications in the 
context of international security.” 
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necessarily actions of war.105 In simplest terms, the sections of USC 10 that are 
concerned with international law are just a small subset of everything addressed 
in that title code. The scope of what the president can do under Title 10 is 
broader than the concerns of international law and, in many cases, does not 
require the patronage of the international community.106 From the perspective of 
the international community, international law governs actions under a 
jurisprudence that does not concern itself with whether domestically implemented 
legal frameworks were correctly utilized for a given action. From the perspective 
of the United States, any U.S. action that is subordinated to international law 
must be intra legem, irrespective of which title authority is responsible for the 
action.107 
                                                 
105 See generally Wall, 119. The “distinction between merely altering computer code without 
asserting control or degrading function and actually assuming control or degrading functions is 
consistent with international law, which does not generally consider intelligence activities to be 
acts of war.” See also SHAPE (PHASE 0) and DETER (PHASE 1). Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, Joint Operational Planning, Joint Publication 5-0, Washington DC: CJCS, August 11, 
2011: III-42. Phases 0 and 1 of the Joint Operational Phasing Model are planned and carried out 
by uniformed member of the armed forces, yet they hardly qualify as acts that reach the threshold 
of war. 
106 See generally Dambisa Moyo and Niall Ferguson, Dead Aid: Why Aid Is Not Working and 
How There Is a Better Way for Africa (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2009), 29–47. See 
also Oliver Cunningham, “The Humanitarian Aid Regime in the Republic of NGOs: The Fallacy of 
‘Building Back Better,” Josef Korbel Journal of Advanced International Studies 4 (Summer 2012): 
101–26. Some more notable examples include the limited role of the UN in mandating or 
restricting military participation in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. Although the UN is 
assigned the lead role in responding to international disasters, it relies entirely off of contributions 
in terms of finances and personnel.  
107 This viewpoint prefers a dualist approach to law. Even within this dualist framework, 
however, there is a de facto compliance that favors monism. This is most evident through the 
subordination of state actions to international law when it is recognized that they affect the 
international community. 
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d. Capability and Tyranny 
Other voices raise concerns that increasing government capability in 
cyberspace would potentially legitimize the growing “surveillance culture”108 and 
possibly lead to gross violations of constitutional rights like freedom of speech, 
personal privacy, and unlawful searches and seizures.109 This too, while 
masquerading as a legal pitfall, is already addressed by current legislation. 
Operating appropriately under the current restrictions and allowances outlined in 
the United States Code will necessitate that operators adhere to all necessary 
controls—to include rules governing search and seizure, privacy, evidence, and 
other statutory procedure. In addition, it is important here to clarify that an 
increase in capability does not equate to a reduction in oversight. Most of the 
parent organizations previously identified have a long history of cooperation 
centered on supporting a variety of National Security objectives.110 The idea that 
an increase in capability has led to widespread and accepted practices of 
                                                 
108 See generally Tim Jordan, Cyberpower: The Culture and Politics of Cyberspace and the 
Internet (New York: Rutledge, 1999), 203–205. See also Bruce Schneier, “The Public-Private 
Surveillance Partnership,” Bloomberg Businessweek, July 31, 2013 
http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2013-07-31/the-public-private-surveillance-partnership. 
See also Ana Marie Cox, “Who Should We Fear More with Our Data: The Government or 
Companies?” Guardian, January 20, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/ 
jan/20/obama-nsa-reform-companies-spying-data. Concerns over surveillance and what 
constitutes surveillance as it applies to privacy laws has arguably emerged as the primary 
concern of the U.S. populace in terms of their participation and involvement in cyberspace. 
109 See generally Lizzy Finnegan, “CISA and The War on Privacy,” Breitbart, November 10, 
2015, http://www.breitbart.com/tech/2015/11/10/cisa-and-the-war-on-privacy. See also Dominic 
Basulto, “We've Outgrown the Traditional Notions of Privacy,” Washington Post, February 12, 
2015 http://www.realcleartechnology.com/2015/02/12/we039ve_outgrown_the_traditional_notions 
_of_privacy_25650.html. 
110 See EXAMPLES OF INTER-TITLE COOPERATION. Infra at Ch. 3 s. (A)(2). 
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neglecting constitutional rights does not have any enduring legitimacy in fact.111 
This refutation is obvious in numerous historical examples where significant 
leaps in capability—notably automatic weapons, precision munitions, air power, 
cyberspace, nuclear weapons, and space technology—were integrated into 
government operations without corresponding breaches of constitutional law.112 
There have undeniably been government activities that have violated law and 
overstepped authorities, but the burden of proof rests with the critics who must 
                                                 
111 See APPENDIX. Lisa O. Monaco, “Re: to Department of Justice of Office of Inspector 
General’s (OIG) A Review of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Activities Under Section 702 of 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 2008,” message to Michael E. Horowitz, Inspector 
General of the U.S. Department of Justice, August, 24 2012, in A Review of the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation’s Activities Under Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 
2008, Office of the Inspector General (Washington DC: DOJ, September 2012), 
https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2015/ o1501.pdf (document was sanitized and declassified on 
January 9, 2015). The National Security Division (NSD) found that the IG’s findings supported 
that the FBI had “implemented it [FISA] targeting procedures with commendable deliberation, 
thoroughness, and professionalism.” But see generally “In Re Production of Tangible Things 
[Redacted],” BR 08-13 (FISC, March 2, 2009), http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/0328/039.%20 
A4000915%20%20BR%2008-13%20%20Order%20(3-2-09)%20Redacted%2020140327.pdf 
(document was sanitized and declassified on March 28, 2014). Based upon the preponderance of 
noncompliance, a judge ordered the NSA to seek FISC approval of the court in each instance 
where they required queries against telephone metadata. See generally Trevor Timm, “Wall 
Street Journal Columnist Repeatedly Gets His Facts Wrong About NSA Surveillance,” Electronic 
Frontier Foundation, November 27, 2013, https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/11/wall-street-
journal-columnist-gordon-crovitz-repeatedly-gets-his-facts-wrong-about. Critics who point out that 
IG findings indicate “systemic” violations of FISA by the FBI and NSA will find it difficult to prove 
that those violations were committed for reasons other than the complexity associated with 
understanding and applying it. Most violations were linked to inadequate training or negligence 
due to misinterpretations. The FISC ruling to restrict NSA collection addressed this same issue. 
While negligence presents legal dilemmas, these acts hardly qualify as sinister or malicious and 
were never apparently deemed to be criminal in nature. Subsequent reports show that 
improvements to training and greater oversight led to marked improvements in legal compliance. 
Had corrupt practices been a systemic norm, it is doubtful that the leaked (now declassified) IG 
reports would have annotated such concern for statutory compliance. Cf. NSA Director of Civil 
Liberties and Privacy Office, NSA's Implementation of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
Section 702, (Washington DC: DOD, 2014), http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/0421/702 
Unclassified%20Document.pdf. 
112 With due regard to the Snowden media leaks, it remains questionable as to whether the 
NSA was ever doing anything that constituted a violation of constitutional rights. Cf. “Remarks By 
the President in a Press Conference,” U.S. Office of the Press Secretary press release, August 9, 
2013, accessed March 9, 2016, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/08/09/ 
remarks-president-press-conference. In addressing the Snowden leaks publicly, the president 
focused on changes that align with American values and not apparently to correct behavior in 
response to illegal activity. But see generally Edward Snowden, “Open Letter to the Brazilian 
People,” Folha de S Paulo, December 17, 2013, reprinted in The Guardian, December 17, 2013, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/17/edward-snowden-letter-brazilian-people. In an 
open letter to the global community, Snowden bemoaned the surveillance capabilities of the 
United States—as opposed to giving concrete examples of violations—which he apparently 
viewed as the primary indictment against the U.S. intelligence community. 
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prove a link to systemic norms of ignoring laws governing oversight and 
compliance.113 Therefore, it is assumed that frameworks for oversight and 
compliance are sufficient for each title authority, as determined by congressional 
legislators. If these frameworks are sufficient, then the integrity of the operation 
will not be diminished as additional authorities are added so long as compliance 
requirements are adhered to. To strengthen the argument further, an increase in 
cooperation between title authorities should incorporate additional bodies of 
oversight and lead to an increased ability to identify missteps, mishaps, and 
violations.  
e. Industry Is Better Suited 
Far from a legal concern, this controversy seeks to make moot, in its 
entirety, any argument for federal presence—inter-title or otherwise—in 
cyberspace. Concerns over trustworthiness and efficiency tend to anchor these 
arguments that propose an industry-first solution to cyberspace operations. In 
many ways, this is a false dilemma posed by those who see the presence of 
government as an “all-or-nothing” decision. To no surprise, industry is not 
excluded from providing assistance that positively affects national security and 
bolsters law-enforcement efforts. The extreme suggestion, however, that the 
government has no place in cyberspace whatsoever is hardly a palatable 
solution. Establishing and enforcing laws governing appropriate behavior, 
identifying and protecting natural rights, and providing for the defense of the 
nation is the exclusive responsibility of government. To suggest a deviation from 
oversight standards in the singular area of cyberspace—which cannot be 
reasonably isolated from critical areas of federal responsibility—is inconsistent 
with established norms. To further suggest that industry should be fully vested 
                                                 
113 To the contrary, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) implemented 
transparency measures in 2014 to address civil liberty concerns. ODNI regularly consolidates and 
released sanitized and declassified material to the public via its website. Cf. “IC on the Record,” 
Office of the Director of National Intelligence, accessed March 9, 2016, 
http://icontherecord.tumblr.com/search/IG+report. Creating an effective link between the 
government and systemic corruption under current oversight measures is untenable—barring the 
unlikelihood of a mass cover-up across every branch and at almost every level of government. 
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with this responsibility seems remarkably inconsistent with federal mandates. 
Additionally, the shift of national defense responsibilities to the corporate sector 
seems largely incompatible with the form and function of corporations. 
Government organizations operating in cyberspace are presumably doing 
so under legislation that is clearly tied to those constitutional rights granted to 
each citizen. The corporate goals that govern industry, however, are not required 
to align with the U.S. Constitution and are most likely tied to the fiduciary 
responsibility they have to their stockholders. If the Snowden revelations were to 
be used to cast the government in a positive light, they would show, at the very 
least, that the federal government struggles to keep secrets from U.S. citizens 
and foreign governments alike. Though certainly an arguable position in terms of 
transparency and trustworthiness, U.S. industry would struggle to mount a 
convincing argument demonstrating a record with consistently upstanding ethics 
and unblemished conduct. 
As to the advantage held by industry over government in terms of 
efficiency, a favorable determination is not awarded to the party that is most 
efficient. Even if industry were able to perform more efficiently and with better 
results, this does not make a less efficient government solution unreasonable. 
The leading branches of the government should strive to be efficient because it 
makes fiscal sense and is most often in the best interest of the nation, but their 
considerations for law and the lengthy legislative processes that accompany it 
are not grounds to disqualify them from providing services that fall under the 
patronage of the national interest. 
3. The U.S.C. and Relevant Agencies 
One of the additional tasks necessary for recommending a framework for 
inter-title cooperation in cyberspace is gaining a reasonable understanding of the 
major federal organizations operating there. An exhaustive list is unnecessary 
because it detracts from the main effort, which is to create a framework into 
which these organizations can be incorporated in order to effectively plan and 
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conduct cyberspace operations. Indeed, incorporating too many groups into the 
scenarios of Chapter V will make an overwhelming chore out of accounting for 
how each organization will contribute to the overall operation. Attempting to 
prioritize a long list of organizational capabilities and goals within the minutia of 
complex operations is something better left to a staff that is equipped to support 
that depth of analysis. For the purposes of these scenarios, simplicity will allow 
for greater focus on how cooperation can be enabled in an environment where 
the overlap between the broader goals of each organization must be assumed. 
On the other hand, enumerating too few of these cyberspace actors has a near 
opposite effect in that it can fail to adequately equip planners to understand what 
is possible under the current legal framework. The ultimate goal is to enjoin 
planners to a framework that allows them to understand and plan for inter-title 
operations. It is not intended to merely establish two cases of inter-title 
cooperation that can then be added to their playbook. 
Concededly, there is considerable variability to constructing an 
appropriately representative cross-section of federal actors operating in 
cyberspace. The list that follows in this section is inadequate but deemed to be 
reasonable for the purpose of the framework and scenarios. Most of the 
organizations were chosen because they have been at the center of many 
perceived or actual controversies. Others were selected because their influence, 
while possibly less known, is undisputed as it relates to their place in the current 
U.S. cyber strategy.114 
The Department of Homeland Security is arguably one of the most 
prominent centerpieces in these discussions. Concerns for homeland security 
                                                 
114 See generally U.S. White House, National Strategy for Information Sharing and 
Safeguarding (Washington DC: White House, 2012), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/ 
files/docs/2012sharingstrategy_1.pdf. See also id., The National Security Strategy of the United 
States, 2015 (Washington DC: White House, 2015). See also U.S. Library of Congress, 
Congressional Research Service, Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative: Legal 
Authorities and Policy Considerations, by John Rollins and Anna C. Henning, R40427 (2009), 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/ R40427.pdf. See also “Cybersecurity in Congressional 
Research Service Reports,” Bureau of Justice Assistance, accessed March 10, 2016, 
https://it.ojp.gov/PrivacyLiberty/reports/service/ 2336. 
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are nearly inseparable from U.S. government ambitions in cyberspace. In order 
to provide an adequate response to these security concerns, DHS operates the 
National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC),115 
which is composed of numerous teams116 under authorities that are primarily 
delineated in Title 6. Another equally dominant figure that looms large in policy 
debates is USCYBERCOM’s Cyber Mission Force (CMF), which operates 
primarily under 10 USC, and occupies a place that is just as prominent in terms 
of national security. In addition to the title authorities governing their military 
operations, they are also influenced by a myriad of codes and corresponding 
sections as they pertain to support to homeland security, intelligence activities, 
law enforcement, and National Guard units, the latter of which is addressed by 
32 USC. 
The FBI and their cyber-crime unit operate under 18 USC and 28 USC—
among others—while the CIA and NSA cyber teams operate almost exclusively 
under 50 USC. Significantly less is known about the planned makeup of the 
cyber cadre, which is still under development by the USCG and the authorities 
granted to them by 14 USC. They are among the most unique cyberspace 
operators since their charge over the approaches to the United States and its 
littorals gives them aspects of both military authorities and law enforcement 
capability.117 Each of these organizations will be expanded upon, and some of 
them will be incorporated into the following chapter containing the scenarios. 
                                                 
115 Established pursuant to 6 USC § 148. 
116 See NCCIC MISSION. “National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center,” 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, accessed March 10, 2016, https://www.us-cert.gov/nccic. 
The three primary operational teams are the United States Computer Emergency Readiness 
Team (US-CERT), the Industrial Control Systems Emergency Readiness Team (ICS-CERT), and 
the National Coordinating Center for Communications (NCC). 
117 See STRATEGIC PRIORITY: ENABLING OPERATIONS. Commandant of the U.S. 
Coast Guard, United States Coast Guard Cyber Strategy, 27–29. Although no formalized 
organization chart for the USCG cyber cadre has been publicly disseminated, the strategy calls 
for the “[development of] a career path for Coast Guard cyberspace operations personnel to 
include recruitment, training, and retention, to create a professional cadre with specialized skills in 
cybersecurity, cyber intelligence, cyber law enforcement missions, cyber support to critical 
infrastructure, and cyber [effects] operations.” Note: “cyber effects” include offensive capabilities. 
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There are other notable operators like the State Department’s Office of the 
Coordinator for Cyber Issues (S/CCI), which represents the third pillar of U.S. 
National Security under 22 USC.118 The United States Secret Service, 
transferred to DHS from the Treasury in 2003, has long been responsible for an 
amalgam of cyber operations that are critical to national security. These will not 
be discussed because, in the latter case, its functions are mostly accounted for 
by the other organizations, and in the former case, its current operational 
significance makes it a crucial yet mostly peripheral partner in the realm of 
cyberspace. 
a. USCYBERCOM (10 USC & 32 USC) 
Cyber Mission Force: Outlined in The DOD Cyber Strategy,119 the Cyber 
Mission Force is composed of three major operational elements that are 
bolstered by a variety of support elements. They include the National Mission 
Forces, Cyber Protection Forces, and the Combat Missions Forces. 
National Mission Forces: Projected to comprise 13 National Mission 
Teams (NMT), the National Mission Forces are organized with a primary focus 
on defending the United States, its allies, and their interests against 
“cyberattacks of significant consequence.”120 There is not a great deal of 
amplifying information on the specific roles or support structures, but one unique 
aspect to this operational unit is their goal to “train and partner with key 
interagency organizations”121 in support of their mission. Specifically, the DOD 
Cyber strategy identifies cooperative efforts that integrate capabilities between 
                                                 
118 See generally Ashley S. Boyle, Fact Sheet: U.S.C. Title 10, Title 22, and Title 50, 
American Security Project (Washington DC: American Security Project, 2012): 1, 
http://www.americansecurityproject.org/ASP%20Reports/Ref%200073%20-%20U.S.C.%20Title 
10%2C%20Title%2022%2C%20and%20Title%2050.pdf. “Title 10, Title 22, and Title 50 of the 
United States Code (U.S.C.) comprise the legislative foundation of US National Security and its 
related agents. These pieces of legislation describe, structure, and constrain the operation of the 
country’s national security agencies. They are also complex legislative structures.” 
119 DOD, supra note 46. 
120 See generally id. at 24–25. 
121 Ibid. 
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government components like the “FBI, CIA, [and] DHS”122 among other 
agencies. One of the main emphases of these integrated teams is to extend the 
range of options available to the president in the case of cyberattacks that place 
the United States at significant risk. Though no details are provided as to how 
these relationships are enabled, it is obvious that the regular functioning of these 
teams envisions inter-title cooperation as a foundational element. 
Cyber Protection Forces: The Cyber Protection Forces comprises 68 
projected Cyber Protection Teams (CPT). They are assigned the primary task of 
finding and disrupting cyberspace threats that extend into traditional cyberspace 
terrain, but includes critical threat networks that are distinct to weapons and 
space systems. These teams are not the primary defense but are designed as an 
augmentation force to defend “priority DOD networks.” These forces appear to be 
the primary point of integration for Title 32 authorities. Public statements released 
by the National Guard indicate a growing effort to establish title-32 capable 
teams throughout the United States.123 One of their major goals is to position 
cyber protection units so that they can adequately respond to emergencies within 
each of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) response 
regions.124 Under authorities present in 32 USC, it appears that cyber 
capabilities will soon be subject to State Active Duty laws and made available to 
governors responsible for state security. This effort requires a tremendous 
amount of coordination in terms of infrastructure, training, manning, and 
munitions. One of the major initial challenges to this inter-title cooperation is that, 
to some degree, the capabilities and limitations of these teams must be 
understood by a competent authority within each state governor’s office. 
                                                 
122 Ibid. 
123 Jon Soucy, “Guard Set To Activate Additional Cyber Units,” National Guard Bureau, 
December 9, 2015, http://www.nationalguard.mil/News/ArticleView/tabid/5563/Article/633547/ 
guard-set-to-activate-additional-cyber-units.aspx. 
124 See generally “FEMA Regional Offices,” Federal Emergency Management Agency, 
accessed March 10, 2016, https://emilms.fema.gov/IS800B/lesson4/NRF0104190t.htm.FEMA 
identifies 10 response regions where offices provide “an interagency facility staffed by Emergency 
Support Functions in anticipation of a serious incident in the region or immediately following an 
incident.” 
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Combat Mission Forces: Combat Mission Teams (CMT) are expected to 
total 27 teams distributed to provide cyberspace support to Combatant 
Commanders (COCOM). These forces are generally seen as the answer to 
expectations for a traditional military response in cyberspace. As discussed 
previously, the traditional distinctions from physical conflict do not easily translate 
to a cyberspace response. CMT support to combatant commands generates a 
myriad of questions for which there is no clear answer—foremost among them is 
how geographically constrained military commanders can effectively respond in a 
domain that is often described as “borderless.”125 Regardless, these teams are 
designed to integrate cyberspace effects in support of theater operational 
planning. 
b. FBI (18 USC and 28 USC) 
Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section (CCIPS): As an 
agency under the Department of Justice, the FBI has primary responsibility for 
investigations and intelligence gathering within domestic jurisdictions. This tends 
to be a major source of consternation as it relates to their involvement in inter-
title operations. One traditional perception is that organizations under other 
departments—most notably the DOD and DOS—are less concerned with 
constitutional integrity since it often provides only an auxiliary concern to the 
international focus that primarily characterizes their operational planning and 
execution. While this is likely true for operations preceding the 9/11 attacks, the 
prevalence of counterterrorism and its associated conflict irregularities have led 
to sweeping reforms in training across every department. The result has been a 
broadening of operational considerations under a variety of legal frameworks that 
address domestic vice purely foreign concerns. 
                                                 
125 See CRITICISMS BASED ON A LACK OF BOUNDARIES IN CYBERSPACE. Philip 
Adam Davis, “The Defamation of Choice-of-Law in Cyberspace: Countering the View that the 
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws is Inadequate to Navigate the Borderless Reaches of 
the Intangible Frontier,” Federal Communications Law Journal 54, no. 2 (March 2002): 350–56, 
http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1299&context=fclj. 
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It is not surprising, therefore, that the FBI has become an indispensable 
asset to operations whose successes are dependent on correctly addressing 
significant domestic aspects. The FBI is intimately aware of the domestic 
thresholds for gathering evidence as well as restrictions as they pertain to 
domestic intelligence gathering. Many shudder at the thought of intelligence 
efforts in a domestic setting, but this is no different from police surveillance and 
requires justification through appropriate legal avenues. The FBI does not have a 
free pass to skirt domestic protections and it too must meet FISA requirements 
for investigations in the same way as every other intelligence agency. The 
CCIPS is subject to executive guidelines as typically provided for by the Attorney 
General. Its agents are critical to inter-title operations since their experience with 
cybercrime give them an intimate familiarity with operations as they pertain to 
privacy concerns and considerations of search and seizure.126 Federal law gives 
the FBI authority to investigate federal crimes that are not exclusively assigned to 
another federal agency.127 
c. CIA and NSA (50 USC) 
The CIA remains one of the most controversial agencies under executive 
control. This sentiment usually corresponds to the reputation they gained in the 
1960s and 1970s when they were linked to ill-fated attempts to overthrow the 
Cuban government through failed assassination attempts and the infamous Bay 
of Pigs incident.128 Their assistance to Chilean insurgents, revelations about the 
MKUltra program, and growing unease of the legality of their activities led to a 
severe curtailing of their authorities in the 1970s. As later discussions will 
address, much of the current Title 50 legislation dealing with oversight controls 
stems from domestic behavior associated with executive powers from the 
                                                 
126 National Cyber Investigative Task Force, supra note 45. 
127 28 USC § 533 
128 See generally “Bay of Pigs Release,” Office of the Chief Information Officer's Information 
Management Services, last modified August 2, 2011, http://www.foia.cia.gov/collection/bay-pigs-
release. Consolidated reports detail Foreign Policy objectives and the development of anti-Castro 
Policies under executive oversight. 
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presidential administrations of John F. Kennedy through Richard Nixon. These 
powers were dramatically curtailed by the 1980s, though this did not move them 
beyond the scrutiny of Congress and the public—The Iran-Contra Affair being 
one of the more notable examples.129 Recent revelations from the Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) allege “abuses and countless mistakes” on the 
part of the CIA in overseeing their Detention and Interrogation Program that was 
widely publicized for its use of torture techniques.130 Despite the controversy 
associated with CIA activity since their inception, they continue to play a critical 
role in activities and operations in support of intelligence activities. This includes, 
though is hardly limited to, cyberspace. 
CIA cyberspace operations are more related to those of other agencies 
than is often assumed. The Iraq and Afghanistan wars, the general rise of 
counterterrorism operations, and reliance on drone operations all form an 
overlapping tapestry of inter-agency operations that are nearly impossible to 
conduct in isolation from the military or other intelligence agencies.131 With the 
sheer amount of coordination that is required to conduct ongoing cyberspace 
operations, it is unlikely that the CIA is able—or desiring—to do so in isolation 
from the other U.S. entities operating there. Additionally, with their 
counterterrorism-focused target set, it is unlikely that they will experience any 
                                                 
129 Lawrence E. Walsh, Firewall: The Iran-Contra Conspiracy and Cover-Up (New York: 
W.W. Norton, 1997), 17–19. In response to revelations on CIA activity in the Iran-Contra Affair 
accompanied by perceived abuses of executive power, Congress enacted the Boland 
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so far as to prohibit the National Security Council (NSC) from providing assistance to the Contras. 
130 See FORWARD by Senator Diane Feinstein. U.S. Congress, Senate, Select Committee 
on Intelligence, Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation 
Program, 113th Cong., 2nd sess., 2014, S. Rep. 113-288, iii-ix, 
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Detention, and Interrogation Program (Washington DC: CIA, 2013), 
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Architecture of Counterterrorism,” Michigan Law Review 112, no. 2 (November 2013): 167–168, 
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significant decline so long as combatting the threat of terrorism remains central to 
U.S. national security.132 
Due to the secretive nature of the CIA, information on updated 
methodologies and the exact nature of each directorate is not easily discerned. 
What is clear, however, is that the creation of the Directorate for Digital 
Innovation (DDI), announced in October of 2015, is focused on advancing the 
Agency’s mission and vision through an improved cyber-capability.133 As with 
nearly every other organization’s cyber-emergence, this requires development of 
tradecraft and increased investment in cyber-infrastructure. Also notable is the 
assertion that the new directorate will “be a strong, agile partner with […] our 
Intelligence Community” to support national requirements.134 Far from being 
merely lip service, this emphasis on cooperative efforts is part of an emerging 
reality that the convergence of intelligence activities is inseparable in many ways 
from cyberspace operations. 
The NSA is no less controversial. Until the Snowden revelations, however, 
they had arguably remained free from the sort of scrutiny and criticism that has 
characterized the public’s relationship with the CIA.135 Ironically, these 
organizations are not nearly as dissimilar as many might expect. Certainly, the 
NSA is unlikely to engage in the sort of “cloak and dagger” activity that is 
generally associated with the CIA, but when it comes to cyberspace, there is no 
reason to think that the methodologies of these intelligence-gathering 
organizations should dramatically differ. One of the effects of the aforementioned 
Snowden media leaks, was the rise to prominence of the NSA’s Tailored Access 
                                                 
132 See COMBAT THE PERSISTENT THREAT OF TERRORISM. U.S. White House, The 
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133 Guy Taylor, “CIA Goes Live With New Cyber Directorate, Massive Internal 
Reorganization,” Washington Times, October 1, 2015, http://www.washingtontimes.com/ 
news/2015/oct/1/cia-goes-live-with-new-cyber-directorate-massive-i. 
134 See DIGITAL INNOVATION. “Offices of CIA: Digital Innovation,” Central Intelligence 
Agency, last modified October 1, 2015, https://www.cia.gov/offices-of-cia/digital-
innovation/index.html. 
135  
  52 
Operations (TAO) program. Little is known about this elite group of cyberspace 
operators, but open-source reporting indicates that TAO has been influential in 
the area of computer network exploitation (CNE)136 and the Intelligence 
Community’s recent push for transparency even has their division chief involved 
in speaking engagements.137 
Whether these organizations take a leading role in offensive operations 
similar to the CIA’s administration of the drone program and execution of “lethal 
covert activities,”138 remains for the three branches of government to resolve. 
Even without this capability, it is almost assured that Title 50 organizations, like 
the NSA and CIA, will be contributing to cyberspace planning and supporting 
operations in their capacity as agencies for foreign intelligence. 
d. DHS (6 USC) 
Both government and businesses alike have come to rely heavily on 
cyberspace. In fact, it has become so central to daily operations that it is now 
depended upon in almost every major area of society—emergency 
preparedness, domestic law enforcement, and industrial operations. Providing 
protection for these and other systems is considered an essential part of 
economic resiliency and national security. These aspects of the U.S. society—
and many more—are dependent on the reliability and functionality of 
infrastructure, which in turn is linked to a global IT infrastructure. The Department 
of Homeland Security is charged with protecting this “critical infrastructure” from 
physical and cyber threats. To do this, DHS has a number of teams and 
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coordination centers that are specifically designed to respond to attacks against 
U.S. critical infrastructure. The mission of DHS, possibly more than any other 
federal organization, demands ease of inter-title cooperation in order to 
effectively ensure safety for critical sectors of the United States.139 
National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center 
(NCCIC): The NCCIC140 acts as a centralized hub for the coordination of a 
multitude of cyberspace activities as they relate to national-level cybersecurity 
and communication protection. They coordinate information sharing between the 
public sector, private sector, other government agencies (both state and federal), 
and international partners to increase situational awareness and ensure that 
actionable tasking is delivered to the appropriate entity. Two primary roles where 
their efforts are critical include their responsibility for coordinating national 
responses to cyber incidents that are covered under the National Cyber Incident 
Response Plan (NCIRP) and providing assistance in initiating, coordinating, 
responding, and reconstituting critical National Security or Emergency 
Preparedness (NS/EP) telecommunications in non-emergency, emergency, and 
crisis situations. In addition, they play a significant role in monitoring many 
ongoing cyber operations in order to analyze responses, which assists in 
mitigation determinations and improves current and future recovery efforts. They 
are composed of four main branches: The NCCIC Operations & Integration 
(NO&I), the National Coordinating Center for Communications (NCC), the United 
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Security and Resilience/PPD-21 (Washington DC: White House, 2013). PPD-21 identifies 16 
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States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT), and the Industrial 
Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT).141 Though all 
four branches are critical, for the purposes of brevity only the latter two will be 
briefly expanded upon in any detail. 
US-CERT: The US-CERT is responsible for a number of areas that 
generally aim to improve the Nation’s cybersecurity posture. US-CERT enables 
this by coordinating the sharing of relevant cyberspace information as well as by 
identifying and managing cyber-risks to national security. They advertise an 
extensive cyber capability that is able to conduct advanced analysis on networks 
and digital media with a focus on identifying and neutralizing malicious activity 
that is directed at critical nodes on U.S. networks. To ensure rapid responses to 
impending threats, their team operates the National Cybersecurity Protection 
System (NCPS), which is responsible for providing “intrusion detection and 
prevention capabilities to covered federal departments and agencies.”142 As a 
department focused on attacks that may occur on U.S. soil, their enduring 
challenge is to execute their mission while protecting the constitutional rights of 
U.S. citizens. To do this, they operate within an extensive network of personnel 
who receive, develop, and distribute actionable information “to federal 
departments and agencies, state and local governments, private sector 
organizations, and international partners.”143 
ICS-CERT: In contrast to other elements of the NCCIC, the ICS-CERT is 
responsible for coordinating security through partnership in both the public and 
private sectors categorized according to four key focus areas. First, they are 
committed to maintaining situational awareness on behalf of Critical 
Infrastructure and Key Resources (CIKR) stakeholders. For example, in 2014, 
ICS-CERT worked with the FBI to provide classified briefings to industry 
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stakeholders and are also responsible for developing the Private Sector 
Clearance Program for Critical Infrastructure (PSCP)144 to ensure that sensitive 
information is still able to reach those responsible for managing various aspect of 
public and private industry.145 Additionally, they provide incident response and 
technical analysis for critical control systems. In another effort with the FBI in 
2014, the team identified various sets of malware that were attempting to infiltrate 
critical U.S. infrastructure. These sophisticated threats were identified through 
the coordinated efforts of US-CERT, the FBI, and industry partners. In addition to 
providing detailed analytics on the threats, affected industries were provided with 
remote and on-sight assistance by ICS-CERT operators. They also conduct 
vulnerability coordination by receiving, consolidating, and distributing known or 
suspected vulnerabilities to researchers and vendors for mitigation or correction. 
Lastly, to add to a recurring theme amongst cyberspace operators, an expressed 
organizational goal is to develop and strengthen partnerships with “law 
enforcement agencies and the intelligence community and [coordinate efforts] 
among Federal, State, [and local] governments and control systems owners, 
operators, and vendors.”146 
e. U.S. Coast Guard (USC 14) 
The U.S. Coast Guard may present one of the most intriguing cases for 
government operations in cyberspace. Under the Homeland Security Act of 2002 
(Pub.L. 107–296), the United States Coast Guard was transferred to the 
Department of Homeland Security, but can leverage up to ten different title 
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codes147 depending on the nature of their activity. Under statutory authority, they 
“shall be a military service and a branch of the armed forces of the United States 
at all times.”148 In addition to this, statutes reserve the possibility of placing the 
Coast Guard under the authority of the DOD—specifically, subordinated to the 
Department of the Navy149—if Congress deems it necessary by declaration of 
war, or at the president’s request. Under authorities derived from Title 6, the 
USCG has 11 distinct missions that are divided into Homeland security and Non-
homeland security missions.150 Under missions that pertain to homeland 
security, the USCG is authorized to protect ports, waterways, and provide coastal 
security as well as perform drug interdiction and other law enforcement.151 
The extent to which the USCG is authorized to use cyberspace operations 
to provide these protections presents a significant legal dilemma since, based on 
previous discussions, it is unclear how their protection of the approaches to the 
United States will be applied in a domain that does not simply nor easily correlate 
to geographic domains. Furthermore, the Coast Guard is one of the few agencies 
that is authorized to enforce federal, international, and domestic laws.152 In the 
case of counter-drug operations, Title 10 requires that the USCG provide 
“members of the Coast Guard who are trained in law enforcement and have 
powers of the Coast Guard under Title 14” for the purposes of “performing law 
enforcement functions” including making “arrests and […] [carrying] out searches 
and seizures” and other “law enforcement” duties.153 This is a significant 
capability and yet it remains unclear how it directly translates to support in 
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  57 
cyberspace. This counternarcotics example provides an illuminating example of 
what is possible since the assignment of law-enforcement capable officers does 
not exclude their colocation aboard ships for the purpose of cooperative 
cyberspace operations.154 Unlike the other branches of the armed forces, which 
are restricted in their law enforcement capability,155 the USCG is not subject to 
the Posse Comitatus Act.156 
Preceding discussions are only moderately fruitful since the Coast Guard’s 
Cyber Command (CGCYBERCOM) has, at the time of writing this, yet to release 
a definitive plan for organizing and structuring their Cyber Cadre. As the Sector 
Specific Agency (SSA) for the Maritime Transportation System within the 
Transportation Sector,157 the Coast Guard is undoubtedly considering 
approaches to provide measures that ensure its security in and against all 
domains158—most relevant to present discussions is cyberspace—but their 
recently released USCG Cyber Strategy of 2015 is far from conclusive in terms of 
practical implementation and simply outlines the need for a “cyber workforce” in 
order to achieve their strategic priority of “defending cyberspace.”159 Even 
without a publicly available plan, it is not difficult to perceive the trajectory of the 
USCG cyber forces. Nearly four years prior to the release of their cyber strategy, 
CAPT John Felker, USCG, gave a briefing that indicated cyber-overlap between 
at least six different title authorities and the need for cooperation between the 
Intelligence Community (IC), the DOJ, DOT, DHS, and the DOD.160 These 
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developments are part of a consistently resurfacing message that the future 
effectiveness of the cyber force is dependent on a broader understanding of 
capabilities and limitations within an operational model that prioritizes 
cooperation in support of inter-title operations. 
4. The U.S.C. and Relevant Legislation 
The previous section identified the major federal organizations and 
agencies operating in cyberspace. No less critical are the relevant laws and 
amendments that dictate roles, responsibilities, and restrictions for each of these 
organizations and, in some cases, cyberspace as a whole. Recommending a 
framework for inter-title cooperation will very much depend on the allowances 
and limitations outlined in these laws as well as an understanding of their chief 
aim. Similar to discussions immediately preceding these, an exhaustive list of 
laws is unnecessary—though tempting. The volumes of legislation, litigation, and 
legal interpretation that would need to be addressed is an undertaking for which 
the task at hand is not intended. Embarking on this errand would likely doom all 
subsequent efforts and, consequently, the simplicity of an inter-title framework 
would likely never materialize. The legislative actions that are addressed in this 
section will have to suffice, and the modest resolution they provide will have to be 
folded, no doubt, into the debate that continues to characterize inter-title 
discussions.  
It is crucial to draw attention, once again, to the considerable amount of 
disagreement in this key area. There is little consensus on what an essential 
legislative portfolio should contain in order to enable definitive conclusions to be 
reached on matters of inter-title operations. Excluding relevant law is especially 
difficult in light of the far-reaching implications of legislation for state, federal, and 
international jurisprudence. For example, the National Defense Authorization Act 
(NDAA) is passed each year to authorize budget expenditures for the 
Department of Defense. The NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012161 is of particular 
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interest because it also included provisions for the detention of military 
prisoners—as authorized under the Authorization for Use of Military Force 
(AUMF)162—and may have critical implications for cyberspace operations that 
are intended to “prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the 
United States.”163 It has, however, been excluded from a more thorough 
discussion because its use in enabling inter-title cyberspace operations, while 
intriguing, is likely too speculative. In fact, the following list was not chosen 
because of its provocative nature or even its completeness in addressing the 
subject matter. Rather, it was selected primarily because it constitutes landmark 
pieces of legislation that resurface in pertinent works and public debates on 
cyberspace, inter-title cooperation, or both. The truth of the matter is that there is 
no amount of legal knowledge that is sufficient for this task, but even still, these 
should provide substantive observations through which to comprehend the 
corpus juris as it relates to this subject. 
The Insurrection Act of 1807 is one of the first pieces of legislation that 
recognized the need to relax federal restrictions during times where rebellion 
threatened the security of states or the sovereignty of state governments. 
Though local uprisings have not been a genuine concern of recent history, the 
9/11 attacks and Hurricane Katrina disasters led to the transformation of this 
outdated legislation, in 2006, into a considerably powerful avenue for the 
executive power to exert federal influence in state territories.164 Ultimately, these 
amendments were repealed in 2008, but they appear to have left an indelible 
mark on the expansion of executive powers. Though not associated with quelling 
insurrection, the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance 
Act (Stafford Act) is seen as complementary to the Insurrection Act in the broad 
allowances it affords to the U.S. president in the deployment of the armed forces 
                                                 
162 Pub. L. 107-40 
163 Pub. L. 107-40, § 2(a) 
164 Pub. L. 109–364, div. A, title X, § 1076(a)(1) was amended on Jan. 28, 2008 by Pub. L. 
110-181, div. A, title X, § 1068(a)(1) to effectively revert back to the version as amended in 1956. 
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within state territories. This culminating piece of legislation first surfaced in the 
1950s as the Federal Disaster Relief Program, which by 1986 had grown into a 
more substantive and predictable framework for federal responses to U.S. 
natural disasters. The provisions of this act have seen only marginal legislative 
changes over the last three decades, but increased reliance on federal aid for 
relief from natural disasters has led to many criticisms that point to the Stafford 
Act’s ineffective relief responses coupled with generous increases in executive 
discretion. The counterbalance to this perceived executive overreach—most 
notably the Insurrection Act—is alleged to be exemplified in the Posse Comitatus 
Act (PCA), which provides a general prohibition against Army and Air Forces 
being used to enforce civil law. 
Due primarily to concerns over national security in the wake of the 9/11 
attacks, congressional legislators introduced and approved temporary laws that 
would temporarily increase executive authority while reducing constraints, 
especially with regard to domestic surveillance. The consolidated acts and 
amendments were signed into law under the Uniting and Strengthening America 
by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act 
of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act)165 with most provisions being temporary and initially 
set to expire on December 31, 2005. This controversial act, which affected a 
dozen different title codes, was extended multiple times—including under the 
USA FREEDOM Act—with most of the substantive provisions having been 
renewed through 2019. An examination of the USA PATRIOT Act will also 
address three of its primary benefactors. 
The first is the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA).166 
This particular piece of legislation has come under intense scrutiny in the wake of 
the Snowden media leaks167 as it has attempted to resolve complications 
presented by cyberspace in the area of foreign intelligence gathering. Public 
                                                 
165 See supra note 80. 
166 Pub. L. 95-511 
167 Supra note 61. 
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responses to bulk collection and secret judicial proceedings have been 
responsible for a contentious debate that will arguably only intensify as 
cyberspace becomes a more entrenched to federal government concerns over 
national security. 
The second is the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 
(ECPA), which is commonly used to refer to both the Electronic Communications 
Privacy Act and the Stored Wire Electronic Communications Act. In light of 
advances in technology and networked communications, the ECPA has generally 
been acknowledged as a necessary update to the Federal Wiretap statute of 
1968.  
The final benefactor of the USA PATRIOT Act is the Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act (CFAA),168 which, along with the ECPA, was enacted in 1986 to 
enable federal investigation and prosecution against the increasing number of 
criminals who were relying on information technology to commit crimes. The 
controversy surrounding the CFAA most often stems from its ambiguous 
language, which grants broad latitude for the inclusion of nearly every networked 
computer—including cell phones, tablets, and reading devices—into criminal 
investigations.169 
Lastly, the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015 (CISA)170 was 
signed into law by President Barak Obama on December 18, 2015 as part of the 
Consolidated Appropriations Act (CAA) of 2016. The inclusion of CISA in this 
spending bill—under the broader Cybersecurity Act of 2015171—is almost as 
                                                 
168 Pub. L. 99-474, 100 Stat. 1213. 
169 See INTRODUCTION. Orin S. Kerr, “Vagueness Challenges to the Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act,” Minnesota Law Review 94, vol. 1561 (2010) http://minnesotalawreview.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/03/Kerr_MLR.pdf. Kerr states that “the CFAA has become so broad, and 
computers so common, that expansive or uncertain interpretations of unauthorized access will 
render it unconstitutional. Such interpretations would either provide insufficient notice of what is 
prohibited or fail to provide guidelines for law enforcement in violation of the constitutional 
requirement of Due Process of the law.” 
170 Pub. L. 114-113 
171 Id. at Div. N. 
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controversial as its content.172 The legislation went through two years of revision 
amid congressional and executive concerns before being signed into law and 
thereby granting increased liability protection to private industry for information 
shared with the government. Each of these acts—The Insurrection Act, PCA, 
USA PATRIOT, FISA, ECPA, CFAA, and CISA—will be discussed in anticipation 
of legality questions that inevitably arise from certain cyberspace operations and 
some related restrictions to inter-title cooperation. Additionally, these laws, while 
by no means comprehensive, represent a relevant contribution to shaping and 
understanding U.S.C. discussions in subsequent chapters. 
a. Insurrection Act (10 USC §§ 331, et seq.) 
There are numerous statutory exceptions that grant the federal 
government lawful avenues for responding to criminal activity. Most of these 
exceptions have been granted to smaller organizations like the FBI or U.S. 
Marshals, and in almost every case, they exclude domestic intervention by the 
armed forces. In the earliest days following the founding of United States, federal 
forces provided an essential supplement to undersupplied state militias and local 
law enforcement in suppressing rebellions and insurrection. As such, Congress 
passed the Insurrection Act of 1807, which allowed the president to use the 
armed forces and militia—now 10 USC and 32 USC, respectively—to “suppress, 
in a State, any insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful combination, or 
conspiracy.”173 As mentioned previously, these authorities were significantly 
expanded under legislation passed in 2006. Those amendments were 
subsequently repealed in 2008. Should current authorities be lawfully invoked, it 
remains the president’s prerogative as to whether to use the National Guard or 
armed forces to respond to the threat. 
                                                 
172 Congress had only recently reconvened on January 5, 2016 before new legislation was 
introduced before Rep. Justin Amash, et al, introduced legislation for the repeal of the 
Cybersecurity Act of 2015. Cf. U.S. Congress, House, Committees on Oversight and Government 
Reform, et al., A Bill to Repeal the Cybersecurity Act of 2015, 114th Cong., 2nd sess., 2016, H.R. 
4350, https://www.congress.gov/114/bills/hr4350/BILLS-114hr4350ih.pdf. 
173 10 USC § 333 
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In the case of cyberspace, this is extremely beneficial in terms of response 
options since cyberspace threats can often be effectively neutralized from remote 
locations. Mapping the cyberspace threat—as it applies to the Insurrection Act—
to a physical counterpart that justifies a federal response of this sort, however, 
remains a murky undertaking. Whether this particular piece of legislation will 
experience any substantive changes to bring clarity to the murky waters of 
cyberspace is unknown. In the meantime, there continue to be a variety of 
attempts to map these key physical terms—insurrection, domestic violence, 
unlawful combination, or conspiracy—to their cyberspace counterparts. 
A major effort in this area has been undertaken by the Air Land Sea 
Application Center (ALSA) in their multiservice manual on Defense Support of 
Civil Authorities (DSCA) that was released in 2015.174 This jointly produced 
service manual identifies “cyberspace-related incidents” as events that may 
trigger a response pursuant to relevant sections of the 10 USC pertaining to the 
Insurrection Act. Even with the recognition that cyberspace events may trigger a 
military response, there are still significant hurdles to deploying the armed forces 
under the justification of insurrection. First, only cyberspace events that meet the 
criteria for insurrection events would authorize military mobilization. Given the 
disagreement on physical and cyberspace equivalents, this is almost assured to 
be met with controversy. Second, and closely related to the first, is the fact that 
cyberspace is prone to accommodate the circumvention of response protocols 
                                                 
174 See generally Air Land Sea Application Center, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, And 
Procedures for Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) (ATP 3-28.1/MCWP 3-36.2/NTTP 3-
57.2/AFTTP 3-2.67) (Joint Base Langley-Eustis, VA: ALSA, 2015), http://armypubs.army.mil/ 
doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/atp3_28x1.pdf.  
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and tactics that can conceal the intentions of actions and prevent the threshold 
for the deploying a federal response from being reached.175 
Another key feature of the Insurrection Act concerns its options for federal 
response, which tend to be highly compartmentalized. For example, in 10 USC § 
331, the president is authorized to deploy federal troops—pending a request from 
the state governor—in order to quell an uprising, but there are still key 
distinctions in how the National Guard and armed forces are authorized to be 
employed. These distinctions are highly dependent on the disposition of both the 
state government and executive powers and their individual perceptions of the 
developing situation. In addition to these considerations, there are also title 
concerns since the National Guard enjoys the possibility of supplementing local 
law enforcement, while the military is to be strictly limited to being used in 
defense of the state. This brings up questions as to whether the armed forces, 
acting in defense of a state, may perform offensive operations or even 
investigate intrusion and attack sources for the purpose of subsequent 
prosecutions. 
These concerns aside, the general progression for deploying resources 
follows a formal request from the state, in response to which the executive 
powers are required to issue a proclamation to “order the insurgents to disperse 
and retire peacefully.”176 If the proclamation requirement is at all applicable to 
cyberspace—for which there is considerable doubt—some consideration must be 
                                                 
175 See generally Magnus Hjortdal, “China's Use of Cyber Warfare: Espionage Meets 
Strategic Deterrence,” Journal of Strategic Security: Strategic Security in the Cyber Age 4, no. 2 
(Summer 2011) doi: 10.5038/1944-0472.4.2.1. The terms for cyber-espionage and cyber-attack 
appear to be used interchangeably even though they justify dramatically different responses 
under frameworks for domestic and international law. See also INTRODUCTION AND 
STATEMENT OF PROBLEM. Chris Brown, Desmond Lee, Colin Scott, and Daniel Strunk, 
American Cyber Insecurity: The Growing Danger of Cyber Attacks, Duke University paper 
(Durham, NC: Duke University, 2014), 1–2. http://hdl.handle.net/10161/8881. “In scholarly work 
on cyber-security there remains a tendency to conflate [the areas of cyber attack and cyber 
espionage]. This tendency is problematic because it obscures significant differences between 
these problems that may call for dramatically disparate policy responses. While both cyber 
espionage and cyber crime are certainly areas of concern for the United States, cyber attacks, 
since they involve network disruption and danger to critical infrastructure and financial markets, 
pose the most pressing threat.” 
176 Pursuant to 10 USC § 334. 
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made for the “reasonable duration” of time that must be allotted for dispersing. 
Whether this is measured in minutes or micro-seconds, federal responders would 
have to be held in abeyance for some set period of time before deploying 
capabilities on behalf of the state. Timelines aside, the bigger issue seems to 
evolve from the unlikely possibility of issuing a decree in the first place. Extensive 
employment of automation, use of covert channels, and the lack of support 
provided by current protocols makes traditional channels for communication an 
unreasonable option. Additionally, the ability to deliver a proclamation to disperse 
will likely first require finding the responsible parties, which almost entirely 
defeats the purpose of proclamation in the first place. Even with these 
considerations, however, it is improbable that the difficulties associated with 
issuing a proclamation to cyberspace actors will constrain or disqualify the 
president from deploying an appropriate federal response. As such, once the 
president has determined by reasonable means that dispersion is unlikely, he 
may order the deployment of an appropriate federal response to protect the state 
against domestic violence and insurrection. 
There are two other sections that deal with insurrection and they share 
some noteworthy similarities. These sections allow the president to initiate a 
federal response without the consent of the state. In the first instance,177 
responses are authorized if the threat within a state poses a threat to the 
enforcement of federal law. Since it is unlikely that a cyber-threat of this requisite 
magnitude will originate entirely within the state it threatens, the threat to federal 
authority will arguably occupy the lion’s share of justifiable responses. The 
second instance178 allows for a federal response if a determination is made by 
the president that the nature of the “insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful 
combination, or conspiracy” is such that the execution of constitutional, federal, 
and state law is hindered and state and federal law enforcement efforts are 
obstructed. As the number of cyberspace-related federal legislation grows, the 
                                                 
177 Pursuant to 10 USC § 332. 
178 Pursuant to 10 USC § 333. 
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justification for interfering in state affairs may also increase, which is an area that 
has received surprisingly little attention.179 
b. The Stafford Act (42 USC §§ 5121, et seq.) 
The Stafford Act is relatively straightforward in its intent. Inconsistent 
federal responses to natural disasters created laborious approval processes and 
gross inefficiencies in delivering aide to state and local governments to assist in 
relief efforts. To correct this, Congress legislated processes to deploy federal 
resources leading up to and following disasters. To monitor and respond to 
events of this nature, President Jimmy Carter issued an executive order in 1979 
that created FEMA, which currently resides under the Department of Homeland 
Security. A federal network of national and regional centers works to prepare for 
and respond to any number of natural disasters that may affect states throughout 
the year. This focus on advanced planning encourages states to create detailed 
disaster preparedness and recovery plans.  
From the perspective of authorities, the president has authorization to 
issue any number of declarations identifying a major disaster or state of 
emergency. Once a declaration has been issued, the federal response can be 
initiated and the president has statutory approval to deploy the National Guard or 
armed forces to assist the state in domestic disaster relief. This deployment of 
federal troops into the domestic sphere leads to at least three main title 
                                                 
179 See generally Thaddeus Hoffmeister, “An Insurrection Act for the 21st Century,” Draft 
paper from the Selected Works of Thaddeus Hoffmeister (Dayton, OH: University of Dayton, 
2009), 5–6, http://works.bepress.com/thaddeus_hoffmeister/6. Hoffmeister is keen to point out 
that there is need for an “updated Insurrection Act that addresses both current and future 
challenges that are sure to arise as this country grows increasingly reliant on the Active Duty 
military for homeland security.” He further notes the difficulty in “creating a finished product that 
maintains the necessary balance in federal-State responsibilities during a domestic crisis.” His 
discussions, however, are entirely absent any explicit reference to cyberspace. See also 
DOMESTIC OPERATIONS. International and Operational Law Department, “Operational Law 
Handbook,” 193–214. The OLH for 2015 does not adequately address cyberspace considerations 
for support to Domestic Operations except to refer to the Incident Annexes of the 2008 National 
Response Framework (NRF). Cf. Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Response 
Framework, 2nd ed. (Washington DC: DHS, 2013), https://www.fema.gov/media-library-
data/20130726-1914-25045-1246/final_national_response_framework_20130501.pdf. 
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considerations that are themselves dependent on the nature of the presidential 
declaration. 
The first consideration is based on the issuance of a major disaster that 
comes at the behest of the state. In the initial stages of a disaster, state officials 
are typically responsible for activating the state emergency operations plan. If 
state and federal representatives determine that the Preliminary Damage 
Assessment (PDA) warrants it, the governor can request that the president issue 
a declaration of a major disaster.180 In this case, the state must agree to cost 
sharing measures for federal assistance pursuant to provisions within the 
Stafford Act. 
Similarly, a second avenue for federal response can closely follow the 
previously outlined process, but may result in a presidential declaration of an 
emergency.181 Even though the PDA is still typically conducted by state and 
federal representatives, the president may choose, with or without the consent of 
the state governor,182 to issue an emergency declaration that allows for federal 
resources to be deployed and, significant to present lines of examination, can 
include assets operating under Title 10 and Title 32. Considerations under this 
declaration and the next to be discussed can be closely tied to threats against 
critical infrastructure. 
Lastly, the president may issue a declaration of defense emergency.183 
This is a typically a preemptive measure that allows the federal government to 
conduct work for no longer than 10 days on systems that are essential for the 
“preservation of life and property.”184 
                                                 
180 See generally Federal Emergency Management Agency, “National Response 
Framework: Stafford Act Support to States,” accessed March 10, 2016, https://www.fema.gov/pdf/ 
emergency/nrf/nrf-stafford.pdf. 
181 Ibid. 
182 If issuance of an emergency declaration is absent the consent of the state governor, the 
federal government must determine that it has primary response authority pursuant to 42 USC § 
5191(b).  
183 See FEMA, supra note 180. 
184 Pursuant to 42 USC § 5170b(c)(1). 
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All of these measures may appear clear-cut and benign within the grander 
narrative surrounding federal involvement in cyberspace operations. In one of the 
broadest interpretations of disaster relief, however, through policy interpretations, 
the executive powers have delineated extensive responsibilities to the DOD, 
DOJ, and DHS in declarations of “national security emergencies” that include 
“natural disaster, military attack, technological emergency, or other emergency, 
that seriously degrades or seriously threatens the national security of the United 
States.”185 
The broad authorities that this translates into can easily enable a spectrum 
of inter-title operations in support of emergency declarations under the Stafford 
Act. Rapid constitution of networks in support of technological emergencies can 
leverage members of the National Guard or military to re-enable banking, power 
restoration, communications, and coordinate search and rescue operations. This 
context can easily be aligned with the tiered approach to disaster response that 
is proposed by the 2008 National Response Framework.186 The executive power 
in responding to “national emergencies” may be extensive, but it is important to 
remain cognizant of the fact that none of the provisions under the Stafford Act 
provide statutory exception for the Posse Comitatus Act—to be discussed in 
greater detail in the immediately succeeding section. The doctrine of the DOD is 
of particular interest in the context of these tensions and is often scrutinized as 
an attempt to circumvent restrictions imposed by the aforementioned act.187 
Despite the claims and the accompanying demands to revamp the Insurrection 
                                                 
185 See generally 42 USC § 5195. Cf. EO 12656, “Assignment of Emergency Preparedness 
Responsibilities” (most recently amended under EO 13603 s. 803(a)). 
186 See generally Mark M. Beckler, “Insurrection Act Restored: States Likely to Maintain 
Authority Over National Guard During Domestic Emergencies,” (monograph, United States Army 
Command and General Staff College, 2008), 50–56, http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/ 
a484794.pdf. 
187 See DISASTER RELIEF LAW: THE STAFFORD ACT. Isaac Tekie, “Bringing the Troops 
Home to a Disaster: Law, Order, and Humanitarian Relief,” Ohio State Law Journal 67, no. 5 
(2006): 1244–1246, http://hdl.handle.net/1811/71058. “The [Stafford] Act does not enable the 
military to restore law and order by arrests and seizures, nor by any other direct law enforcement 
methods unless those actions happen to consist of a military purpose like guarding military 
bases.” 
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Act, Stafford Act, and Posse Comitatus Act, legal opinion has yet to side with this 
more insidious interpretation.188 
c. Posse Comitatus Act (18 USC § 1385) 
The PCA has long been seen as the quintessential legislation that 
balances the tendency for executive overreach. The phrase posse comitatus is 
Latin for the “force of the county” and generally refers to a group of citizens who 
are called upon to defend the territory or “county” in a law enforcement role.189 
The United States in particular has a general prohibition against presidential use 
of the armed forces or National Guard for the purposes of law enforcement.190 
The specifics of the legislation prohibit the use of “Army or the Air Force as a 
posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws.” Although the United States 
Navy and Marine Corps are not explicitly included in the prohibition of PCA, they 
were made subject to it under DOD regulation beginning in 1992.191 The PCA, 
while effective at providing broad prohibitions against the use of the armed forces 
                                                 
188 See NOTE 105. Id. at 1245. “DOD DIRECTIVE 5525.5 para. E2.1.4 (1986). The military 
purpose doctrine is not an exception to the PCA because actions undertaken for a valid military 
purpose fall outside the scope of the purpose of the PCA to prohibit military enforcement of 
civilian laws. People v. Burden, 303 N.W.2d 444, 447 (Mich. 1981); Clarence I. Meeks III, Illegal 
Law Enforcement: Aiding Civil Authorities in Violation of the Posse Comitatus Act, 70 MIL. L. 
REV. 83, 124 (1975). Any benefits provided to civilian law enforcement pursuant to a military 
purpose are said to be incidental to the primary purpose. Id. at 124–26. […] the obvious question 
for the courts, which generally arises when military actions provide law enforcement benefits, is 
what constitutes a valid military purpose? The answer given by courts escapes consistency. See 
[Charles Doyle, The Posse Comitatus Act and Related Matters: The Use of the Military to 
Execute Civilian Law, in THE POSSE COMITATUS ACT AND RELATED MATTERS: CURRENT 
ISSUES AND BACKGROUND 17, 24 (Susan Boriotti & Donna Dennis eds., 2004)]: 49–51. 
Stricter courts demand a close nexus between the stated purpose and the law enforcement 
activity, while others settle for a mere relation between the two. Id. Notably, these cases arise in 
activities like undercover drug operations and routine criminal investigations. The working of this 
exception in the context of a large-scale disaster relief effort is not covered by the cases.” 
189 Bryan A. Garner, ed., Black's Law Dictionary, 9th ed. (St. Paul, MN: West Group, 2009) 
s.v. “Posse Comitatus.” Defined as "The power or force of the county. The entire population of a 
county above the age of fifteen, which a sheriff may summon to his assistance in certain cases, 
as to aid him in keeping the peace, in pursuing and arresting felons, etc." 
190 See NOTE 11. Matthew Carlton Hammond, “The Posse Comitatus Act: A Principle in 
Need of Renewal,” Washington University Law Quarterly 75, no. 2 (1997): 954, 
http://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol75/iss2/11. “In 1854, the Attorney General 
interpreted posse comitatus to include the military.” See NOTE 44. Id. at 960. “Act of Sept. 18, 
1850, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462,462-63.”  
191 32 C.F.R. § 213.2 
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in the employment of domestic law enforcement, still falls short in a number of 
areas. 
There are numerous examples of congressional legislation that effectively 
create statutory exceptions to the PCA.192 For one, the National Guard when 
under the control of the state governor—SAD status—can fill key law 
enforcement roles and the armed forces can respond to national security 
concerns over nuclear, chemical, and biological threats.193 The Coast Guard has 
already been noted as being exempt from PCA and there are numerous Title 10 
exceptions, like those that require the armed forces to “serve as the single lead 
agency” for surveillance against “aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into 
the United States.”194 
Since Title 10 is the primary object of PCA, it is worth enumerating the 
extensive authorizations that are at least tangentially concerned with statutory 
compliance. Title 10 has been modified over the course of its existence to 
enhance cooperative efforts with state authorities in support of operations not 
strictly prohibited by the Posse Comitatus Act—but also not restricted to the 
provisions of the Insurrection Act and the Stafford Act.195 The armed forces are 
given broad latitude to assist in cases of domestic emergencies196 to share 
information with federal, state, or local law enforcement officials,197 and to “make 
                                                 
192 See APPENDIX A – Notable Violations and Exceptions to the Posse Comitatus Act. See 
also APPENDIX D. Eric V. Larson and John E. Peters, “Preparing the U.S. Army for Homeland 
Security: Concepts, Issues, and Options,” (monograph report, Rand Corporation, 2001), 243–45, 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1251.html. 
193 18 USC §§ 831,832. § 832 still has restrictions against arrests made by federal troops. 
194 10 USC § 124 
195 Pursuant to USC 10 §§ 380,381. 
196 USC 10 § 2557 allows the DOD to provide “excess nonlethal supplies: availability for 
humanitarian relief [and] domestic emergency assistance,” which could easily include cyber 
infrastructure. This reasonable provision could be provided pursuant to USC 10 § 2557(c) so long 
as the military does not “conduct any activity which, if carried out as an intelligence activity by the 
Department of Defense, would require a notice to the intelligence committees under title V of the 
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091, et seq.).” 
197 Only information that was gathered during the normal course of military training or 
operations may be shared with state and local law enforcement. This information has the added 
stipulation that it must be relevant to a violation of federal or state law pursuant to 10 USC § 371. 
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available any [DOD] equipment […] [or] base facility […]”—presumably 
cyberspace infrastructure is included—“to any Federal, State, or local civilian law 
enforcement official for law enforcement purposes.”198 Title 10 further allows 
DOD to train local law enforcement on operating and maintaining this 
equipment199 and to make DOD personnel available for operating this 
equipment.200 These allowances are available through inter-title cooperation with 
other federal agencies201 and civilian law enforcement.202 
Far from establishing broad principles for undermining the intent of the 
PCA, these exceptions provide demarcation lines that limit federal military power 
to a passive role that is intended to reinforce state—vice federal—objectives with 
restrictions that prevent supplanting local law enforcement efforts.203 These 
passive allowances are followed up by appropriate limitations that prohibit the 
                                                 
198 10 USC § 372 
199 10 USC § 373 
200 Subject to restrictions pursuant to 10 USC § 374. 
201 See generally 10 USC § 374(b)(1). Under the general provisions of this section, the 
Secretary of Defense may make DOD personnel available to another federal agency for the 
maintenance and operation of equipment with respect to select criminal violations and in support 
that agency’s support to foreign, state, or municipal governments. This includes support of “a 
foreign or domestic counter-terrorism operation” as well as “the rendition of a suspected terrorist 
from a foreign country, and other activities” so long as “such support does not involve direct 
participation by such personnel in a civilian law enforcement operation unless such direct 
participation is otherwise authorized by law.” 
202 See generally 10 USC § 374(b)(2). Under the general provisions of this section, the 
Secretary of Defense may make DOD personnel available to “a civilian law enforcement agency” 
for the purposes of “detection, monitoring, and communication of the movement of air and sea 
traffic,” and specifically the “movement of surface traffic outside of the geographic boundary of the 
United States and within the United States not to exceed 25 miles of the boundary if the initial 
detection occurred outside of the boundary.” They are additional authorized to provide personnel 
support for “aerial reconnaissance” and the “interception of vessels or aircraft detected outside 
the land area of the United States for the purposes of communicating with such vessels and 
aircraft to direct such vessels and aircraft to go to a location designated by appropriate civilian 
officials.” DOD personnel may ultimately operate equipment “to facilitate communications in 
connection with specified law enforcement programs” and in other cases pursuant to 10 USC § 
374(b)(4) to the extent that “such support does not involve direct participation by such personnel 
in a civilian law enforcement operation unless such direct participation is otherwise authorized by 
law.” 
203 See THE POSSE COMITATUS ACT. Danielle Crockett, “The Insurrection Act and 
Executive Power to Respond with Force to Natural Disasters” (Paper prepared for Law 224.9: 
Disasters & the Law, University of California Berkeley School of Law, 2007), 20–26, 
https://www.law.berkeley.edu/library/resources/ disasters/Crockett.pdf. 
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“direct participation by a member of the [armed forces] in a search, seizure, [or] 
arrest […] unless […] such activity by such member is otherwise authorized by 
law.”204 These limitations are also complemented with fiscal restrictions that 
require reimbursement by any agency that receives or utilizes these services.205 
Along the lines of PCA compliance it is important to note that the courts 
have regularly determined that the Posse Comitatus Act is generally held to have 
been violated in the absence of a recognized exception. This specifically applies 
when local law enforcement employ military investigators—termed “direct active 
use”—or “when the use of the military ‘pervades the activities’ of the civilian 
officials” or subjects “citizens to the exercise of military power that is ‘regulatory, 
prescriptive, or compulsory in nature.’”206 In terms of implications for cyberspace, 
this likely means that military forces will be relegated to a passive role—unless 
employed under authorities pursuant to the Insurrection Act or Stafford Act—in 
providing infrastructure and training, but not in active implementation of state 
cyberspace efforts—most importantly those cyberspace efforts that relate to law 
enforcement. Their regular and positive contribution should allow fiscally 
constrained state governments to utilize DOD infrastructure to provide a level of 
                                                 
204 10 USC § 375 
205 Where federal reimbursements are not explicitly linked to specific agencies and 
organizations, they generally fall under the statutory authority of the Economy Act (31 USC § 
1535) 
206 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, The Use of Federal Troops 
for Disaster Assistance: Legal Issues, by Jennifer K. Elsea and R. Chuck Mason, RS22266 
(2008), 1–2, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RS22266.pdf. 
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security that aligns with citizens’ constitutional rights and state statutory 
authority.207 
It is worthwhile to end PCA discussion with some affirmative statements 
regarding the extent to which it affects specific title authorities. The stipulations 
on Title 10 activities have been covered to a reasonable degree, but the Act does 
not generally apply to the National Guard while they are in a SAD status, which 
allows them to be used for law enforcement purposes, nor does it apply to them 
while activated under 32 USC authorities. Conditions of the PCA are not 
applicable to FBI operations (18 USC) in investigating and prosecuting 
cybercrime nor do they hold authority over the Coast Guard (14 USC) when 
operating in a peace-time capacity208 or DHS (6 USC) in the execution of 
homeland security operations. Since the CIA and NSA (50 USC) do not have a 
law enforcement role, PCA is unlikely to influence their involvement, which 
typically requires the elements foreign intelligence or counterterrorism to be 
present.209 
                                                 
207 See Crockett, 24–25. Crockett illuminates many arguments purporting to undermine the 
intent of the PCA. For example, “DOD Directive 5525 § E4.1.2.3 (1989)” is cited as providing “the 
inherent right ‘to ensure the preservation of public order and to carry out governmental operations 
within its territorial limits, or otherwise in accordance with applicable law, by force, if necessary.’” 
Further, DOD Directive 3025.1 § 4.5 (1993) and 32 C.F.R. § 215.4(c)(2)(ii) allow commanders to 
“provide resources and assistance, including law enforcement, when a disaster overwhelms the 
capabilities of State authorities and requires an immediate response.” Crockett maintains, 
however, that “the PCA’s requirement of ‘an Act of Congress’ indicates that the Department of 
Defense does not have the authority to create exceptions to the PCA.” She supports this by 
noting DOD Directive 3025.1-M, C8.5, at 109 (June 1994), which “states that [the directive] is not 
to be relied upon as a source of authority and instead should be viewed as providing guidance.” 
This manual, she notes, “identifies the Posse Comitatus Act as a limitation on the military’s role in 
disaster response” and cites DOD regulations, which “explicitly state that only the President (or 
the Attorney General if authorized by the President) may request the use of active duty military 
forces in response to domestic disturbances.” 
208 Wartime obligations are unlikely to supplant the USCG’s role in homeland security 
operations pursuant to relevant provisions within 6 USC, 14 USC, et al. 
209 Although NSA is subordinate to the DOD and managed by military staff, they are not 
generally acknowledged to be constrained by this particular Act since those organizations that 
constitute the armed forces are the explicit object of the PCA’s federally imposed limitations. An 
argument a fortiori is found in the exemptions to a number of federal limitations as provided for in 
the USA PATRIOT Act and FISA, which fulfill the clause that takes exception to those “cases and 
[…] circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress.” 
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Later discussions will address the need for considering the effectiveness 
of each of these organizations and the context that determines which legislation 
is applicable at any given time—and to which organizations they are applicable—
over the course of the operation. Whether applicable statutes expand authorities 
or impose limitations, these considerations are especially relevant as they factor 
into discussions that are focused on identifying a lead authority for inter-title 
cyberspace operations. 
d. USA PATRIOT Act (18 USC, 50 USC, et al) 
The USA PATRIOT Act’s extensive amendments to the United States 
Code210 make it arguably the most controversial legislation of the 21st century. 
Originally passed in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Congress intended the 
sweeping legislative changes to enable quick responses for deterring any near-
term terrorist attacks and for investigating and prosecuting those responsible for 
the 9/11 attacks. The imminent nature of the threat does not appear at first to 
have been a long-term consideration. This is presumed based on the temporary 
nature of most of the provisions within the USA PATRIOT Act—referred to as 
sunset provisions. Many of the more controversial measures within the Act were 
intended to sunset after little more than four years, but, all told, have been 
extended nearly 14 years beyond their original life expectancy.211 Many of the 
measures have since been made permanent while only a handful have been 
subjected to congressional repeal. As a point of commentary, this progression 
appears to be part of a greater realization that the new legal framework must 
respond to the likelihood that the threat of terrorism may be a permanent fixture 
across the global arena. 
                                                 
210 The following ten titles were amended by the USA PATRIOT Act: 8 USC, 12 USC, 15 
USC, 18 USC, 20 USC, 31 USC, 42 USC, 47 USC, 49 USC, and 50 USC. 
211 See generally “Uniting and Strengthening America by Fulfilling Rights and Ensuring 
Effective Discipline Over Monitoring (USA FREEDOM) Act of 2015,” Pub. L. 114–23 (June 2, 
2015). The expiration of USA PATRIOT Act measures on June 1, 2015 amounts to little more 
than legislative politics. In effect, the USA FREEDOM Act, which was signed into law the very 
next day on June 2, 2015, restored every relevant measure from its predecessor with major 
revisions to only one section (50 USC § 1861) that prevents bulk data collection associated with 
accessing “business records for foreign intelligence and international terrorism investigations.” 
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A closer examination shows that the Act’s primary objective was improved 
capability against terrorism, which is obvious by the title and made apparent by 
the introduction of numerous sections of the USC that specifically address 
terrorism.212 One recurring criticism, however, involves the definition of terrorist 
activity, which was expanded to include the vague term, “domestic terrorism.”213 
While seemingly straightforward, there are many more innocuous activities that 
can easily meet the criteria for this definition—for example, a protest gone-awry. 
This ambiguity favors an increase in the number and type of instances under 
which the federal government can conduct investigations and possibly achieve 
convictions.214 This concern is exacerbated further by parallel measures that 
broaden the authorities for the type of communications that the federal 
government can intercept and the conditions under which they can be 
intercepted and stored. Many of these provisions relate to the prevention, 
detection, and prosecution of personnel or institutions with international ties to 
money laundering associated with financing terrorist groups.215 Other measures, 
however are not so high profile, and can effectively lower the threshold for 
                                                 
212 8 USC §1226A, 15 USC §1681v, 18 USC §§ 175b,1992,2339,2712, 31 USC § 5318A, 50 
USC § 403-5b (now § 3143), and 51 USC § 5103a. Further, 18 USC §§ 2339,2339A, 
2339B,2339C,2339D relate to harboring, supporting, financing, and receiving training from 
terrorists and terrorist organizations. 
213 18 USC § 2331(5). “The term "domestic terrorism" means activities that— (A) involve acts 
dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any 
State; (B) appear to be intended— (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;(ii) to influence 
the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a 
government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and (C) occur primarily within the 
territorial jurisdiction of the United States. 
214 See generally, United States Secret Service, “CYBER CRIME: The U.S. Secret Service 
Partners with State, Local and International Law Enforcement to Pursue the World’s Most Wanted 
Cyber Criminals,” trifold handout at Massachusetts Collectors and Treasurers Association Virtual 
Conference, 2015 (Washington DC: DHS, 2015) http://mcta.virtualtownhall.net/pages/ 
MCTA_Presentations/2015-06/USSS%20Cyber%20Programs%20phamphlet%203-13-15.pdf. 
Pamphlet boasts that “since 2001, the USSS has arrested over 10,000 suspects for cyber crime 
related violations, and prevented over $13 billion in potential losses to victims. Finally, the USSS 
has continued its long-standing tradition of excellent partnerships with U.S. Attorneys’ Offices, 
achieving a high conviction rate of 99.4% for all cases that went to trial” (author’s emphasis). 
215 Amended 18 USC §§ 981,1956(c)(7)(D), et seq. 
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conviction with many violations of federal law showing no punitive difference 
between conspiracy to commit the act and committing the act itself.216 
Greater fidelity, however, is gradually being achieved in this area. The 
definition so far remains unchanged, but critical amendments in 2006 to sections 
like “Civil Forfeiture”217 no longer address domestic terrorism as a generality. 
Instead, this revised section references a list of specific terrorist acts that must be 
engaged in before a person is made subject to the punitive measures of that 
statute.218 Even with these amendments, significant search and seizure 
concerns exist and, more pertinent to ensuing discussion, areas like cyberspace 
remain open to broad interpretation. This is especially evident in those sections 
that relate terrorist activities to computers.219 
This area of crimes as they relate to networks and information technology 
will occupy the remainder of USA PATRIOT Act discussions here. In contrast to 
legislative discussions thus far, in which significant abstractions must be 
overcome in order to establish relevance within the context of inter-title 
cyberspace operations, the trio of Acts that follow—FISA, ECPA, and CFAA—
directly address and more closely relate to the cyberspace domain. CISA shares 
many of the same concerns with these preceding three, but will be discussed in 
its own section since it is well removed—by more than a decade—from the initial 
intentions of the USA PATRIOT Act. 
                                                 
216 18 USC §§ 81,930, et seq. 
217 18 USC § 981 
218 Relevant sections still maintain broad definitions for domestic terrorism in their statutory 
application (c.f., 11 USC § 101, 18 USC §§ 226,1001,1028,1505, 18 USC App Fed R Crim P 
Rule 41, 26 USC § 6103, 28 USC §§ 530C,599A,994, 42 USC §§ 300d-71,3714a, 50 USC §§ 
2314,3056). 
219 In accordance with 18 USC § 1030(a)(1), hackers who unlawfully access federal 
computers (as well as anyone supporting them pursuant to 18 USC §§ 2339, et seq.) can be 
charged with the federal crime of terrorism. Additionally, in accordance with 18 USC § 
1030(a)(5)(A), anyone responsible for the creation of a virus that damages another computer (as 
well as anyone supporting them, pursuant to 18 USC §§ 2339, et seq.) federal crime of terrorism. 
Additional provisions covering violations resulting in damage as defined in 18 USC § 
1030(c)(4)(A)(i)(II) through (VI) can result in federal terrorism charges. Note: The federal crime of 
terrorism is defined in 18 USC § 2332b(g)(5). 
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FISA (50 USC §§ 1801, et seq.): The attacks of 9/11 have been previously 
cited—over several instances—as forcing a significant shift in policy and 
legislation that has subsequently led to both planned and unforeseen changes 
that affect U.S. operations in cyberspace. In most regards, these changes led to 
looser restriction and greater leeway for agencies in determining how to best 
approach foreign and domestic threats to national security. While by no means 
reversing this trend, the Snowden media leaks slowed these processes and 
made previously hidden aspects of the federal government the subject of public 
scrutiny. There was arguably no legislation more affected by this than FISA, 
which had congressional lawmakers scramble to propose a FISA Improvements 
Act220 less than six months after Edward Snowden became an internationally 
recognized name. This all happened despite the fact that even though the SSCI 
found “instances of inadvertent non-compliance;” the committee maintained that 
over the life of the bulk data collection program,221 they had “not identified a 
single case in which a government official engaged in a willful effort to circumvent 
                                                 
220 U.S. Congress, Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, FISA Improvements Act of 
2013, 113th Cong., 1st sess., 2013, S. 1631, https://www.congress.gov/113/bills/s1631/BILLS-
113s1631pcs.pdf. The intention of this bill was, more or less, achieved by the sunset provisions of 
the USA PATRIOT Act (Pub. L. 107-56 s. 215) and subsequent amendments as contained in the 
USA FREEDOM Act of 2015. U.S. Congress, House, Committees on Oversight and Government 
Reform, et al., A Bill to Repeal the Cybersecurity Act of 2015, 114th Cong., 2nd sess., 2016, H.R. 
4350, https://www.congress.gov/114/bills/hr4350/BILLS-114hr4350ih.pdf 
221 See ACCESS TO RECORDS AND OTHER ITEMS UNDER THE FOREIGN 
INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT. Pub. L. 107-56, s. 215. See also Barack Hussein 
Obama, et al., appellants v. Larry Elliott Klayman, et al., appellees, in Court Decision of U.S.D.C. 
D.C.C., No. 14-5004 (2015), https://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/opinions.nsf/ 
ED64DC482F286F1785257EAF004F71E8/$file/14-5004-1570210.pdf. The court decision 
vacated a preliminary injunction entered by the District of Columbia Circuit Court after 
determining that there were no additional restrictions imposed by the 180-day extension afforded 
by s. 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act following its expiration (cf. Klayman v. Obama, D.D.C., 13-
CV-851, ECF No. 77 (2014)). This ruling effectively extended the bulk data collection program out 
to December 1, 2015. The extensions—provided for in the USA FREEDOM Act—were intended 
to facilitate a progressive draw-down in dependency on this type of collection. See also Ellen 
Nakashima, “NSA’s Bulk Collection of Americans’ Phone Records Ends Sunday,” Washington 
Post, November 27, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/ world/national-security/nsas-bulk-
collection-of-americans-phone-records-ends-sunday/2015/11/27/75dc62e2-9546-11e5-a2d6-
f57908580b1f_story.html. 
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or violate Section 215 in the conduct of the bulk telephone metadata 
program.”222 
These increasingly frequent federal responses were a clear indication of 
just how significantly FISA had changed since the original was passed in 
1978.223 Furthermore, the variation of responses showed that following this new 
statutory framework for electronic surveillance was evidently more difficult than 
originally anticipated with the additional contexts of counterterrorism, homeland 
security, and cybersecurity that have characterized the post-9/11 United States. 
It was in an attempt to address these contexts that the framework for FISA was 
significantly amended under the USA PATRIOT Act for the purpose of enabling 
counterterrorism efforts and assuring homeland security. The most significant 
increase in capability and authorities, however, did not come until the Protect 
America Act (PAA) of 2007224 was signed into law. This act—effectively 
reauthorized by the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (FAA)225 and re-provisioned 
under the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015226—modernized FISA to enable 
intelligence agencies to support national interests in light of rapid technological 
advances. 
As FISA has been more frequently applied to cyberspace operations, an 
item of increasing importance is an understanding of how electronic surveillance 
is defined by this Act, since it differs significantly from the interception of 
electronic communications under ECPA statutes. 50 USC § 1801(f) defines 
“electronic surveillance” as: 
 (1) the acquisition by [any surveillance device] of the contents of 
any wire or radio communication sent by or intended to be received 
                                                 
222 See BACKGROUND AND NEED FOR LEGISLATION. Senate, FISA Improvements Act 
of 2013, 1–4. 
223 See generally Wikipedia, s.v. "Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act," last modified 
February 28, 2016, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_Intelligence_Surveillance_Act. 
224 Pub. L. 110-55 
225 Pub. L. 110-261 
226 Pub. L. 114-23 
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by a particular, known United States person who is in the United 
States227 (emphasis mine). 
(2) the acquisition by [any surveillance device] of the contents of 
any wire communication to or from a person in the United States, 
without the consent of any party thereto228 (emphasis mine). 
(3) the intentional acquisition by [any surveillance device] of the 
contents of any radio communication, under circumstances in which 
a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant 
would be required for law enforcement purposes [if sender and all 
recipients are in the United States] (emphasis mine). 
(4) the installation or use of [any surveillance device] in the United 
States for monitoring to acquire information, other than from a wire 
or radio communication, under circumstances in which a person 
has a reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be 
required for law enforcement purposes (emphasis mine). 
The emphasis in these relevant statutes is intended to demonstrate the 
broad nature of these definitions, which has the capacity to encompass every 
electronic communication that passes within the grasp of the IC—within the 
jurisdiction of foreign intelligence and other exceptions. However, while the 
definition remains broad, the restrictions against using FISA are plentiful. In the 
first instance, facts must be submitted to the Attorney General that give probable 
cause to believe that “the target of the electronic surveillance is a foreign power 
or the agent of a foreign power.”229 This stipulation is further restricted by forcing 
the exclusion of all evidence that may be protected under the First Amendment. 
In other words, the federal government is not allowed to surveil someone based 
on expressions of free speech as protected under First Amendment constitutional 
rights. 
                                                 
227 50 USC § 1801(f)(1) further stipulates “if the contents are acquired by intentionally 
targeting that United States person, under circumstances in which a person has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required for law enforcement purposes.” 
228 50 USC § 1801(f)(2) further stipulates “if such acquisition occurs in the United States, but 
does not include the acquisition of those communications of computer trespassers that would be 
permissible under section 2511(2)(i) of Title 18.” 
229 50 USC § 1805(a) 
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FISA additionally allows for the employment of pen register and trap and 
trace surveillance devices. Pen register devices are used to capture destination 
information for outgoing communications. Trap and trace devices capture the 
information coming to the source (trap) and then subsequently enumerate 
information about its originating point as well as the communication path (trace). 
The ECPA—discussed later—employs these for domestic investigations, while 
FISA investigations are for the purpose of obtaining “foreign intelligence 
information230 or to “protect against international terrorism or clandestine 
intelligence activities.”231 
This narrow area aside, investigations approved under FISA are merely 
required to have foreign intelligence as “a significant purpose of the 
surveillance.”232 This may appear to broaden the scope for electronic 
surveillance, but when issuing a court order under FISA, approval is dependent 
on the intention of the surveillance being for the purpose of foreign 
intelligence.233 That is not to say that relevant and legally obtainable information 
gathered over the course of the surveillance must be discarded. Instead, it simply 
requires that any FISA-approved surveillance be for the primary purpose of 
foreign intelligence.234 For cyberspace operations, FISA allows for inter-title 
cooperation,235 but its narrow focus likely requires that FISA considerations be 
used in a complimentary role for operations with a broader scope. 
Business records are also subject to FISA inquiry.236 Interestingly, 
however, the FBI is the only agency permitted to submit applications for this 
                                                 
230 Pursuant to 50 USC § 1842(a)(1), foreign intelligence information for pen register and 
trap and trace devices are not authorized to concern a United States person. 
231 50 USC § 1842(a)(1) 
232 50 USC § 1804(a)(6)(B) relating to electronic surveillance, 50 USC § 1823(a)(6)(B) 
relating to physical searches, 50 USC § 1881a(g)(2)(A)(v),1881b(1)F)(ii),1881c(b)(5)(B) 
pertaining to certain persons outside the United States. 
233 As described in 50 USC § 1801(e) pertaining to electronic surveillance. 
234 In accordance with the definition set forth in 50 USC § 1842(a)(1). 
235 In accordance with presidential policy (c.f., EO 12139, s. 1-103). 
236 50 USC § 1801 
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information. This does not necessarily restrict other members of the IC from 
accessing this information or making requests for it, but simply requires that all 
requests be ultimately vetted and submitted by the Director of the FBI.237 
One final consideration is of particular importance and concerns the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court’s (FISC) burden of proof for refusing an 
erroneous federal application. After a FISA application has been appropriately 
vetted and determined to align with definitions and purposes, the FISC is then 
required to issue a court order so long as the application and its supporting 
information is “not clearly erroneous.”238 In the minds of some, this has the 
appearance of spuriously favoring intelligence agencies, but this concern, 
however appropriate, is not a malformation of jurisprudence. In light of the 
extensively detailed information requirements and the extensive vetting process 
that precedes application submissions for court orders,239 the burden of proof, 
which rests on the FISA Courts, assures a normative response once federal 
mandates have been met. Those who are concerned with the structure of this 
process would likely be astonished at conditions under which electronic 
surveillance may be authorized without a court order.240 Even in these cases, 
however, the Attorney General must certify that there “is no substantial likelihood 
that the surveillance will acquire the contents of any communication to which a 
United States person is a party.”241 
The point here—indeed throughout—is not to uncover discomforts with the 
current legal process, even if they pose relevant questions to executive 
                                                 
237 Or, as stipulated in 50 USC § 1801(a), applications may also be submitted by “a 
designee of the Director (whose rank shall be no lower than Assistant Special Agent in Charge).” 
238 Pursuant to 50 USC § 1805(a)(4). 
239 Pursuant to 50 USC § 1804. 
240 Pursuant to 50 USC § 1802. 
241 50 USC § 1802(a)(1)(B). See OTHER POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF NEW SECTIONS 105A, 
105B, and 105C. Elizabeth B. Bazan, The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: Overview and 
Modifications (New York: Nova Science, 2008), 11–14. Though her exceptional work on FISA in 
now slightly dated in light of FAA amendments, Bazan maintains many relevant positions on other 
possibly objectionable actions that have the potential to allow for circumventing the oversight of 
the FISC. 
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procedure. Instead, these lines of examination are intended to show that, no 
matter how contentious, the extensive processes that are currently in place 
provide the necessary oversight and compliance to enable expanded cooperative 
efforts between agencies that may traditionally be more familiar with operating 
along narrower lines of authorities. This oversight and compliance is one of the 
key discussion points and, in the specific case of FISA, it is clear that it extends 
well beyond the FISA Courts. The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 
of the House of Representatives (HPSCI) and the Select Committee on 
Intelligence of the Senate also have extensive oversight to ensure compliance 
with all aspects of the FISA program,242 and legislation affords aggrieved parties 
to appeal decisions243 or to retrospectively recoup damages associated with 
FISA violations. 
ECPA (18 USC § 2510, et seq.):244 The ECPA was significantly modified 
by the USA PATRIOT Act to provide greater clarity to jurisdictions as they 
applied to new and emerging technologies. Behaviors and methods associated 
                                                 
242 Pursuant to 50 USC §§ 1807,1808 relating to electronic surveillance; 50 USC § 1826 
relating to physical searches; 50 USC § 1846 relating to pen registers and trap and trace devices; 
50 USC § 1862 relating to business records; 50 USC §§ 1871, et seq. relating to program 
oversight; 50 USC § 1881f relating to additional procedures. 
243 See generally “Statement by the ODNI and the U.S. DOJ on the Declassification of 
Documents Related to the Protect America Act Litigation,” Office of the Director of National 




company, Yahoo!, “opposed the U.S. Government’s motion to compel compliance with [FISA] 
directives primarily on the ground that the directives violated the Fourth Amendment rights of its 
customers. On April 25, 2008, following extensive briefing by the parties, the FISC held that the 
directives were lawful and ordered Yahoo! to comply.” 
244 See generally Donald P. Delaney, Dorothy E. Denning, John Kaye and Alan R. 
McDonald, Wiretap Laws and Procedures: What Happens When the U.S. Government Taps a 
Line, white paper distributed by D.E. Denning, Professor and Chair Computer Science 
Department at Georgetown University (Washington DC: Georgetown University, 1993), 
http://faculty.nps.edu/dedennin/ publications/WiretapLawsProcedures.txt. This part of ECPA was 
actually an amendment of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, which 
contained a wiretap statute that already covered wire and oral communications. The ECPA added 
electronic communications so as to clarify that electronic communications were also protected 
from access. See also DEFINITIONS. 47 USC § 1001. Definitions altered by the USA PATRIOT 
Act of 2001 provided significant increases in authority for the FBI—most especially in the area of 
counterterrorism. 
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with using these technologies were as influential in legislation and subsequent 
legal opinions as the technology itself. The amended version of the ECPA 
protects all wire, oral, and electronic communications during their inception, 
transmission, or storage. ECPA provides protections for private chat, email, and 
electronically stored data, and also protects telephone conversations delivered 
through both the Public Switched Telephone Network (PTSN) and Voice over IP 
(VoIP). 
The ECPA has three titles. Title I, often referred to as the Wiretap Act,245 
prohibits the intentional attempted or actual interception of any “wire, oral, or 
electronic communication” or the intentional disclosure of such information if it 
was obtained in violation of federal law.246 It also prevents all subsequent 
information from being used in court if its procurement was federally 
prohibited.247 Though the Wiretap Act is contained in Title 18, it is by no means 
isolated from other title authorities. For example, this section of the ECPA makes 
provision for collection that is for the purposes of foreign intelligence authorized 
under FISA.248  
There are three significant exceptions to the Wiretap Act that affect 
cyberspace operations. The first allows “for an officer, employee, or agent of the 
United States in the normal course of his official duty to conduct electronic 
                                                 
245 18 USC §§ 2510–2522 
246 Pursuant to 18 USC § 2511. 
247 Pursuant to 18 USC § 2515. 
248 18 USC sec 2511(2)(a)(iii)) 
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surveillance.”249 The second is a "provider" exception that allows service 
providers to supply customer records and monitor calls or record information 
when directed by law enforcement officers operating under a valid court order,250 
in the course of normal service provision,251 for maintenance related 
purposes,252 or in the protection of their property.253 The third exception is 
applicable “where one of the parties to the communication has given prior 
consent to such interception.”254 
Title II255 of the ECPA is referred to as the Stored Communications Act 
(SCA)256 and is focused on providing privacy protections against the 
unauthorized viewing of electronic files and associated records that are stored by 
service providers. These provisions broadly cover personal identifiers like 
subscriber and billing information as well as any applicable IP ranges. The 
structure of the SCA is unique because it varies the degree to which privacy 
                                                 
249 Pursuant to 18 USC § 2511(2)(e) “as defined in section 101 of the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978.” Though patently obvious, the “normal course of law 
enforcement” is subject to the rigorous statutes governing federal investigations and criminal 
procedure. See SPECIFIC PROVISIONS. “Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 
(ECPA), 18 U.S.C. § 2510–22,” DOJ Bureau of Justice Assistance, DHS Office for Civil Rights 
and Civil Liberties, DHS Privacy Office, last modified July 30, 2013, https://it.ojp.gov/ 
privacyliberty/authorities/statutes/1285. “[ECPA] provides procedures for Federal, State, and 
other government officers to obtain judicial authorization for intercepting such communications, 
and regulates the use and disclosure of information obtained through authorized wiretapping. 18 
U.S.C. § 2516–18. A judge may issue a warrant authorizing interception of communications for up 
to 30 days upon a showing of probable cause that the interception will reveal evidence that an 
individual is committing, has committed, or is about to commit a "particular offense" listed in § 
2516. 18 U.S.C. § 2518.” 
250 Pursuant to 18 USC § 2511(2)(a)(ii) 
251 Pursuant to 18 USC §§ 2511(2)(a)(i),2702(b)(5). This can include random monitoring that 
is intended to report the health of the system or ensure network optimization. 
252 Pursuant to 18 USC § 2511(2)(a)(i) 
253 Ibid. One example of service providers using this property protection clause is to monitor 
or prevent the use of their network from unauthorized users. 
254 Pursuant to 18 USC § 2511(2)(d) 
255 18 USC §§ 2701–2712 
256 See NOTE 1. Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section (CCIPS), Searching and 
Seizing Computers and Obtaining Electronic Evidence In Criminal Investigations, (Washington 
DC: Office of Legal Education, 2009), 115, http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ criminal-
ccips/legacy/2015/01/14/ssmanual2009.pdf. “Although 18 U.S.C. § 2701–2712 is referred to as 
the “Stored Communications Act” here and elsewhere, the phrase “Stored Communications Act” 
appears nowhere in the language of the statute” 
  85 
concerns apply based on the type of information being stored.257 For example, 
from the perspective of ECPA, the contents of stored emails are of significantly 
higher concern than information associated with the subscriber. A consequence 
of this is the variety of legal processes that must be followed based on the nature 
of the desired content, to include a subpoena, special court order, or even a 
search warrant. Of even greater concern are the provisions that may or may not 
even require the subscriber to be notified of certain federal actions. The few 
exceptions that permit access to stored communications appear to favor the 
subscriber by offering “varying degrees of legal protection depending on the 
perceived importance of the privacy interest involved.”258 
The third and final section259 of the ECPA is closely related to the first and 
the pair of them are primarily responsible for enabling real-time electronic 
surveillance as part of ongoing federal criminal investigations.260 This section 
outlines authorities and procedures for obtaining court orders for the employment 
of the pen register and trap and trace surveillance devices covered previously 
under FISA discussions. Since no communication content is captured by these 
devices, they are often required to be used in conjunction with provisions under 
the Wiretap Act in order to gain insight into the exact nature of the electronic 
communication. 
CFAA (18 USC § 1030): The CFAA has been amended numerous times 
since it was first passed in 1986, including its own inception, which was really an 
amendment to the provisions of the computer fraud law that was incorporated 
                                                 
257 See APPENDIX B – Quick Reference Guide for the Stored Communications Act. 
258 Ibid., 115. 
259 18 USC §§ 3121–3127 
260 See ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE IN COMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS. CCIPS, 
Searching and Seizing Computers and Obtaining Electronic Evidence In Criminal Investigations, 
151–90. 
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into legislation from 1984.261 In January of 2015, President Barak Obama 
proposed legislation262 that would more effectively combat cybercrime through 
expanded authorities to both the CFAA and the Racketeer Influenced and 
Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act.263 This announcement met with notable 
public criticism as proposed expansions to authorities were perceived as 
diversion from the original intent of the CFAA.264 
Attempts to revise and clarify laws based on changes to the cyberspace 
landscape are a normal course for most applicable legislation. Though difficulties 
exist in applying rapidly evolving processes and methodologies to the glacial 
pace of legislation, the DOJ in particular has made significant inroads through 
extensive policies and procedure manuals—most especially those that address 
federal laws as they relate to computer crimes.265 These manuals specifically 
concentrate on crimes that target information technology or are enabled by it. For 
                                                 
261 The computer fraud law created 18 USC § 1030 under the Comprehensive Crime Control 
Act of 1984 (Pub. L. 98-473). The CFAA that amended it has since received minor amendments 
in 1988 (Pub. L. 100-690), 1989 (Pub. L. 101-73), 1990 (Pub. L. 101-647), 1994 (Pub. L. 102-
322), and 2002 (Pub. L. 107–273 and 107–296) with major revisions in 1996 (Pub. L. 104–294), 
under the USA PATRIOT Act in 2001 (Pub. L. 107–56), and in 2008 (Pub. L. 110–326). 
262 See “SECURING CYBERSPACE - President Obama Announces New Cybersecurity 
Legislative Proposal and Other Cybersecurity Efforts,” Office of the Press Secretary press 
release, January 13, 2015, accessed August 11, 2015, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2015/01/13/securing-cyberspace-president-obama-announces-new-cybersecurity-legislat. 
263 Pub. L. 91-452 leading to the creation of 18 USC §§ 1961, et seq. The Act was a 
response to growing criminal influence by Organized Crime syndicates. Cf. RICO’S 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY. Organized Crime and Racketeering Section, Criminal RICO: 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 1961–1968, A Manual for Federal Prosecutors, 5th ed. (Washington DC: DOJ, 2009), 3–16, 
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usam/legacy/2014/10/17/rico.pdf. 
264 See generally “Lofgren, Wyden, Paul Introduce Bipartisan, Bicameral Aaron’s Law to 
Reform Computer Fraud and Abuse Act,” press release by Peter Whippy, April 21, 2015, 
accessed August 11, 2015, https://lofgren.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx? 
DocumentID=397911. See also Mark Jaycox, “Broad Coalition of Groups Oppose CFAA 
Amendment to CISA Surveillance Bill,” Electronic Frontier Foundation, October 3, 2015, 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/10/bipartisan-groups-oppose-cfaa-amendment-cisa-
surveillance-bill. 
265 See CCIPS, supra note 260. See also PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS. 
Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section, Prosecuting Computer Crimes, 2nd ed. 
(Washington DC: Office of Legal Education, 2015), v-vi, https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ 
criminal-ccips/legacy/2015/01/14/ccmanual.pdf. The CFAA is limited in that it cannot cover every 
issue, like “state [laws] [nor] […] every type of crime related to computers, such as child 
pornography or phishing.” See APPENDIX A. Id. at 149–55. Even with these limitations, however, 
there are still considerable provisions under Title 18 for procedures that enables prevention of 
cybercrime under applicable sections (i.e., 18 USC §§ 875, 1343, 1951, 2251, et seq.). 
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the FBI, it is significant to note that computer crime is synonymous with 
cybercrime and network crime. Examples of cybercrime that are specifically 
envisioned by this Act include those that are “interstate in nature” and include 
methods like DOS, DDOS, computer and network intrusions, and the implanting 
of malicious code.266 These manuals are unable to address every concern, but 
instead provide guidelines for clarifying investigative procedure as it relates to the 
nature of the cybercrime.  
The overall intent of the law and subsequent amendments has been to 
equate criminal conduct with any activity that victimizes computers and computer 
networks. There are seven distinct types of criminal activity that are considered 
violations of the CFAA (Fig. 1). Shocking as it may be, when viewed as a whole, 
these seven criminal violations effectively cover ever computer, and computer 
device in the world. Even though the term “protected computer” portends to 
address only computers owned by the government, and those relevant to 
national security and the economy, in practice it has constituted every computer 
that is connected to the Internet.267  
                                                 
266 Ibid. 
267 See PROTECTED COMPUTER. Corey Varma, “What is the Computer Fraud and Abuse 
Act (CFAA)?,” Cyberspace Law, Information Technology And Privacy Law, January 3, 2015 
http://www.coreyvarma.com/2015/01/what-is-the-computer-fraud-and-abuse-act-
cfaa/#protected_computer. “In US v. Trotter, the Defendant argued that his former employer’s 
computer network was not a ‘protected computer’ as set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2)(B). The 
8th Circuit rejected this claim and affirmed the Defendant’s conviction because the Defendant 
admitted, at a plea hearing, that his former employer’s network was connected to the Internet. 
The Court used this admission to determine the computer network met the statutory definition of a 
‘protected computer.’” 
  88 
Figure 1.  Summary of CFAA Penalties 
 
Source: Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section, Prosecuting 
Computer Crimes, 2nd ed. (Washington DC: Office of Legal Education, 2015), 3. 
Upon initial examination, the law appears designed to target two types of 
perpetrators through two key distinctions. This first concerns those who access a 
computer based on the sole condition that it is done “without authorization.”268 
The second includes an additional provision that the perpetrator “exceeds 
authorized access.”269 There is also a third provision that broadly covers 
extortion that is coerced through threats to commit these preceding violations.270 
In the first instance, the term “without authorization” appears to be plainly obvious 
because it is not included in the section under definitions. In the second instance, 
however, the term “exceeds authorized access” is defined as an instance where 
a perpetrator has authorized “access to a computer” and uses that access “to 
obtain or alter information in the computer that [he] is not entitled [to].”271 From 
this, the two key distinctions appear to be based loosely on crimes perpetrated 
                                                 
268 Relevant sections include 18 U.S.C. §§ 1030(a)(3),1030(a)(5),1030(a)(6). 
269 Relevant sections include id. at §§ 1030(a)(1),1030(a)(2),1030(a)(4). 
270 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(7). 
271 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(6). 
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by insider threats and those perpetrated by outsider threats.272 According to the 
FBI’s manual on Prosecuting Computer Crimes, 
The legislative history of the CFAA reflects an expectation that 
persons who “exceed authorized access” will be insiders (e.g., 
employees using a victim’s corporate computer network), while 
persons who access computers “without authorization” will typically 
be outsiders (e.g., hackers).273 
Those threats that deal with national security entail threats from both 
insiders and outsiders, while trespassing, computer damage, and password 
stealing are seen as almost strictly involving outsiders. The difference between 
insiders and outsiders is significant when introducing the idea of inter-title 
cooperation, most especially as it involves the military. Since special emergency 
circumstances are unlikely—though not impossible—to justify the use of the 
military, threats that are perpetrated solely by domestic insiders would likely 
exclude military involvement except as authorized under relevant intelligence 
sharing provisions.274 
For investigations involving outsiders who are not U.S. persons or are 
U.S. persons who may be investigated pursuant to applicable sections of FISA, 
inter-title cooperation may be a legally viable avenue and fiscally desirable 
avenue. Involvement from the armed forces, DHS, the NSA, the Coast Guard, or 
any number of agencies may be desirable so long as those agencies are 
                                                 
272 See CYBERCRIME LAW: A UNITED STATES PERSPECTIVE. Susan W. Brenner, 
Digital Evidence and Computer Crime: Forensic Science, Computers and the Internet, 3rd ed., 
ed. Eoghan Casey (New York: Academic Press, 2011), 85–122. The threat from an involves 
primarily insider activity concern threats that are introduced by a trusted user with authorized 
access to a computer. Though this includes unknowing individuals, 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(6) makes 
clear that the perpetrator must ‘knowingly’ or ‘intentionally’ commit the alleged offenses. Outsider 
threats, by contrast, are perpetrated by individuals who have “no authorization to access the 
computer or computer system.” 
273 CCIPS, Prosecuting Computer Crimes, 5-6. “See S. Rep. No. 99-432, at 10 (1986), 
reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2479 (discussing section 1030(a)(5), ‘insiders, who are authorized 
to access a computer, face criminal liability only if they intend to cause damage to the computer, 
not for recklessly or negligently causing damage. By contrast, outside intruders who break into a 
computer could be punished for any intentional, reckless, or other damage they cause by their 
trespass.’); S. Rep. No. 104-357, at 11 (1996), available at 1996 WL 492169; United States v. 
Phillips, 477 F.3d 215, 219 (5th Cir. 2007) (discussing legislative history)." 
274 See supra note 197. 
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equipped with some unique capability to aid in prosecution or are not degraded in 
their own primary mission areas by providing assistance. This is especially true 
for instances involving violations that threaten national security—a topic for which 
there is significant overlap between countless federal agencies.275 These 
considerations do not appear to be recent revelations for legislators who 
apparently recognize the overlap and clarify that the CFAA is not intended to 
“prohibit any lawfully authorized investigative, protective, or intelligence activity of 
a law enforcement agency […] or of an intelligence agency.” 
There are certainly more considerations than those listed previously, like 
ensuring compliance and reporting with relevant sections on oversight,276 but 
necessary training and compliance measures are not beyond the capability of a 
lead agency to coordinate and implement. For cases of CFAA violations, the FBI 
is designated as the “primary authority to investigate offenses” to National 
Security Information277 “involving espionage, foreign counterintelligence, 
information protected against unauthorized disclosure for reasons of national 
defense or foreign relations.”278 Specifically, any pending investigation or 
indictment under 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(1) “requires the prior approval of the 
National Security Division of the Department of Justice, through the 
Counterespionage Section.”279 As stated earlier, however, the delineation of lead 
authorities and coordinating bodies does not preclude the involvement of other 
entities. 
                                                 
275 See generally “National Security Council,” U.S. White House, accessed March 11, 2016, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/nsc. “The NSC is chaired by the President. Its 
regular attendees [are] […] the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of 
Defense, and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff is the statutory military advisor to the Council, and the Director of National 
Intelligence is the intelligence advisor. […] The Attorney General and […] [the] heads of other 
executive departments and agencies, as well as other senior officials, are invited to attend 
meetings of the NSC when appropriate” (emphasis mine). 
276 18 USC § 1030(h) et al. 
277 Pursuant to 18 USC § 1030(a)(1). 
278 18 USC § 1030(d) 
279 CCIPS, “Prosecuting Computer Crimes,” 12. 
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A good example of the potential for unifying inter-title efforts among 
cyberspace operators can be seen in the example of the five Chinese hackers 
who were charged by the DOJ in 2014 with violations of the CFAA.280 Though 
there was no accompanied acknowledgement of involvement from other federal 
agencies or entities, the overlap that exists between the FBI and DHS in terms of 
critical infrastructure protection (CIP), the armed forces in the operational 
preparation of the environment (OPE), the NSA and CIA in their scope of foreign 
intelligence concerns are all examples of where title authorities would enable 
operations aimed at neutralizing the activities of these Chinese hackers. It is also 
of little concern that those aims may differ significantly between agencies and 
organizations. The FBI may be seeking indictment, while DHS may support 
operations in order to protect Critical Infrastructure stakeholders, the NSA may 
desire to infiltrate and enumerate foreign hacker networks, and the armed forces 
may seek to establish a capability against any of the observed cyberspace 
methodologies. These intentions matter little so long as they are authorized and 
cooperation is not explicitly prohibited. 
e. CISA (Pub. L. 114-113, Div. N, Title I) 
Passing as part of an omnibus bill281 that appeared designed to address 
federal funding, CISA was signed into law less than two weeks before the New 
Year. The effects of its controversial passing remain a constant topic among 
                                                 
280 See generally United States of America v. Wang Dong, et al., in Criminal Complaint of 
U.S.D.C. W.D.P., No. 14-118 (2014), http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/ 
5122014519132358461949.pdf. Of the 31 purported violations brought against the Chinese 
hackers identified by the DOJ, there was one count of “Conspiring to commit computer fraud and 
abuse” pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1030(b), eight counts of “Accessing (or attempting to access) a 
protected computer without authorization to obtain information for the purpose of commercial 
advantage and private financial gain” pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 1030(a)(2)(C),1030(c)(2)(B)(i)-(iii), 
and 14 counts of “Transmitting a program, information, code, or command with the intent to cause 
damage to protected computers” pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 1030(a)(5)(A),1030(c)(4)(B). 
281 Pub. L. 114-113. 
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government cybersecurity experts, legislators, and privacy advocates.282 The 
arguments are many and varied, and while this paper takes no position on the 
ethics position in legislation, it is worth stating that the concepts of security and 
privacy are interdependent. The fact that the government has access to 
information that is protected by privacy laws does not make their accessing of it 
irrefutably illegal or unethical. The preceding discussions show that there are 
significant divergences between federal provision to national cybersecurity and 
private sector’s provision of cybersecurity on behalf of themselves. In many 
ways, CISA aims to remove these obstacles and to allow time-sensitive data to 
be shared between industry and federal entities in ways that lead to an effective 
response to the ever-increasing losses experienced due to cybercrime.283 This 
aim, however, does not allay fears and suspicion, nor does it solve the numerous 
potential conflicts that CISA poses to the legal frameworks of other laws. 
Since this law primarily addresses domestic industry, pertinent concerns 
generally affect provisions pursuant to ECPA and CFAA as they relate to due 
process. As noted by numerous critics, CISA’s current wording enables network 
monitoring, information sharing, and defensive measures to be enacted so long 
as they are “for a cybersecurity purpose.”284 CISA defines “cybersecurity 
purpose” as “the purpose of protecting an information system or information that 
is stored on, processed by, or transiting an information system from a 
cybersecurity threat or security vulnerability.”285 While this is not a complete 
suspension of ECPA provisions, it gives a wide berth for industry to monitor their 
networks and to share cybersecurity-relevant information. More than that, CISA 
                                                 
282 See generally, Cory Bennett, “Cybesecurity’s Winners and Losers,” The Hill, December 
19, 2015, http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/263785-cybesecuritys-winners-and-losers. See 
also Larry Greenemeier, “A Quick Guide to the Senate's Newly Passed Cybersecurity Bill: The 
Basics of the Controversial Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act (CISA),” Scientific American, 
October 28, 2015, http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/a-quick-guide-to-the-senate-s-newly-
passed-cybersecurity-bill. 
283 See supra note 50. 
284 Pub. L. 114-113, Div. N, Title I, ss. 104(a)(1),(b)(1),(c)(1) 
285 Id. at s. 102(4). 
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adds “notwithstanding” clauses to these information-sharing sections286 that 
allow industry to effectively suspend provisions under ECPA’s Wiretap Act so 
long as their actions are conducted under cybersecurity purposes. 
These provisions, while unsettling in any other setting, are not so shocking 
in the context of cyberspace. While the ECPA definitions may allow for 
monitoring on standard network nodes,287 it has traditionally been interpreted to 
prevent the intentional interception of any information and further restricts the 
sharing of those “contents”288 without a court order. Since the “contents” of 
cyberspace information are defined as “any information concerning the 
substance, purport, or meaning of that communication,”289 industry cooperation 
on cybersecurity reporting may be easily interpreted as a violation of the Wiretap 
Act. Legal analyst, Susan Hennessey, notes that 
ECPA […] creates uncertainty [in the context of cybersecurity and] 
makes it difficult for companies to understand precisely what sort of 
monitoring is okay and what sort is a crime. Ambiguity in a 
litigation-averse culture runs contrary to a goal of responsible, 
proactive cybersecurity monitoring. Whether we like it or not, 
effective cybersecurity monitoring likely does extend to the contents 
of communications in at least some circumstances” (emphasis 
mine).290 
Hennessey’s opinion is certainly not definitive, but exposes the likely intent 
of this Act, which is the enablement of responsible cybersecurity measures that 
protect private industry and Critical Infrastructure. It may appear that simply 
obtaining the necessary consent or incorporating this information access into 
service agreements is a viable replacement for CISA provisions, but the 
                                                 
286 Supra note 283. 
287 See 18 USC §§ 2510(4),5(a)(ii). Under definitions for “intercept” and "electronic, 
mechanical, or other device," there may be latitude for interpreting cybersecurity devices as being 
“used by a provider of wire or electronic communication service in the ordinary course of its 
business.” 
288 18 USC § 2510(8). 
289 Ibid. 
290 See THE ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS PRIVACY ACT. Susan Hennessey, “The 
Problems CISA Solves: ECPA Reform in Disguise,” Lawfare, December 23, 2015 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/problems-cisa-solves-ecpa-reform-disguise. 
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inconsistency in legal application is a cause of concern for most service 
providers. For example, current trends in case law have taken notice of the 
extensive permissions granted to corporations through their terms of service and 
privacy agreements. The courts have responded by holding corporations 
accountable to their company norms for handling information instead of 
permitting them to leverage the extensive service agreements that allow for 
broad and ambiguous exceptions to privacy protections.291 
Despite the broad freedoms that it grants for industry sharing, for the 
purposes of cyberspace operations, CISA poses potential problems to inter-title 
cooperation. Even if industry is sharing information for cybersecurity purposes, it 
may be unclear whether the shared indicators have international elements or are 
of a purely domestic concern. In these cases, law enforcement related legal 
restrictions imposed by Posse Comitatus Act would become a major concern for 
any armed forces involvement. In spite of this, CISA very obviously enlists and 
necessitates cooperation between numerous departments and agencies of the 
federal government.292 In order to align the handling of information with 
applicable statutes, the CFAA assigns the development of policy and procedure 
to the Attorney General (head of DOJ) and the Secretary of Homeland 
Security.293 By placing the Secretary of Homeland Security as the lead agency 
for CISA-related information sharing provisions, CISA limits the possibilities for 
information abuse by making liability protection contingent on sharing with 
DHS.294 The Act does, however, allow for DHS to establish an automated 
                                                 
291 See THE CONSENT EXCEPTION. Ibid. 
292 Pub. L. 114-113, Div. N, Title I, ss. 103(a). “Consistent with the protection of classified 
information, intelligence sources and methods, and privacy and civil liberties, the Director of 
National Intelligence, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of Defense, and the 
Attorney General, in consultation with the heads of the appropriate Federal entities, shall jointly 
develop and issue procedures to facilitate and promote [information sharing]. (emphasis mine)” 
293 Id. at ss. 105(a)(4), et seq. 
294 See generally, Paul Rosenzweig, “The Cybersecurity Act of 2015,” Lawfare, December 
16, 2015, https://www.lawfareblog.com/cybersecurity-act-2015. 
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system for sharing information with other government agencies295 through non-
DHS centers subject to executive approval and congressional notification.296 
A particularly keen remark from Hennessy addresses the use of 
information that has been collected and shared pursuant to CISA. 
[This information] is limited not only by the express use provisions 
but also by all “otherwise applicable provisions of Federal law.” 
Legally speaking, this provision [means that] the government has to 
comply with the law. Thanks for pointing that out. But it also foot 
stomps an important point: Whatever the government could not do 
before, it cannot do now. The government use provisions operate 
exclusively as a limitation, and in no way expand the government’s 
authority. Therefore, whatever genuine civil liberties concerns CISA 
creates must derive from some new set of information that the 
government otherwise could not or would not obtain” (emphasis 
mine).297 
In this case, it should be clear that the provisions of the CFAA and ECPA 
must remain in place and that the provisions of CISA are not intended to allow 
the federal government to sweep aside privacy rights298 and access information 
that they are prohibited from viewing in the normal course of investigations. 
Instead, it appears designed to provide this information through channels that 
allow it to remain relevant to national cybersecurity objectives. 
There is no doubt that CISA enables the federal government to access 
data that was previously subject to court order, but this development does not 
equate to a carte blanche on cyberspace information. As stated earlier, the 
emergence of cyberspace legislation, imperfect as it may be, is a clear indication 
that cyberspace threats—whether emerging or persistent—require a response 
                                                 
295 See supra note 291. 
296 Rosenzweig, supra note 293. 
297 See generally Susan Hennessey, “CISA in Context: Government Use and What Really 
Matters for Civil Liberties,” Lawfare, January 14, 2016, https://www.lawfareblog.com/cisa-context-
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298 See generally Jennifer Granick, “OmniCISA Pits DHS Against the FCC and FTC on User 
Privacy,” Just Security, December 16, 2015, https://www.justsecurity.org/28386/omnicisa-pits-
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that, as yet, is not effectual under current legislation.299 This, and subsequent 
shifts in policy that aim to maximize inter-title cooperation, further shows that 
these threats are not easily addressed by any one department, agency, or private 
entity. The current architecture of information networks—connections, 
communications mediums, protocols, and network nodes—appears to require 
cooperation from all involved.  
                                                 
299 See DHS, supra note 8. 
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III. ENABLING INTER-TITLE OPERATIONS  
A. INTER-TITLE COOPERATION 
1. The Place of Policy 
Policy has played a central role in the functioning of the government since 
the earliest years following the founding of the United States. In the Post-
Revolutionary period, the disparity in power between the government and the 
local militia was surprisingly small. Aside from the warship, muskets and cannon 
were accessible enough to deem state militias an adequate measure for national 
security and a reasonable deterrent against any incentive for government 
tyranny. Indeed, this may likely have contributed to the vague requirements 
levied upon the executive powers as they are outlined in Article 2 of the U.S. 
Constitution. This marginal inequality increased over the next 150 years in favor 
of the federal government—specifically, the Executive branch—but it was the 
advent of the nuclear bomb that induced the most dramatic and irreversible 
change.300 
In the years that followed, legislative changes and legal interpretations 
attempted to balance the increased powers of the presidency with an appropriate 
level of accountability that still allowed the president to effectively execute the 
duties of the office. While legislation curtailing the power of the president was 
scarce at the outset, it eventually evolved so as to place both demands and 
limitations on the Executive branch in order to align executive action with the 
desires of Congress. Landmark legislation like the War Powers Resolution of 
1973,301 the Hughes-Ryan Amendment of 1974,302 FISA, and the Intelligence 
                                                 
300 Garry Willis, Bomb Power: The Modern Presidency and the National Security State (New 
York: Penguin Books, 2010) 1–4. For Willis, the advent of the atomic bomb in the 1940s 
“redefined the presidency […] [and] redefined the government as a National Security State, with 
an apparatus of secrecy and executive control.” 
301 50 USC §§ 1541, et seq. 
  98 
Oversight Act of 1991303 are all examples of the rebalancing of legislative and 
executive powers—not absent judiciary concurrence. In response to the 
aforementioned legislation, Executive Orders were issued by subsequent 
presidents Gerald Ford (EO 11905), Jimmy Carter (EO 12036), and Ronald 
Reagan (EO 12333) to reinforce this new balance, specifically as it pertained to 
interactions between intelligence entities—the CIA for example—and the armed 
forces. This is significant, because, as eluded to in previous sections, the unique 
response demanded from cyberspace has created similar tensions that are being 
resolved through available frameworks and the appropriate balance—in light of 
the emerging context of cyberspace304—continues to be refined through 
continual legislation and policy issuances. 
The current rebalancing, as it applies to cyberspace, may easily be 
characterized by greater turbulence than the preceding nuclear age. Not only is 
the advancement of information technology proceeding at a significantly faster 
pace, but the barriers to ascension are substantially lower for cyberspace than 
they were—and presumably still are—for nuclear technology. It is not surprising, 
therefore, that there is also a resurgence of executive behavior that is eerily 
reminiscent of the Cold War era. Seedier methods for protecting national security 
like torture and political assassinations—banned in 1996305 by legislation and 
                                                                                                                                                 
302 See generally James S. Van Wagenen, “A Review of Congressional Oversight: Critics 
and Defenders,” CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence, April 14, 2007, last modified June 27, 
2008, https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-
studies/studies/97unclass/wagenen.html. This was an “amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act 
of 1961 [that] addressed the question of CIA covert actions and prohibited the use of appropriated 
funds for their conduct unless and until the President ‘finds’ that each such operation is important 
to the national security and submits this Finding to the appropriate Congressional committees--a 
total of six committees.” 
303 Pub. L. 102-88. Title VI of this Act provided Congress with increased oversight of 
intelligence activities and specifically “bars the President from authorizing the conduct of covert 
actions” as outlined in the Act and further mandates congressional notification of any necessary 
covert activities “before the covert action is initiated.” 
304 There are inevitably dependencies between this emerging context—profoundly impacted 
by terrorism and networked technology—and the prominent rise of national security concerns 
over the latter half of the 20th century. In this emerging context, it is important to realize that the 
nature and accessibility of cyberspace dramatically shrinks the power disparity, but in no way 
removes previous technological advancements. 
305 Pub. L. 103-236 
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1976 by executive order,306 respectively—became acceptable tenets in early 
counterterrorism efforts.307 These inclinations, combined with a generally 
acknowledged need for total secrecy in active cyberspace operations, makes it of 
even greater importance that federal policies clearly discern the intent, extent, 
and provisions of the law. 
Federal policies not only provide a framework for effectively and legally 
accomplishing the goals of national security and furthering U.S. national 
interests, but they also work to mitigate risk and manage decision making.308 The 
relationship between policy and legislation is often misunderstood and the 
restrictions imposed by policy and procedures are often confused for restrictions 
imposed by the law. For example, the laws concerning FISA may state that the 
federal government must apply for a court order with the minimum information 
outlined in the statute, but the policy imposed by the president could place 
greater demands on those applications or even require that the information be 
further validated through a specific source or method. Furthermore, each agency 
can set up organizational policies that restrict the federal employees who may be 
responsible for initial vetting of applications before they are officially submitted to 
the Attorney General or forwarded on to the FISC. 
This murky environment is inundated with memoranda that are 
provisioned by various echelons of organizational policy that is in turn contingent 
                                                 
306 EO 11905 
307 Regarding TORTURE: The federal prohibition against torture (codified under 18 USC §§ 
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upon overarching legal and procedural policy that is ultimately subject to 
legislation. Ideally, this would make the lowest levels subject to the most 
restrictive aspects of policy, but this expectation is rarely the case when policies 
from one organization become entangled with the policies from another—as is 
often the case for inter-title operations. A classic example is found in the diverse 
classification policies that characterize various agencies within the federal 
government.309 The complex and diverse classification interpretations that exist 
between disparate government entities make information sharing an extremely 
difficult and complex endeavor. Prior to the information sharing mandates of 
2001, this is one of the reasons that agencies avoided planning and executing 
operations outside of their own organization.310 
Furthermore, the dynamics and dependencies of this environment are 
constantly churned by the current political climate, changing social context, and 
even operational outcomes. Not only that, but executive interpretation of 
legislation is subject to change and greatly affects when and how government 
departments and agencies leverage authorities to accomplish the goals of the 
executive administration. There is often a complex relationship between policy 
and legislation that is supplemented by innumerable amendments and 
repeals.311 Incomprehensive as it may be for present discussions, it shows the 
volatility with which policy, strategy, and even organizational identity change 
                                                 
309 See WHY OVERCLASSIFICATION OCCURS. Elizabeth Goitein and David M. Shapiro, 
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when compared with the significantly more stable course of legislation. Thus, the 
role of policy is necessary, but it does not factor in to current discussions with the 
same force of permanence that characterize examinations of legislation. 
Another consideration that frustrates inter-title cooperation is that as policy 
is created, it often seeks to avoid the precarious overlap between operations 
conducted on foreign soil and those conducted in defense of the homeland. 
These are especially pronounced in the areas of Homeland Security and 
counterterrorism. Even when developing policy for foreign intelligence operations 
in isolation from all else, however, there are concerns that must distinguish 
between traditional military operations and foreign intelligence gathering—the 
latter of which occurs under significantly more stringent requirements.312 The 
difficulties associated with forming and reforming these policies to address 
evolving threats are numerous, but recent policy interpretations of cyberspace-
relevant legislation has arguably favored inter-title cooperation more often than 
not.313 
Policies, therefore, provide an indication of the current course and 
direction that current executive administrations are taking and represent the 
potential for future administrations. Guantanamo is an excellent example of the 
potential of policy across administrations. On November 13, 2001, President 
George W. Bush signed a military order to convene a military tribunal that 
effectively turned the military base at Guantanamo Bay into a detention facility for 
alleged terrorists.314 Over eight years later, in response to this, President Barak 
Obama issued EO 13492315 calling for the prompt closure of the detention facility 
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after assigning an official disposition to those who were being detained. Just over 
two years after that order was issued, President Barak Obama followed it up with 
EO 13277,316 which allowed for continued detention of prisoners under similar 
justifications as President George W. Bush nearly a decade earlier. No significant 
legislative changes demanded these policy issuances, but the presidential policy, 
in each case, gave a definitive—albeit sometimes short-lived—direction to 
executive agencies based upon current circumstances and future goals. 
Additionally, policy provides benchmarks, which provide active feedback 
for legislators. If policy goes too far, the judiciary should step in and put a halt to 
it. If it goes in an undesirable direction, then legislators serve to provide course 
corrections. In either case, the law remains the foundational principle and policy 
can often be more quickly adjusted to more effectively pursue national interests 
and provide national security. 
2. Examples of Inter-Title Cooperation 
The following discussions will address some notable inter-title events, 
lessons from which will be applied to inter-title cooperation as it relates to 
cyberspace operations. These operations are not exhaustive nor do they contain 
the enumerable inter-title operations that preclude an examination due to 
classification requirements. 
The Los Angeles Riots of 1992 saw support from State and Local Law 
Enforcement (SLLE), The National Guard, U.S. armed forces, the U.S. marshals, 
and the FBI. These consolidated forces are one of the largest inter-title 
operations to be enforced under a federalized state of emergency. The 
challenges posed to this short-fused operation provide insight into force 
organization and communications during inter-title operations. 
Federal emergency response efforts addressing the devastation left by 
Hurricane Katrina in 2005, which was responsible for nearly 2,000 U.S. deaths 
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and over $150 billion in damages.317 The highly criticized response saw support 
from numerous agencies operating under at least five title authorities to provide 
responses to displaced populations originating throughout “all of the coastal 
counties of Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama” and extending “well inland” 
throughout area of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama.318 
While not linked to any specific event, select activities in the War on 
Terrorism will be examined since most of them include Title 50 authorities both 
domestically and abroad. The NSA, CIA, FBI, U.S. armed forces, National Guard, 
Coast Guard, and DHS all proudly broadcast the pooling of their combined 
expertise, equipment, and efforts that have reduced the threat of terrorism to the 
United States and her allies. This examination will be complemented by a brief 
overview of some Homeland Security efforts in terms of exercises and events 
that show the extent to which DHS intends to leverage interagency cooperation 
to ensure the adequacy of various homeland defense measures. 
a. L.A. Riots 
On April 29, 1992, following the controversial acquittal of four Police 
Officers accused of unlawful conduct against the now-prominent Rodney King, 
riots broke out across large portions of Los Angeles, California. For the purposes 
of this examination, the causes of the riots are less significant than the 
government responses—specifically those that involved multiple title authorities 
supporting the same operation. The initial hours of rioting began around 1630 
and were addressed by mostly SLLE. A little over four hours later, however, 
California governor, Pete Wilson, formally requested the mobilization of 2,000 
National Guard troops from the Adjutant General. Complete mobilization took 
another 18 hours, but by 1500 the following day, National Guard troops operating 
under SAD authorities were supporting law enforcement efforts across the city of 
                                                 
317 See generally United States Census Bureau, “Profile America Facts for Features: 
Hurricane Katrina 10th Anniversary,” No. CB15-FF.16 (Washington DC: DOC, 2015), 
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Los Angeles. There were ongoing and lingering debate about whether the 
National Guard was needed to supplement the resource shortage or to remedy 
the city’s resource mismanagement.319 Regardless, the SAD had been 
authorized and the governor was funding the deployment of the state’s militia to 
quell city-wide rioting. Escalating violence over the next eight hours led to an 
official governor’s request for federal troops at just after midnight on the first of 
May.320 
When the request had reached the White House, President George H.W. 
Bush authorized the deployment of 4,000 armed forces personnel by Executive 
Order321 pursuant to provisions in the Insurrection Act.322 In addition, the 
president ordered DOJ to make 2,000 special riot-control units available to the 
ongoing operation from the FBI and the U.S. Marshals. Nearly 24 hours after the 
initial mobilization of troops under the authorities of California State Active Duty, 
Joint Task Force Los Angeles (JTF-LA) was formed with SLLE, National Guard 
(32 USC),323 and U.S. armed forces (10 USC), and members of the FBI and U.S. 
Marshals (18 USC).324 
Despite the successes in deploying the vast forces of diverse personnel, 
the operation struggled from disunity in effort and a lack of clear command and 
control. Since the president had leveraged authorities under the Insurrection Act, 
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the operation became federalized and eventually was placed under the 
command of Army General Marvin Covault.325 The implications of this were 
relatively clear between the armed forces and the National Guard, but there 
appeared to be little understanding of how to integrate federal efforts with the 
SLLE.326 Many of the reports that were consolidated in the aftermath of the L.A. 
Riots suggested that there were major deficiencies in training that caused federal 
troops—especially in the armed forces—to be unsure of how to properly assist or 
conduct law enforcement activities.327 All parties appeared to clearly understand 
the need for unity of effort and a clear chain of command. Within the federal 
ranks, however, only the National Guard appeared to understand the “mission 
requirements, constraints, and interagency operations better than the active duty 
commanders.” 
Misunderstandings were a significant hurdle that impaired the overall 
effectiveness of the operation and led to disjointed efforts throughout the 
operation. This theme of clear lines for responsibility and authority are not only 
important to operational efficiency, but they are, in most cases, a requirement of 
the law. In every case, the spectrum of responsibility and extent of authorities 
demands that operators be trained to clearly understand the expectations and 
limitations of their involvement based on the spectrum of authorities involved in 
the operation. 
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b. Hurricane Katrina 
On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina made landfall as a Category 3 
hurricane near the Louisiana-Mississippi border. This was its third landfall, but 
the storm had still not substantially diminished in strength. The ensuing 
devastation would accrue over $100 billion in damages and claim the lives of 
over 1,200 people. It was not only one of the worst natural disasters in recent 
memory, but in the history of the United States.328 The event timeline preceded 
Katrina’s landfall by three days when, in anticipation of the impending storm, the 
Louisiana governor’s office declared a state of emergency and subsequently 
activated 4,000 National Guard personnel under SAD authorities. Mississippi 
soon followed suit and activated near as many with 2,500 from their National 
Guard.329 On August 27, 2005, President George W. Bush responded to the two 
governor’s federal-aid requests by declaring Louisiana a federal disaster area 
and invoking authorities available pursuant to the Stafford Act.330 
In response to this, United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) 
began forming pieces of what would later officially constitute Joint Task Force 
Katrina (JTF-Katrina).331 In contrast to the Los Angeles Riots, there was a 
significantly greater lead time for planning and coordination; however, the sheer 
geographic extent and unforeseen complexity of factors that characterized this 
disaster led to widespread criticism of what amounted to mostly reactionary 
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responses. When Katrina made landfall on August 29, then President George W. 
Bush issued an emergency declaration and the Secretary of DHS, Michael 
Chertoff, in turn declared Hurricane Katrina to be an “Incident of National 
Significance.”332 These and other developments led to the National Guard being 
transitioned from a state-funded status (under SAD) to a federally funded 
National Guard status (32 USC), which allowed them to remain operational and 
under the control of the state governor. One legislative development that allowed 
for the states to surge their response capability came in 1996 when Congress 
passed consent to the Emergency Management Assistance Compact 
(EMAC).333 This law effectively allowed states to pool resources, including 
police, fire, medical services,334 and state militia335 to improve responses to 
exceptionally challenging emergency disasters.336 
From a federal perspective, the EMAC appears to limit the number of 
federal options in responding to events where EMAC has been activated. These 
complications derive from the legislation’s specific prohibition against the use of 
the National Guard for Title 32 operations outside their home state. Due to the 
wording of the EMAC legislation, which reads, “nothing in this compact shall 
authorize or permit the use of military force by the National Guard of a State at 
any place outside that State in any emergency for which the president is 
authorized by law to call into federal service the militia,” it may appear that once 
the National Guard are transitioned to Title 32 authorities, they are unable to 
perform duties on behalf of any state except their own. A more careful reading 
suggests, however, that so long as the militia remains under the authority of the 
governor, they appear to avoid the “military force” prohibition and are authorized 
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to perform “other duties” as stipulated in 32 USC.337 This interpretation appears 
consistent with the Hurricane Katrina report for Congress.338 
For cyberspace operations, this becomes of critical importance. If 
USCYBERCOM is able to establish a National Guard capability under the Cyber 
Protection Forces, then any mission-capable teams will likely have statutory 
authorization under EMAC to perform “other duties” in a federally funded role (32 
USC) to respond to state requirements for cyber emergency disasters. 
Additionally, under provisions in 10 USC, these National Guard teams would 
likely be able to utilize DOD facilities in order to deliver these requirements.339 
In the case of Katrina, however, the EMAC provisions that enabled the 
deployment of nearly 46,000 National Guard personnel to provide emergency 
relief to Mississippi and Louisiana,340 were deemed by most critical examinations 
to have fallen short of success. In keeping with the National Response Plan,341 
the DOD prevented itself from adequately counteracting the state governors’ 
severe miscalculations in response requirements. Furthermore, when a DOD 
response was initiated, it was apparently done without coordinating with 
FEMA.342 In addition to the irregular aspects of some DOD response efforts, the 
Louisiana governor, Kathleen Blanco, refused to allow the commander of JTF-
Katrina (10 USC) to take control of evacuation efforts or unify command of the 
National Guard under his authority. 
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There are a great number of examinations as to why Hurricane Katrina 
relief efforts failed to achieve a successful response threshold.343 Many of the 
complexities that derailed Hurricane Katrina relief efforts were founded in 
ambiguous or ill-suited legislation. Since USNORTHCOM (10 USC) was 
commanding JTF-Katrina, many saw it as being precluded by the Posse 
Comitatus Act from directing Title 32 in law enforcement efforts.344 More than 
that, there was no clear precedence for USNORTHCOM to unify command and 
control over the United States Coast Guard (14 USC) assets or any of the FEMA 
(6 USC) efforts. In retrospect, given the severe impotence of Louisiana SLLE, the 
president arguably had statutory authority under the Insurrection Act345 to 
federalize forces where he could reasonably establish an absence of the rule of 
law—the Louisiana Superdome being a prime example.346 This arguably would 
have allowed USNORTHCOM to direct all efforts in defense of the state and to 
more closely support the U.S. Coast Guard and FEMA relief efforts. This 
observation may appear inappropriate given that Hurricane Katrina responses 
were primarily focused on relief efforts, with restoral of order being a secondary 
concern. This decision to place USNORTHCOM over all federal operations, 
however, is more closely linked to their surge capacity in terms of mobility, 
staffing, and coordination than any other factor. If DHS had the staffing and surge 
capacity, JTF-Katrina could arguably be more directly employed by the Secretary 
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of Homeland Security, though likely still under the operational control of 
USNORTHCOM.347 
Though his choice of wording is regrettable, Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Homeland Defense, Paul McHale pointed out that the National 
Defense Authorization Act of 2004348 enabled, 
a single National Guard officer [to be] given […] dual-hatted 
command. He was placed in Title 32 status to command the Title 
32 forces [and] was placed simultaneously in Title 10 status under 
the command and control of the combatant commander so that 
unity of effort could be achieved, even though we maintained the 
distinction in terms of unity of command.349 
Significantly less is known about the FBI’s involvement in Hurricane 
Katrina relief efforts despite their claim that over 500 of their agents were 
consolidated from around the country to, “secure the city, answer emergency 
calls, patrol the streets, conduct search and rescue operations, and identify 
victims.”350 As such, it is difficult to fold their operations into and understand 
them under the overall scrutiny of inter-title operations that characterized the 
experiences of DHS, DOD, and SLLE. 
Subsequent legislation—most notably, the National Defense Authorization 
Act of 2010351—would eliminate many of the remaining statutes that were seen 
as mutually excluding unity of command during inter-title operations. In addition 
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to poor cooperation between personnel operating under Title 10 and Title 32 
authorities, FEMA was harshly criticized in the aftermath of Katrina for their 
anemic natural disaster response and coordination capability, which was 
neglected as a result of the heavy emphasis being placed on terrorism 
prevention and preparedness since the 9/11 attacks.352 
c. Homeland Security: Counterterrorism 
One of the difficulties in addressing terrorism is that it possesses no 
universally accepted definition.353 To pair it with the nebulous descriptions often 
associated with cyberspace make the task of applying legal frameworks to 
cyberterrorism a nearly insurmountable task. For one, domestic and international 
interpretations of terrorism are still steeped in the national liberation movements 
that characterized the 20th century and no clear consensus has adequately 
surmised the nature of the current terrorist threat.354 Additionally, there is still 
great diversity in how terrorism is legally approached. In some cases of federal 
law, terrorism and its various aspects are seen as an act of war355 while other 
instances of terrorism are considered to be criminal in nature.356 With its broad 
punitive authorities and ambiguous definitions, federal counterterrorism efforts 
generate an endless supply of legal analyses. 
Armed Forces Counterterrorism: Given the declaration of a “War on 
Terror,” by President George W. Bush in 2001, the armed forces seemingly need 
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no additional authorities to conduct counterterrorism operations. However, 
ambiguity under Geneva conventions357 and the primary employment of the 
armed forces as the standing military have led to significant changes in legal 
interpretation. As alluded to earlier, Title 10 takes advantage of an interpretation 
of terrorism that sees some individual acts of terrorism as part of a “broader 
campaign of violence directed against the state.”358 Current interpretations still 
lack support for using traditional Geneva Conventions’ definitions to justify 
counterterrorism as a response to an international armed conflict. This, however, 
has not dissuaded efforts that find significantly more traction under resolutions 
establishing a nation’s inherent right to self-defense.359 With a significantly 
greater capacity for effectiveness there is justification for understanding terrorist 
acts as threatening “territorial integrity or political independence.”360 
Along these lines, Operation Neptune Spear,361 taking place on May 2, 
2011, and leading to the death of Osama Bin Laden, presents an interesting case 
study for the justifiability of inter-title operations in support of counterterrorism. At 
the time, Leon Panetta was the Director of the CIA—soon to be named Secretary 
of Defense—and was quick to clarify that the raid had been conducted under 
Title 50 authorities.362 This oft-cited distinction epitomizes proponents and 
detractors alike in assessing the appropriateness of inter-title operations. This 
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“either-or” concept—i.e., either “Title 50” or “Title 10”—is the product of an 
imprecise policy and is not a necessary distinction precipitated by the law. In the 
case of the Bin Laden raid, so long as Title 50 and Title 10 oversight 
requirements are met and the authorities authorize the actions, there are no 
glaring issues that would prevent the integration of inter-title forces for an 
operation that provides a mutual advantage to both forces.363 
CIA Counterterrorism: One of the more controversial programs executed 
under the federal counterterrorism mission is the CIA’s use of drones under the 
presidential direction. After more than a decade of operational successes, this 
mission set—often referred to as the “CIA Drone Program”—remains the subject 
of numerous editorials and a host of legal scrutiny. This “new age” of 
counterterrorism has seen a resurgence in CIA activity, which uses covert action 
to achieve foreign policy objectives and support national security objectives 
under Title 50 provisions.364 Far from the world of traditional espionage, 
however, the CIA has projected a more military-like persona as they have made 
use of drones that were originally developed for employment by the armed 
forces. These operations are undergirded by precarious legal interpretations that 
do not appear to be able to be applied consistently. In the first place, the 
justification derives from the president’s authority to conduct covert action so long 
as it is delivered through approved federal appropriations and congressional 
reporting requirements are met. 
While seemingly simple, the definition of “covert action” presents a 
nagging contradiction to the counterterrorism discourse since its stipulation that 
“the role of the United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged 
                                                 
363 This conclusion is purposefully overstated. There are fiscal concerns, and de jure 
prohibitions that are unique to many instances of inter-title cooperation. In the case of Operation 
Neptune Spear, however, most of these concerns were not present in applicable law. See 
INTRODUCTION. Wall, 85–87. See also Robert M. Chesney, “Military-Intelligence Convergence 
and the Law of the Title 10/Title 50 Debate,” Journal of National Security Law & Policy 5 (2012): 
539–44. 
364 Pursuant to 50 USC § 3093. 
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publicly”365 is all too often disregarded. Some more notable examples of this 
include the publicly issued authorizations for the CIA to conduct drone strikes 
that killed Anwar al-Awlaki and his 16-year-old son, Abdulrahman al-Awlaki in 
2011.366 To complicate matters further, there is an additional prohibition against 
conducting covert actions that are considered traditional military activity.367 Even 
still, executive authorities are likely to provide themselves with a certain amount 
of leeway in affirming adherence to these legal distinctions, even when the 
operational means and methods used by each title authority may be the same.368 
Previous examples have illuminated close inter-title cooperation between 
the armed forces and the CIA, with the presumed support of the NSA as a co-
Title 50 authority. By contrast, the CIA and FBI share a much more checkered 
past. Their oft-defunct relationship was a recurring theme in final report from the 
9/11 Commission,369 though current reports seem to indicate a positive trend 
between the two historically discordant agencies.370 
FBI Counterterrorism: The primary goal of the FBI is to use federal 
avenues for legal prosecution to disrupt support for terrorism and terrorist 
activities. Since every major terrorist organization is reliant on the same global 
                                                 
365 Id. at § 3093(e). 
366 See generally Greg Miller, “Muslim Cleric Aulaqi Is 1st U.S. Citizen On List of Those CIA 
Is Allowed To Kill,” Washington Post, April 7, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/ 
content/article/2010/04/06/AR2010040604121.html. The kill order for the two al-Awlakis was 
more controversial because it raised questions about the legality of authorizing the killing of U.S. 
citizens abroad. 
367 50 USC § 3093(e)(2). 
368 This is not an entirely unreasonable prospect. The CIA, NSA, Armed Forces, and FBI 
have significant similarity in the ways and means of executing their respective title authorities. 
Weapons, surveillance, security, tactics, and policy can be very similar even if the underlying 
authorities are different. 
369 See ADAPTATION—AND NONADAPTATION—IN THE LAW ENFORCEMENT 
COMMUNITY. Kean and Hamilton, et al., “The 9/11 Commission Report,” 73–82. See also id. at 
423–28. 
370 See generally Bruce Hoffman, Edwin Meese III and Timothy J. Roemer, “The FBI: 
Protecting the Homeland in the 21st Century,” report of the congressionally-directed 9/11 Review 
Commission to the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (Washington DC: GPO, 2015), 
15–37, https://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/protecting-the-homeland-in-the-21st-
century. 
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support networks as the United States, the FBI is able to employ a wide variety of 
statutory authorities. Many of these authorities came as a direct result of 
amendments contained in the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001. These expanded 
authorities have allowed the FBI to increase counterterrorism efforts pursuant to 
previously discussed statutory amendments to FISA and the ECPA. In addition to 
these, amendments to laws authorizing the issuance of National Security Letters 
(NSL)371 have enabled the FBI to advance investigations through increased 
collection against domestic and international terrorists.372 Above all else, the 
increased provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act have served to break down the 
“perceived barrier wall that had impeded the sharing of information between 
intelligence and criminal investigators.”373 
These new authorities and expanded definitions for terrorism374 have 
authorized investigators to compliment counterterrorism efforts primarily by 
prosecuting acts that target individual citizens or groups as well as disrupting 
material support and the delivery of weapons and ordinance.375 Relevant 
statutory authority preemptively compliments counterterrorism efforts by allowing 
the FBI to target illicit supply chains and intervene during the critical stages of 
recruitment and planning. Efforts against these supply networks add value to 
other organizations—the armed forces, U.S. Coast Guard, DHS, intelligence 
agencies, etc.—in that they are often responsible for identifying persons of 
                                                 
371 12 USC § 3414(a)(5)(A), 15 USC §§ 1681u,1681v, 18 USC § 2709, and 50 USC § 436. 
372 See generally Gabriel Malor, “Cut the Crap, Apple, and Open Syed Farook’s iPhone,” 
The Federalist, February 19, 2016, http://thefederalist.com/2016/02/19/cut-the-crap-apple-and-
open-syed-farooks-iphone. Statutes pertaining to NSL were one of the primary authorities behind 
the FBI’s court order demanding Apple, Inc. to assist the federal government in accessing the 
phone of deceased domestic terrorist, Syed Farook. See also United States of America v. Apple, 
Inc., in Hearing On Government's Motion to Compel Apple Inc. To Comply With This Court's 
February 16, 2016 Order Compelling Assistance In Search in U.S.D.C. C.D.C., CM 16-10 (2016), 
https://www.justice.gov/usao-cdca/file/826836/download. The FBI used additional provisions 
pursuant to the All Writs Act (28 USC § 1651) to compel Apple, Inc. to provide technical 
assistance as a third party in obtaining the evidence of Farook’s iPhone. 
373 Hoffman, et al., 25. 
374 Definitions for domestic and international terrorism are contained in 18 USC § 2331. The 
federal crime of terrorism is further defined in 18 USC § 2332b. 
375 See supra note 355. See also 18 USC §§ 1203,2332 which concern hostage taking and 
terrorist acts abroad against U.S. citizens—including murder. 
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interests that compliment ongoing operations being conducted by other title 
authorities. There are also additional statutory authorities that are designed to be 
directly complimentary to inter-title operations in the areas of international 
terrorism376 and weapons of mass destruction.377 
Overall, the broad authorities of the FBI allow them to gather relevant 
information through a variety of criminal investigations378 and to compliment 
counterterrorism operations by disseminating relevant information to other 
agencies and organizations.379 The FBI also has the added benefit that their 
threshold for initiating investigations and gathering evidence tends to be one of 
the strictest amongst their inter-title counterparts. This suggests that any 
information they contribute is unlikely to disrupt or derail operations based on the 
myriad of rules of evidence or investigative procedure that their partners are 
operating under. 
DHS Counterterrorism: Counterterrorism is the cornerstone of the DHS 
homeland security mission380 and was the primary reason for their creation 
under the Homeland Security Act of 2002381 following the September 11 attacks 
in 2001. Under Title 6 authorities, DHS pursues both global and domestic 
terrorism that threaten national security. Though DHS is charged with preventing 
and assisting in recovery from terrorist attacks, “primary responsibility for 
investigating and prosecuting acts of terrorism” are vested in “federal, State, and 
local law enforcement agencies with jurisdiction over the acts in question.”382 
                                                 
376 Pursuant to 18 USC § 2332b. Statues apply to terrorism that transcends national 
boundaries. 
377 Id. at § 2332a. 
378 For instance, cybercrime, identity theft, immigration violations, and even perjury. 
379 See TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE ROBERT S. MUELLER, III. U.S. Congress, 
Senate, Committee On The Judiciary, The War Against Terrorism: Working Together to Protect 
America, 108th Cong., 1st sess., 2013, https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/mueller_ 
testimony_03_04_03.pdf. 
380 6 USC § 111(b)(1) 
381 Pub. L. 107-296. 
382 6 USC § 111(b)(2) 
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This can pose a number of challenges for DHS, which relies heavily upon a 
robust network of coordination centers to fulfill their statutory requirements. The 
cyber-coordination capability that exists under the NCCIC, however, has overlap 
and compatibility with similar watch floors at the National Counterterrorism 
Center (NCTC), the National Counter Proliferation Center (NCPC), and the 
National Intelligence Centers (NIC), all of which operate under the Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence (ODNI).383 
DHS operates under authorities derived from a vast collection of laws and 
regulations. Within the bounds of terrorism prevention, they are authorized to 
make relevant databases available to businesses in order to alleviate work status 
concerns for current or new employees.384 Under the Homeland Security 
Appropriations Act of 2007,385 they can establish “risk-based performance 
standards” to improve security at high-risk chemical facilities and propose 
legislation for improved chemical distribution regulations.386 Under Critical 
Infrastructure Information authorities387 and CISA, DHS can more easily facilitate 
the sharing of information between the owners and operators of the critical 
infrastructures and relevant government agencies that are involved in 
infrastructure protection and counterterrorism. There are additional, though 
limited provisions for DHS to affect travel procedures as well as authorities that 
relate to prevention and response measures for bioterrorism. 
                                                 
383 Pursuant to 50 USC § 3056, et seq., the following centers have information sharing 
partnerships with Central Intelligence Agency: Defense Intelligence Agency, Department of 
Agriculture, Department of Defense, Department of Energy, Department of Health & Human 
Services, Department of Homeland Security, Department of Justice, Department of State, 
Department of the Treasury, Drug Enforcement Administration, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, National Security 
Agency, Transportation Security Administration, and the U.S. Capitol Police among others. 
384 Pursuant to 8 USC § 1324a 
385 Pub. L. 109-295 
386 See AMMONIUM NITRATE SECURITY PROGRAM; PROPOSED RULE. F.R. vol. 76, 
no. 149 (August 3, 2011). 
387 6 USC §§ 131, et seq. 
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Conclusions on Counterterrorism: Some of the preceding observations 
may convey a critical view of ongoing operations for certain organizations—most 
notably the CIA. These observations, however, are not intended to argue for the 
negation of inter-title cooperation, but rather, they demonstrate that, in the case 
of counterterrorism, there are ongoing legal concerns that apply uniquely to each 
title authority. Whether by injudicious application or legislative ambiguity, these 
unique legal concerns may lead to inappropriately enabling or constraining inter-
title operations. As it is increasingly unlikely that terrorist organizations will 
cooperate with federal attempts to resolve hostilities by means of peaceful 
discourse, there is an increasing necessity for the United States to comprehend 
the nature of its victimization and to defend itself appropriately without resorting 
to blatant and unlawful acts. As legislation and the context for these legal 
interpretations change, the framework for inter-title cooperation is likely to be 
affected as it pertains to counterterrorism. 
d. Homeland Security: Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) 
The importance of CIP is obvious from the central role that it plays in 
policy and legislation. When Leon Panetta used the term, “cyber Pearl Harbor,” 
he was not imagining a decisive assault against the U.S. military complex as the 
genuine event of 1941 proposed to be. Instead, speaking with business 
executives in New York City, he forecasted a future where cyberspace will be 
used to derail passenger trains and chemical shipments. Additional foreboding 
descriptions saw the poisoning of metropolitan water supplies and “several 
attacks on our critical infrastructure at one time, in combination with a physical 
attack on our country.”388 Panetta’s ominous vision embodies much of the 
underlying emotion that underpins CIP efforts—not least of these efforts are the 
policy and legislation themselves. The “lack of imagination” that contributed to 
the sheer shock and surprise shared by federal employees and civilians is 
                                                 
388 See generally Leon E. Panetta, “Remarks on Cybersecurity” (speech, Business 
Executives for National Security, New York, October 11, 2012) published in Council on Foreign 
Relations, October 12, 2012, http://www.cfr.org/cybersecurity/secretary-panettas-speech-
cybersecurity/p29262. 
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something that the United States appears keen to prevent from happening 
again.389 
It is not just terrorism, however, that informs measures in CIP and the 
broader framework for national security. The surprise of terrorist attacks may 
have provided the level of motivation needed to institute broad and necessary 
changes, but serious approaches to domestic homeland security existed long 
before the fateful events of September 11, 2001.390 The U.S. Commission on 
National Security/21st Century—known as the Hart-Rudman Commission—was 
started in 1998 by then Secretary of Defense William Cohen. Their final report, 
which was a culmination of more than three years’ worth of work, was published 
in February of 2001—nearly a full seven months before 9/11. The report, Road 
Map for National Security: Imperative for Change, called for numerous 
improvements including the development of a strategic framework for homeland 
security,391 an organizational realignment that supported homeland security 
efforts,392 and the need for executive-legislative cooperation393 to ensure its 
effectiveness. All of these themes have been hallmarks of extensive efforts that 
have led to an expansion of inter-title cooperation in the area of 21st-century 
homeland security and specifically, Critical Infrastructure Protection. 
CIP is primarily a function of Title 6 authorities,394 but it involves large 
portions of the civilian sector and almost every major executive department and 
subordinate agency in the federal government. USNORTHCOM and United 
States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) are some of the more notable title-
                                                 
389 See FORESIGHT—AND HINDSIGHT. Kean and Hamilton, et al., “The 9/11 Commission 
Report,” 339. The Commission reported that “the 9/11 attacks revealed four kinds of failures: in 
imagination, policy, capabilities, and management.” 
390 Gary Hart and Warren B. Rudman, Road Map for National Security: Imperative for 
Change, report submitted by the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century 
(Washington DC: GPO, 2001). http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/nssg/PhaseIIIFR.pdf. 
391 Id. at 11. 
392 Id. at 14. 
393 Id. at 26. 
394 See supra note 386. 
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10 organizations that make up the federal consortium, though every COCOM 
arguably makes a significant contribution to homeland security efforts—
especially the sub-unified command, USCYBERCOM. Also, as mentioned in the 
previous chapter, the United States Coast Guard plays a direct role in CIP as the 
SSA for the Maritime Transportation System.395 This extensive network of 
partners requires the Department of Homeland Security to maintain multiple 
coordination centers across the United States. Executive Order 13691396 builds 
upon previous policy efforts addressing CIP.397 It conspicuously designates the 
NCCIC as the primary cyber coordination center “for sharing of information 
related to cybersecurity risks and incidents,” which connects numerous federal, 
state, and civilian organizations through information sharing networks like the 
Homeland Security Information Network for Critical Infrastructure (HSIN-CI). 
Ultimately, the goal of these partnerships is to mitigate risk and reduce the 
uncertainty associated with CIP. 
Risk and uncertainty in the protection of Critical Infrastructure remains one 
of the single most convincing arguments for federal presence in cyberspace. This 
argument stems from a number of developments to industry over the last four 
decades. For one, many of the systems and subsystems associated with Critical 
Infrastructure have been in existence for decades—even centuries—but have 
only recently been linked through a series of networks. In many cases, these 
proprietary networks are attached to the Internet and are therefore vulnerable to 
many malicious activities that occur in cyberspace. 
There are significant and convincing arguments for maintaining 
cyberspace as an “open, global commons of information that [allows] innovation 
                                                 
395 See supra note 157. 
396 80 F.R. 9349, “Promoting Private Sector Cybersecurity Information Sharing” (February 
13, 2015). 
397 See generally EO 13636 (February 12, 2013) and PPD-21. 
  121 
and rapid technological growth.”398 Pursuing these avenues is worthwhile, but 
they tend to be predicated on the prime objective being the maximization of 
innovation. These inferences often fail to recognize the exclusive Constitutional 
mandate for the federal provision of national defense.399 While private industry 
solutions are certainly advantageous and desirable, the inextricable linkages 
between critical infrastructure and the security of U.S. citizens mandates a 
certain amount of federal presence. 
One of the difficulties facing federal security provision is the fact that most 
major industries have connected critical services into networks that are 
accessible both domestically and internationally—most of them through the 
Internet. Many more companies are exacerbating the problem of security by 
replacing manual processes with automated and networked ones that have either 
no manual backup or no capacity for supporting service stoppage.400 It is no 
more feasible to exclude the federal government from cyberspace than from 
security efforts in the air, space, maritime or land domains.401 
Moreover, the 2016 Mandiant report on cybersecurity breaches reveals a 
significant diversification in both the location and the motivation of cyberspace 
attackers. Additionally, the report shows that upwards of 89% of the breaches 
                                                 
398 See generally Catherine Hart, Dal Yong Jin and Andrew Feenberg, “The Insecurity of 
Innovation: A Critical Analysis of Cybersecurity in the United States,” International Journal of 
Communication 8 (2014): 2860–78, http://ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/article/viewFile/2774/1257. 
399 See generally U.S. Constitution, Art. 1 s. 8 pertaining to the powers of Congress, at least 
six of which deal with national security. See also id. at Art. 2 pertaining to the president’s 
responsibility to execute the authorities of Congress. See also id. at Article 4 s. 4 requiring the 
federal government to protect the United States “against invasion.” 
400 Water dams are just one notable example of networked critical infrastructure whose 
short-term failure can result in devastating environmental impacts and loss of life. 
401 This is not to suggest that the federal government should be able to operate without 
limitation, but it does suggest that, contrary to some critics, terms like “war” and “violence”—much 
like “attack,” “exploit,” and “defend”—are as appropriate to the realm of cyberspace as they are to 
the physical domains. C.f. DISCOURSE IS A BATTLEFIELD. Ben Kamis and Thorsten Thiel, 
“The Original Battle Trolls: How States Represent the Internet as a Violent Place,” working paper 
for ECPR General Conference (Bordeaux, France: ECPR, 2015), 19–23, http://ecpr.eu/filestore/ 
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covered were distributed relatively evenly across ten industry sectors.402 
Although Mandiant is not generally the first responder to attacks on critical 
infrastructure, these figures illustrate the need for a holistic approach—not 
absent inter-title efforts—necessary to not only respond to attacks, but to 
perceive how and by whom they will be perpetrated in order to establish 
measures that prevent their occurrence. 
Many of the barriers to information sharing have been addressed through 
previously discussed legislation like CISA and other provisions in the USA 
PATRIOT Act—amended and extended by the USA FREEDOM Act. Information 
sharing, while an essential pillar, is not the only lynch pin that is needed to 
enable inter-title cooperation. As will be discussed in subsequent sections, 
barring policy and attitude, there are significant legislative requirements in the 
area of budgetary responsibilities and congressional oversight. This 
accountability necessitates a clear delineation of operational responsibilities, 
which further raises questions of chain-of-command. 
e. Intelligence Activities 
Much of the previous conversation has already encapsulated many of the 
opinions and legislative challenges associated with inter-title cooperation as it 
applies to intelligence activities. The recommendations from the 9/11 
Commission and the subsequent provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act remain the 
primary influences in explicitly advocating and making provision for inter-title 
cooperation. The U.S. armed forces (10 USC), the CIA and NSA (50 USC), the 
USCG (14 USC), the FBI (18 USC), and DHS (6 USC) are just a few of the 
beneficiaries of legislation that compels greater collaboration and information 
sharing between the executive departments and subordinate agencies of the 
federal government. Even with these mandates in place, however, there are 
substantial legislative ambiguities and a prolific spread of misinformation that 
                                                 
402 See BY THE NUMBERS. Mandiant Intelligence Center, "M-Trends 2016,” Mandiant 
Corporation (2016), 6, available for download at https://www2.fireeye.com/M-Trends-2016.html. 
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influence the course of cooperation within the IC. Negative responses to Leon 
Panetta’s “Title 50 clarification” of the Abbottabad raid,403 supposed legal 
distinctions between covert and overt activity,404 and claims of misconduct by 
Congress have all unnecessarily—at least from a jurisprudence standpoint—
inhibited inter-title cooperation in the area of intelligence activities. 
In the case of Panetta’s comments, his distinction begs the question of 
who is really in charge. In many ways, it can give the appearance that the armed 
forces are being placed at the disposal of organizations and entities that lack 
either the training or the authorities to direct. This attempt to distinguish 
operations as either exclusively “Title 10” or “Title 50” appears ignorant to the fact 
that the president has authorities and responsibilities under all 53 titles of the 
United States Code. The Secretary of Defense is delegated authorities under two 
of these titles—10 USC and 50 USC. Despite this longstanding delegation of 
authority, it continues to surprise many that a single office is capable of lawfully 
executing a mission or overseeing an operation under multiple title authorities.405 
                                                 
403 See Panetta, supra note 361. 
404 For arguments concerning covert vs. overt legal distinctions, see TRANSPARENT VS. 
COVERT. Supra at Ch. 2 s. (C)(2)(b). See also NOTE 4. Wall, 87. “Admiral Vern Clark, former 
Chief of Naval Operations of the U.S. Navy, Professor John Radsan, a former assistant general 
counsel for the CIA, and Professor Gregory McNeal, a former Department of Justice lawyer, were 
asked "what is Title 10 authority?" and "what is Title 50 authority?" during a panel discussion at a 
law school symposium on national security law. Admiral Clark phrased the debate as one "about 
the line between covert and overt"” […] “yet his articulation of this concern focused on military 
transparency and public perceptions about the military. Professor Radsan framed the debate in 
terms of defined roles for the military and intelligence communities, while Professor McNeal 
opined that military lawyers advising special operations forces are often confused about the legal 
basis for their actions. National Security Symposium: The Battle Between Congress & The Courts 
in the Face of an Unprecedented Global Threat: Legislation Panel: Discussion & Commentary, 21 
REGENT U.L. REV. 331, 347 (2009).” 
405 See NOTE 129. Id. at 125. “The Secretary of Defense may direct DoD personnel to carry 
out intelligence activities in response to national intelligence requirements, or to meet the 
intelligence needs of the military. When DoD personnel conduct intelligence activities in response 
to national intelligence requirements, they do so primarily under Title 50 authorities [50 U.S.C. § 
3038] and pursuant to priorities and needs determined by the DNI [50 U.S.C. § 3024(f)]. When 
DoD personnel conduct intelligence activities to fulfill military intelligence requirements, those 
intelligence activities are conducted under Title 10 authorities, e.g., [10 U.S.C. §§ 113,164], and 
delegated authorities from the President and Secretary of Defense; if the DoD personnel are also 
members of the Intelligence Community (e.g., NSA) the activities are also conducted pursuant to 
Title 50 authorities [50 U.S.C.§ 3038]. These military operations are also sometimes referred to 
as ‘DoD Intelligence Related Activities’ or ‘Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA).’” 
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Many instances where Congress has alleged inter-title misconduct can be 
the result of either ignorance regarding the extensive network of congressional 
oversight, or perhaps motivated by political attempts to further restrict 
presidential powers. Take, for instance, the HPSCI Report on the Intelligence 
Authorization Act of 2010. In it, the committee notes that 
clandestine military intelligence-gathering operations, even those 
legitimately recognized as OPE, carry the same diplomatic and 
national security risks as traditional intelligence-gathering activities. 
While the purpose of many such operations is to gather 
intelligence, DOD has shown a propensity to apply the OPE label 
where the slightest nexus of a theoretical, distant military operation 
might one day exist. Consequently, these activities often escape 
the scrutiny of the intelligence committees, and the congressional 
defense committees cannot be expected to exercise oversight 
outside of their jurisdiction (emphasis mine).406 
These claims, however, show an unawareness of the fact that the armed 
services committees exercise regular oversight over the clandestine operations 
of the armed forces. Regardless of how the operation is defined, whether as OPE 
or covert action, it does not escape congressional oversight in one form or 
another.407 
Deciding whether an action falls under the umbrella of traditional military 
activity or covert action is not inconsequential, however. As previously shown, 
there are distinct limitations on covert action and the oversight governing it 
represents an entirely different congressional body. In acknowledging the close 
relationship between these two activities, Representative David McCurdy noted 
in a 1991 congressional conference report that 
none of the counterintelligence activities which the Department of 
Defense […] reported to the intelligence committees [constituted] 
covert action within the meaning of this definition. [Furthermore,] 
                                                 
406 House, Report to Accompany H.R. 2701, ‘The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2010,’ 48. 
407 See generally Wall, 102-04. 
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“traditional military activities” and “routine support” to such activities 
do not fall within the definition of covert action.”408 
Military intelligence activities, while authorized under 10 USC,409 can 
appear identical to those intelligence activities authorized under 50 USC. In 
practice, however, military intelligence activities are more strictly subject to 
executive approval, even though they often yield identical information and are 
stored in the same data repositories. Realizing that there was a need to better 
distinguish between such activities—covert action and traditional military 
activities—the report suggested that four elements should be present if the 
intelligence activity is to be considered traditional military activity:410 
1. Conducted by U.S. military personnel, and 
2. Under the direction and control of a U.S. military commander, and 
3. Preceding and related to anticipated hostilities or related to ongoing 
hostilities involving U.S. military forces, and 
4. The U.S. role "in the overall operation is apparent or to be 
acknowledged publicly" 
While the first two elements may be more obvious and practical, the third 
and fourth stipulations present some unique challenges. For cyberspace 
activity—as well as for traditional intelligence activities—the requirement that the 
activity “precede and relate to anticipated hostilities” calls into question the 
subjective nature of the terms. Many of the military’s activities involve war-
gaming and preparation for anticipated hostilities of varying degrees of likelihood. 
The nearness of hostilities and the validity of the threat do not prevent the U.S. 
military from preparing for “worst case scenarios.” In this case, it would seem that 
traditional military activities would be given a wide berth for intelligence gathered 
in anticipation of hostilities. Even activities that “relate to ongoing hostilities” can 
                                                 
408 House, Conference Report on the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991, 
H5905. 
409 10 USC §§ 401 et seq. 
410 See Wall, 132–36. 
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find a variety of valid justifications depending on the extent to which the matrices 
of dependencies extend to ancillary variables.411 
The fourth stipulation can hardly be applied in a consistent manner since 
there are a number of military operations—both in cyberspace and the physical 
domains—that are intended to be concealed and not acknowledged publicly. It 
would seem then, that while a lack of public acknowledgement would not exclude 
the activity from being traditional military activity, the presence of a public 
acknowledgement would exclude the presence of a covert action.412 Returning 
again to the Abbottabad raid, this would seem to indicate that the operation was 
more of a traditional military activity than a covert action. To label it as either 
“Title 10” or “Title 50,” however, is overly simplistic and, as with many 
oversimplified conclusions on inter-title cooperation, it fails to account for many of 
the fiscal and oversight requirements associated with the operation. 
These arguments extend beyond just 10 USC and 50 USC. This line of 
reasoning applies to Title 6 and Title 10 interactions which require that the 
Secretaries of the DOD and DHS “shall provide personnel, equipment, and 
facilities in order to increase interdepartmental collaboration“ that will “leverage 
the expertise of each individual Department and [avoid duplication of effort].”413 
This mandate necessarily draws in the Coast Guard (14 USC) while 
considerations for the FBI still primarily fall under 50 USC—as delineated by the 
president in EO 12333. This special attention given to intelligence activities 
reveals critical arguments that are no less significant in cyberspace, where the 
activities characterizing intelligence gathering are, in some cases, 
indistinguishable from traditional military activities. Under an examination of 
                                                 
411 Ibid. 
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413 Pub. L. 112–81, div. A, title X, § 1090, which concerns “Cybersecurity Collaboration 
Between the Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security.” 
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general legisprudence,414 it is reasonable to propose that whether the separation 
results from policy or legislation, they should remain subject to constant 
reexamination and be regularly adjusted to preserve the fundamental rights of 
citizens while also effectively addressing changes in environmental, social, 
technological, economic, and geopolitical contexts.415 
B. INTER-TITLE CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS 
Central to the enablement of inter-title operations in cyberspace is the 
need for balance. In keeping with the purpose of the United States Code, it is 
clear that there remains a distinct and pronounced need for an assured cyber-
capability and the reliability of an effective cyber-response. Reduced timelines 
associated with cyberspace and the potentially devastating effects of security 
patches underpin growing demands for increased secrecy and policies that 
enable more-rapid decision making. On the other hand, there remains the 
fundamental requirement to ensure that frameworks exist for facilitating 
appropriate oversight and compliance, and ultimately for ensuring that 
government powers remain subject to the rule of law. 
Many critics see in this process an erosion of the U.S. legal framework as 
it is continually reinterpreted in the context of expanded cyberspace efforts and 
growing concerns for increased national security. Some of these criticisms rightly 
point out that the legal difficulties presented by cyberspace are not simply 
restricted to geographic concerns or the “indeterminate collateral consequences” 
associated with cyber effects.416 Characterization of threats, categorization of 
                                                 
414 See generally Luc Wintgens, ed., Legisprudence: New Theoretical Approach to Legislation 
(Portland, OR: Hart, 2002). A phrase coined by Luc Wintgens as early as 1992. Rather than 
focusing on the application of the law by judicial authorities, legisprudence expands the context to 
include studies on the creation of the law by legislators. 
415 See generally W. R. Stahel, “The Service Economy: ‘Wealth Without Resource 
Consumption’?,” Philosophical Transactions: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences 
355, no. 1728 (July, 1997): 1309–20, http://www.jstor.org/stable/54751. Adapted from Stahel’s 
“five pillars of sustainability.” 
416 See generally Chesney, “Military-Intelligence Convergence and the Law of the Title 
10/Title 50 Debate,” 580–83. 
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activities, and even the burdens of ex ante determinations that are associated 
with employing cyber-munitions are all contributors that increase the number of 
obstacles and compound the complexity facing decision makers and legislators 
alike.417 In this case, a basic understanding of the strategic, organizational, and 
technical challenges of cyberspace should expose much of the misinformation 
currently in circulation. 
Dissenting claims are often paired with many of the misleading arguments 
identified previously418 and assert that current methods for strategic planning and 
execution are not possible within the context of cyberspace. Unique challenges 
from cyberspace are undeniable, but a strategic overhaul based on 
unsubstantiated claims of incompatibility tends toward overreaction. The 2015 
National Security Strategy for example, calls for increased pressure against 
terrorist groups and their affiliates.419 From a cyberspace perspective, the idea of 
combatting malicious hacking conducted by terrorists and disrupting their use of 
social media420 is not so dissimilar from the kinetic strikes conducted against 
terrorist training compounds and Information Operations (IO) campaigns that 
achieve similar counterinformation objectives in the physical domain. 
This brief example illuminates an important aspect of cyberspace 
operations, which is that, while they may require effects to be delivered between 
two network nodes, their activities are folded into an overall strategy that involves 
traditional military responses in the Land, Maritime, Air, and Space domains.421 
Though not directly related to inter-title cooperation, an often disruptive 
source of misinformation is found in the perceived social gap between the sorts 
                                                 
417 Ibid. 
418 Supra at Ch. 2 s. (C)(2). 
419 See supra note 132. 
420 E.W., “Should Twitter Block Islamic Snuff Videos?,” Economist, Aug 21, 2014, 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2014/08/twitter-terror-and-free-speech. 
421 See generally Brett Williams, “Cyberspace: What Is It, Where Is It and Who Cares?” 
Armed Forces Journal, March 13, 2014, http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/cyberspace-what-is-
it-where-is-it-and-who-cares. 
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of individuals who are suited to the organization of the federal government and 
those whose expertise is in cyberspace—the presumption being that the two are 
generally incompatible. Cultural stereotypes have led to the idea that those most 
suited for cyberspace are incapable of being effective within a traditional chain of 
command and, in the case of the military, will be encumbered by a uniform, and 
are unlikely to meet necessary physical fitness standards.422 Too many members 
of the military harbor a defeatist attitude about the government’s—particularly the 
military’s—ability to attract talented individuals who are presumed to be the sort 
of “anti-establishment loners” or “geeks” who are only interested in the more 
lucrative jobs offered by the civilian sector. This idea that the best cyberspace 
operators are overweight, opposed to discipline, and consumed with online video 
game—played from their parents’ basement—is hardly an accurate depiction of 
modern-day cyberspace actors. Instead, modern studies are increasingly 
showing that the nature of cyberspace actors and hackers is more complex than 
previously imagined and tends to be present in an assortment of self-taught and 
highly trained individuals.423 As subsequent generations receive increased 
exposure to information technology at earlier ages, the recruiting pool will 
inevitably increase and aptitude should emerge from a variety of groups within 
society. 
In a similar vein, the sheer size and complexity of cyberspace become too 
daunting to comprehend and incorporate. As such, the highly technical nature of 
cyberspace has been deemed an insurmountable problem with its composition of 
not only logical and physical components, but of endless cyber personas that are 
an amalgam of people, groups, and sometimes pets. This can create any number 
of complications, which in turn may prevent executing operations under clear 
                                                 
422 See THINKING AHEAD. James Stavridis and David Weinstein, “Time for a US Cyber 
Force,” Proceedings 140, no. 1 (January 2014): 44. 
423 See generally Timo Gnambs, “What Makes a Computer Wiz? Linking Personality Traits 
and Programming Aptitude,” Journal of Research in Personality 58 (October 2015): 31–34. See 
also, Jim Romeo, “The Hacker Beside You,” Transaction World Magazine, May 1, 2014, 
www.transactionworld.net/articles/2014/may/cover-story.html. See also, Emma Sturgis, “10 Myths 
About Hackers (That Are Totally False),” Nerd Like You, September 8, 2015, 
http://www.nerdlikeyou.com/10-myths-about-hackers-that-are-totally-false. 
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authorities or consistent Rules of Engagement (ROE). The complicated answer 
to this will be addressed by the proposed framework, but the complexities 
associated with comprehending the legislative authorities for cyberspace 
operations is significantly more encumbering when compared with the stability of 
its architecture and protocols. 
Another key vantage point that presents cyberspace in a more accessible 
manner is the priority to view it primarily as a domain and not an arrangement of 
networked systems. Analogies are very useful in analyzing policy and strategy 
situations, but they tend to be a double-edged sword when associated with 
cyberspace.424 The diverse and numerous arguments over appropriate 
analogues might seem to suggest that suitable analogies do not exist for 
cyberspace. More accurately, however, it is unlikely that a single analogy can 
completely convey the nature of cyberspace. Furthermore, this limitation on 
analogy applies to every domain. While earlier discussions revealed deficiencies 
in establishing a complete physical-to-cyberspace equivalence,425 the current 
discussions are looking at the problem from a broader perspective. For example, 
it was previously stated that there is doubt as to whether or not an order to 
disperse can be issued by the president for cyberspace operations.426 The 
absence of a direct equivalence, however, does not prevent the Executive from 
responding to threats—especially those against individual states. If the 
environment of cyberspace is capable of supporting the sort of destruction and 
                                                 
424 For CYBERSPACE WARFARE ANALOGIES, see generally Sean Lawson, “Putting the 
‘War’ in Cyberwar: Metaphor, Analogy, and Cybersecurity Discourse in the United States,” First 
Monday 17, no. 7 (July, 2012) http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/3848/3270. For 
CYBERSPACE BOUNDARY ANALOGIES, see generally Duncan B. Hollis, “Re-Thinking the 
Boundaries of Law in Cyberspace: A Duty to Hack?,” in Cyber War: Law and Ethics for Virtual 
Conflicts, eds. Jens David Ohlin, Claire Finkelstein and Kevin Govern (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2015), 129–74. “Law-by-analogy” provides a way to replicate earlier laws in Cyberspace, 
but becomes increasingly difficult in situations where there is no suitable analogue. Analogies are 
useful in some instances, but at some point cyberspace requires a more crafted approach to 
delineating boundaries. For “CYBERSPACE AS PLACE” ANALOGIES see generally Kathleen K. 
Olsen, “Cyberspace as Place and the Limits of Metaphor,” Convergence: The Journal of 
Research into New Media Technologies 11, no. 1 (Spring 2005): 10–18, 
http://www.andredeak.com.br/pdf/cyberspace.pdf. 
425 See INTERNATIONAL VS. DOMESTIC. Supra at Ch. 2 s. (C)(2)(c).  
426 Supra note 176. 
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havoc that is analogous to an insurrection in the physical domains, then its actors 
and activities can be made subject to relevant statutes. 
To state this problem more succinctly, limited aspects of cyberspace can 
be subjected to analogy in constructive ways. Furthermore, while it is unlikely 
that a single analogy can completely capture the whole of the cyberspace 
domain, it is equally unlikely that any single analogy could fully encapsulate the 
aspects for any of the physical domains. In the case of space, there is a vastness 
and overlap with the air domain that allows territorial encroachment that is not 
shared in the other physical domains. Furthermore, its unique physical 
characteristics share traits with the maritime domain that are distinct from the air 
and land domain.427 Therefore, it is likely that the misapplication of analogy has 
more to do with its undisciplined approach than with a lack of suitability. In each 
case, however, the importance of the domain is linked to its broad use across a 
myriad of disciplines that include domestic and international use in areas like the 
economy, information, civilian, and government. In addition to providing support 
for these individuals and interests, each of these domains—no less 
cyberspace—are home to a host of criminals and criminal activity. 
In this way, cyberspace has much in common with the complex and multi-
faceted physical domains, and especially with the maritime and space domains, 
which are largely associated with freedom of use and generally characterized as 
a “global commons.”428 This idea of shared space inevitably leads to the 
presence of numerous stakeholders—federal stakeholders in the case of the 
U.S. government—and lends itself toward an environment where mutual support 
is often a natural byproduct of the coordination necessary among the various 
agencies and organizations operating there. This being said, the varying levels of 
                                                 
427 See generally Elizabeth Howell, “The Ocean Is A Lot Like Outer Space,” Universe Today: 
Space and Astronomy News, January 23, 2013, http://www.universetoday.com/99593/the-ocean-
is-a-lot-like-outer-space. 
428 See generally Mark Barrett, Dick Bedford, Elizabeth Skinner and Eva Vergles, Assured 
Access to The Global Commons (Norfolk, VA: NATO Headquarters, 2011), 
http://www.act.nato.int/images/stories/events/2010/gc/aagc_finalreport.pdf. 
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friction that cyberspace experiences with other domains does not make it 
incapable of lawfully appropriating relevant federal authorities. Already a 
resounding theme of this paper, the following section will show that the United 
States Code does not present an ethical contradiction for the management and 
use of cyberspace through inter-title cooperation. 
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IV. FRAMEWORK FOR INTER-TITLE OPERATIONS 
Previous discussions have been primarily concerned with dispelling 
misinformation about cyberspace and inter-title operations. A number of 
particularly negative conclusions purporting to be legal prohibitions have been 
exposed to be merely policy matters masquerading as legal concerns. Some of 
these alleged restrictions stem from political maneuvering amidst the perpetual 
struggle for greater control that exists primarily between the executive and 
legislative branches. More still are the result of national concerns over the extent 
of power and control bestowed upon the U.S. government as many are prone to 
cite potential damage to the United States’ reputation amongst its international 
partners. Some of these concerns are easily dismissed or else addressed 
through new or revised policy. Other concerns are considerable and go to the 
very heart of how Americans see themselves and how they want to be perceived. 
Practically, however, these desires find very little footing in available legislation.  
As noted previously, philosophical concerns over the United States Code 
generally do not address legislative implementation and authorities. Having 
scrutinized many of these concerns under the lex scripta of domestic law, it is 
now essential to turn the focus to constructing the framework under which 
cyberspace operations can be planned and executed. Throughout the preceding 
sections, legitimate legal concerns have generally fallen into three broad 
categories: oversight and compliance, fiscal controls, and statutory authority. The 
following sections will address these in greater depth, which will result in a 
simplified framework for understanding the legal requirements associated with 
planning and executing inter-title operations. 
A. OVERSIGHT AND COMPLIANCE 
The United States Congress has no explicit right to oversight and 
compliance through any stipulation in the U.S. Constitution. It seems however, 
that the constitutional implication for congressional oversight has always been 
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assumed by its founders and has thus been firmly established since the country’s 
founding. Congress largely exercises oversight through two primary means. The 
first is through the standing committee system. Reports detailing expenses 
associated with the latest in military advancements will often highlight 
congressional comments originating from the House Armed Services Committee 
(HASC) or the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC). These committees 
are specifically responsible for overseeing military activities (10 USC and 32 
USC) as they relate to “common defense”429 and ensuring the lawful 
employment of authorities under standing policy and in accordance with 
applicable legislation.430 The constitutional authority granted to the president as 
the executive power and Commander in Chief431 restricts Congress from 
exercising control over the ways and means by which the president employs 
these forces. Instead, the House and Senate Appropriations Committees are only 
able to limit which budgetary line items will be funded—vis-à-vis the annual 
Department of Defense Appropriations Act. This level of control is significant but 
not nearly as extensive as those that are afforded to Congress as they oversee 
intelligence activities. 
For intelligence activities (50 USC), the Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence (SSCI) and Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
House of Representatives (HPSCI) exercise significant oversight.432 Statutes 
require intelligence committees to be kept “fully and currently informed of all 
intelligence activities, other than covert action.”433 The subset of intelligence 
activities known as “covert action”434 requires presidential authorization and 
                                                 
429 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Rules and Administration, Standing Rules of the 
Senate, 113th Cong., 1st sess., 2013, S. Doc. 113-18, Rule XXV s. (1)(c)(1)(2), 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CDOC-113sdoc18/pdf/CDOC-113sdoc18.pdf. 
430 Id. at s. (1)(c)(2) 
431 Pursuant to U.S. Constitution, Art. 2, ss. 1,2. 
432 Pursuant to 50 USC §§ 3091 et seq. 
433 Pursuant to id. at § 3092(a)(1). 
434 As defined in id. at § 3093(e). 
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notification to the relevant committees “as soon as possible after such approval 
and before the initiation of the covert action.”435 By default, covert actions do not 
have appropriated funds and may not receive funding until a presidential finding 
has been submitted to the appropriate committees, with the HPSCI exercising 
additional scrutiny beyond their Senate counterpart. 
Although the statutes of this section maintain that the oversight 
stipulations are not to be construed as “requiring the approval of the 
[committees]” to initiate intelligence activities, the House rules governing the 
conduct and jurisdiction of the committees stipulate that the HPSCI are 
additionally authorized to review the “sources and methods”436 associated with 
intelligence activities within their jurisdiction.437 Reporting requirements alone 
may not halt the intelligence activities of executive agencies, but when subjected 
to the broad scrutiny of the intelligence committees and approval by relevant 
appropriations committees, it is clear that the legislation indeed does make 
provision for granting Congress some significant control in managing the 
execution of Title 50 authorities. 
While intelligence activities may appear to have a number of hurdles to 
successfully employing them in inter-title activities, the Department of Homeland 
Security likely presents the greatest challenge. The oversight is so complex that 
6 USC simply states that throughout the federal statute, 
the term “appropriate congressional committee” means any 
committee of the House of Representatives or the Senate having 
                                                 
435 Pursuant to id. at § 3093(c)(1) 
436 See U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Rules, Rules of the House of Representatives 
of the United States One Hundred Thirteenth Congress, 113th Cong., 2nd sess., 2015, H. Doc. 
113-181, § 744 Rule X s. (3)(m), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/HMAN-114/pdf/HMAN-114.pdf. 
This review of “sources and methods” is a further source of tension with the Executive branch and 
other committees like the Committee on Appropriations. 
437 See id. at s. 12(a). For FISA related activity, HPSCI shares jurisdiction with House 
Committee on the Judiciary (HJC). See also id. at ss. 11(b)(1)(B),11(b)(1)(D)(ii). The HPSCI 
claims jurisdiction over activities and requests for appropriations dealing with “Intelligence and 
intelligence-related activities of all other departments and agencies of the Government, including 
the tactical intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the Department of Defense.” This 
would require a shared jurisdiction with the HASC as it pertains to military intelligence. 
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legislative or oversight jurisdiction under the Rules of the House of 
Representatives or the Senate, respectively, over the matter 
concerned.438 
This process and the ensuing debates over inter-title cooperation would 
be enormously simplified if Congress were to align its congressional committees 
to the relevant statutory authorities.439 Frequent attempts have been made to 
depict committee involvement in homeland security in a way that either clarifies 
congressional oversight over DHS as it pertains to Title 6 and Title 14, or else in 
a way that demonstrates the extent of its dysfunction.440 For the present 
purposes of constructing a framework, only four of the more than 30 relevant 
oversight committees will be addressed. This small sample size should not 
adversely impact the framework since the inclusion of these four still 
demonstrates the need for operational planners to identify and notify the correct 
congressional body as relevant aspects of the operation may pertain to 
homeland security operations. Numerous and significant research has delved 
into the spider’s web of oversight committees that influence homeland 
security,441 and while the oversight structure has yet to be optimized, it remains 
suitable for the purposes of supporting inter-title operations. 
 The first two committees reside within the Senate. They are the Senate 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (HSGAC) and the 
                                                 
438 6 USC § 101(2) 
439 Wall, 107. 
440 See APPENDIX A. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and Business 
Executives for National Security (BENS), Untangling the Web: Congressional Oversight and the 
Department of Homeland Security (Washington DC: CSIS and BENS, 2004) http://csis.org/files/ 
attachments/041210_dhs_whitepaper.pdf. See also Task Force on Streamlining and 
Consolidating Congressional Oversight of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS 
Congressional Oversight Task Force), Streamlining and Consolidating Congressional Oversight 
of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, (Washington DC: Aspen Institute , 2013): 11, 
http://www.aspeninstitute.org/sites/default/files/content/docs/pubs/Sunnylands%20report%2009-
11-13.pdf. 
441 See generally Ibid. See also David P. O’Leary, “Beyond Measure: New Approaches to 
Analyzing Congressional Oversight of Homeland Security,” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate 
School, 2015). See also Peter J. May, Ashley E. Jochim and Joshua Sapotichne, “Constructing 
Homeland Security: An Anemic Policy Regime,” Policy Studies Journal 39, no. 2 (2011): 285–
307, doi: 10.1111/j.1541-0072.2011.00408.x.  See also Tapan Sen, “Congressional Oversight of 
Homeland Security: Help or Hindrance?,” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2012). 
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Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee (CS&T). The 
HSGAC has oversight over all major functions of DHS with the exception of the 
USCG, immigration services, and the USSS442 while the CS&T has oversight 
over the USCG and coastal zone management, to include inland waterways.443 
The next two committees are the House Committee on Homeland Security 
(CHS) and the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee (T&I). The 
obvious counterpart to the HSGAC, the House’s CHS oversees large parts of the 
DHS mission as it broadly pertains to Title 6 authorities. Its jurisdiction begins 
with the organizational structure that supports homeland security operations and 
covers most major DHS functions like border security, customs, threat 
notifications, domestic preparedness, and counterterrorism.444 Furthermore, one 
of the special oversight functions of the CHS is to oversee all interagency activity 
involving DHS,445 which would naturally extend to inter-title operations. The T&I 
is the counterpart to the CS&T in that it provides oversight for Coast Guard 
activities as well as coastal regions and inland waterways.446 
The final two congressional committees considered for the framework are 
generally responsible for providing oversight to Title 18 and Title 28 authorities. 
These congressional bodies are the House Judiciary Committee (HJC)447 and 
the Senate Judiciary Committee (SJC).448 The overlap between criminal and 
judicial procedure and other title authorities requires the judiciary committees to 
participate in a significant number of other jurisdictions—6 USC, 14 USC, and 50 
USC being the most notable examples. 
                                                 
442 See APPENDIX. Senate Committee on Rules, 73–76. Exception is pursuant to S. Res. 
445, s. 101(b)(1), (October 9, 2004). 
443 Id. at Rule XXV s. (1)(f)(1)  
444 See House Committee on Rules, Rule X § 723a(1)(j). 
445 Id. at Rule X § 744 (3)(g)(1) 
446 Id. at Rule X § 739 (1)(r) 
447 Id. at Rule X § 729 (1)(l) 
448 Senate Committee on Rules, Rule XXV s. 101(m). 
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Table 1 represents the first major step in clarifying oversight for planners 
who are preparing for inter-title operations. This consolidated view of 
congressional oversight committees forms one of the strongest arguments for 
inter-title operations. In many ways, the overlapping jurisdictions within the 
statutory framework mirrors the overlapping jurisdictions within the congressional 
oversight structure. Having already identified numerous areas of overlap in 
authorities throughout the previous sections, it is critical to identify congressional 
committee overlap in order for relevant Senate and House oversight committees 
and sub-committees to ensure that operations comply with statutory limitations 
and reporting requirements. This may appear an insurmountable task, but it is 
important to recognize that fulfilling the oversight stipulations of the committees 
can be effected through already established channels. Congress can establish 
these reporting requirements by codifying them under the relevant U.S. title code, 
or by incorporating them into appropriations and authorization bills. One notable 
example of this is found in the Title 6 section on “Information and Analysis and 
Infrastructure Protection,”449 which authorizes inter-title cooperation and has 
initial—and codified—reporting requirements450 as well as additional reporting 
requirements identified in annual legislation.451  
                                                 
449 6 USC § 121  
450 Id. at § 121(d)(25). 
451 Pub. L. 111-259, title III, §336, e.g., the Intelligence Authorization Act of 2010, which 
provides statutes pertaining to cybersecurity oversight.  
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Table 1.   Title Authority and Its Relation to Congressional Oversight 
Title Authority Oversight Body 
6 USC HSGAC/CHS (CS&T/T&I) 
10/32 USC SASC/HASC* 
14 USC CS&T/T&I (HSGAC/CHS) 
18/28 USC SJC/HJC 
50 USC SSCI/HPSCI✝ 
SAD State Committee 
* Under executive control of the Commander in Chief, activities pursuant to 
relevant authorities are, in general, only limited by the president. 
✝Current structures for congressional oversight make congressional approval, in 
general, a necessity for authorizing intelligence activities—to include covert 
activity. 
This table of oversight can facilitate enabling inter-title cyberspace 
operations by ensuring that the proper congressional oversight committees are 
informed of the efforts of each agency and organization involved in the operation. 
As planning is conducted, federal operators must remain cognizant of how their 
participation—assuming it is statutorily authorized—translates to reporting 
requirements for pertinent congressional committees. In some cases, the 
oversight requirements are fulfilled subsequent to an operation, but in other 
cases—as is the case with covert action and previously unapproved intelligence 
activities—it must be done prior to conducting the operation. In most cases, this 
can hardly be done without communicating the full extent of the inter-title 
cooperation including relevant stages the ultimate objectives of the operation. To 
accomplish this, operational planners would require a quorum of all pertinent 
committees to be present to convey the extent of activities and the role to be 
performed by each organization and agency. 
Fulfilling oversight requirements in this scenario is hardly plausible for 
upward of seven title authorities and 40 or more congressional committees. 
Instead, as is often the case with jurisdictional overlap, there is a process by 
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which reporting is sequentially passed from one congressional committee to the 
other. In some cases, legislation has streamlined the reporting process. In terms 
of cybersecurity, relevant departments are statutorily required to choose a lead 
organization to coordinate required reporting to Congress and the president.452 
This scarcely eases the burden of congressional oversight, but at the very least, 
it demonstrates the possibility for consolidated reporting from organizations 
operating under distinct title authorities. Where consolidated reporting is not 
possible or prohibited, there is likely a benefit in vying to be the final committee to 
scrutinize the inter-title operation after all adjustments have been made and 
recommendations incorporated from previous committees. Recommendations for 
a congressional committee succession plan will be outlined under discussions in 
the final section of this chapter. 
B. FISCAL REQUIREMENTS 
Fulfilling the requirements of congressional oversight does not ultimately 
overcome the legislative hurdles associated with inter-title cooperation. Though 
there is a fiscal aspect to the oversight and compliance exercised by Congress 
over activities conducted under the United States Code, fiscal concerns are 
vetted through avenues that, in many cases, are entirely independent of the 
relevant congressional oversight committees. In some cases, this stems from the 
fact that once funds are assigned, there is a certain amount of discretion over 
how and under what conditions they can be used. 
In this, there is an inherent and sometimes explicit responsibility for 
cooperating agencies and organizations to share costs associated with executing 
their joint mission. In turn, this requires determinations as to what constitutes the 
fair share of each participating authority. These determinations are easier in 
cases involving cooperative research and development efforts between two 
organizations—like those statutes that govern Coast Guard and Navy contracting 
                                                 
452 Pursuant to id. at, § 336(b)(3). 
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efforts.453 It becomes significantly more complicated in inter-title operations 
where one agency’s role may be more central to the operation than those of 
supporting organizations. In the case of funds governing intelligence, this is less 
complicated since the task is generally delegated to the ODNI who is given a 
significant amount of statutory discretion in expending appropriated funds.454 
Other provisions for intelligence allow the president to exercise discretion over 
non-appropriated funds in support of activities that have not been explicitly 
denied by congressional oversight committees.455 The expenditure of these 
types of funds usually comes with additional statutory reporting if they are not 
expended under previously approved activities. While the administrative 
challenge associated with this task is immense, it is important to recognize that, 
with few exceptions, there is no statutory prohibition against making this 
determination. 
Along similar lines, some statutes allow for the unique capabilities of one 
organization to be utilized by another. It is helpful to imagine a proverbial pooling 
of federal assets. Agencies that are inhibited in exercising their authorities by 
other-than-statutory deficiencies may, in some cases, employ federal resources 
that are under the patronage of another agency or organization. Depending on 
the complexity of this resource or the requesting agency’s resident level of 
expertise, there may be additional requirements to employ operators who can 
effectively respond to that agency’s operational command authorities. In other 
cases, the agency may just require access. In any case, there is a need to 
identify this type of “loaning” behavior since it requires reimbursement throughout 
many relevant statutes. 
Title 6, for example envisions the corporate employment of effort and 
resources by the State Department, CIA, FBI, NSA, NGA, DIA, and “any other 
                                                 
453 14 USC § 566 
454 See generally, 50 USC § 3024(c). Fair share between intelligence activities is at the 
discretion of the Director of National Intelligence so long as it falls under the National Intelligence 
Program activities. 
455 50 USC § 3094. 
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agency of the Federal Government that the President considers appropriate” in 
creating a consolidated intelligence picture to support infrastructure protection.456 
This same statutory section authorizes cybersecurity collaboration between the 
DOD and DHS and explicitly states that “the Secretary of Defense and the 
Secretary of Homeland Security shall provide personnel, equipment, and facilities 
in order to increase interdepartmental collaboration.”457 There are further 
stipulations that prevent these provisions from being used to circumvent statutory 
prohibitions,458 but the salient point in all of this is that the multitude of 
interactions will incur costs that will need to be shared between the agencies and 
organizations involved in the operation. 
Another fiscal consideration concerns the appropriations committees that 
reside in the House and Senate. These committees are less concerned with 
compliance as it concerns the intent of relevant statutes. As previously 
discussed, the vast expanse of standing and select committees and 
subcommittees throughout the Congress are responsible for compliance. 
Instead, appropriations committees are concerned with linking specific amounts 
of money in the federal budget to specific statutory requirements as codified in 
the U.S.C. and various legislation.459 As such, the efforts of the appropriations 
process manifest themselves through three distinct products. The first is seen in 
regular appropriations bills that provide funding for the associated fiscal year. As 
                                                 
456 6 USC § 121(f)(2) 
457 Pursuant to relevant statutes contained in the National Defense Authorization Act of 2012 
(Pub. L. 112-81). 
458 For example, the creation of any new cybersecurity initiatives is required to be reported 
by the president to Congress within 30 days of commencement of operations in a report that must 
justify the legal basis for such program (pursuant to 18 USC § 2511(2)(a)(ii)(B)). See also POSSE 
COMITATUS ACT (18 USC § 1385). Supra at Ch. 2 s. (C)(4)(c). 
459 See SUMMARY. U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, The 
Congressional Appropriations Process: An Introduction, by Jessica Tollestrup, R42388 (2014) 
http://www.senate.gov/CRSReports/crs-publish.cfm?pid=%260BL%2BP%3C%3B3%0A. 
“Congress annually considers several appropriations measures, which provide discretionary 
funding for numerous activities—for example, national defense, education, and homeland 
security—as well as general government operations. Congress has developed certain rules and 
practices for the consideration of appropriations measures, referred to as the congressional 
appropriations process.”  
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with the Consolidated Appropriations Bill of 2016,460 these bills are sometimes 
complicated by additional statutory inclusions that are unrelated to fiscal 
distributions.461 The next comes in the form of continuing resolutions—more 
notable examples include bills to avoid “government shut-downs.” The third is 
found in supplemental appropriations bills, which generally provide “additional 
funding for selected activities over and above the amount provided through 
annual or continuing appropriations.”462 A salient point to this is that each of 
these pieces of legislation outline terms under which funds are to be used and 
possible additional reporting requirements associated with their expenditure. 
Congressional approval of financing is a complicated but necessary 
requirement in the process of establishing an inter-title framework. This is 
because the budget that Congress passes—as approved by the president—
delineates how much money will be expended under each title authority. These 
line items can be extremely specific. Take for instance the Intelligence 
Authorization Act for 2015,463 which allocates $507,400,000 to the ODNI “to be 
appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account.”464 As such, 
determining fair share becomes an integral part of planning and executing inter-
title operations. 
Determination of fair share is not a new concept for federal organizations. 
The Department of Transportation “ensures effective cooperation between the 
DOD, Department of Transportation (DOT), and State DOTs in matters pertaining 
to defense use of public highways.” Governing instructions like the Defense 
Transportation Regulation (DTR) and funding lines—like those governing federal-
aid funds to the interstate system or Defense Access Road funds—are prevalent 
                                                 
460 Pub. L. 114-113. 
461 See supra at Ch. 2 s. (C)(4)(e). 
462 CRS, The Congressional Appropriations Process: An Introduction, 15. 
463 Pub. L. 113-293 
464 Id. at s. 104(a). 
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throughout executive departments and subordinate agencies. One area requiring 
significant consideration is unsurprisingly in the domain of cyberspace. 
Most operations in cyberspace require the use of techniques or munitions 
that may require a significant amount of capital to develop465 and have a limited 
capability for reuse. This complication is not trivial because in addition to being 
difficult, determining fair share may become highly contentious between those 
agencies that are vying for use of limited capabilities. USCYBERCOM, in 
conjunction with DHS, may be the best suited for making fair share determination 
on shared systems and for the use and sustainment of equipment, personnel, 
and munitions.466 Ultimately, however, this becomes a matter for policy makers 
and is not beyond the scope of legislation to authorize. Table 2 represents the 
minimum fiscal considerations needed to make inter-title determinations in 
support of cooperative cyberspace operations.  
                                                 
465 Aliya Sternstein, “$460M CYBERCOM Contract Will Create Digital Munitions,” Defense 
One, October 5, 2015, http://www.defenseone.com/technology/2015/10/460m-cybercom-contract-
will-create-digital-munitions/122556. 
466 In the case of cyber-munitions, if prices associated with each munition are paid for under 
authorized funds, then the use of that munition may accomplish one organization’s goals at the 
expense of another. Another consideration may allow the pooling of funds to create an available 
armory of cyber-munitions that teams may utilize when necessary. This, however, might favor 
more active agencies like, presumably, the DHS and DOD. If cyber munitions are developed in 
isolation then disparities in training and skill-level could put some organizations at a significant 
disadvantage. This may also lead to fiscal excesses as this option leaves open the possibility for 
cyber-munitions to be developed in parallel. A fortiori, the increased cost would not prevent the 
munition’s loss to all entities once it is used by a single organization. 
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Table 2.   Title Authority and Its Relation to Fiscal Requirements 
Title Authority 
Fiscal Responsibility 
Funds Personnel Reimbursement 
6 USC    
10/32 USC    
14 USC    
18/28 USC    
50 USC    
SAD    
Under this format, planners can determine relevant fiscal allowances and 
prohibitions, and assign funding lines, dollar amounts, or share percentages. 
The entries in this table are blank and must be filled in by the planners, 
which can be done in a number of ways. For simpler operations, the spaces can 
be used to more thoroughly characterize the assets being made available by 
each participating organization (i.e., fiscal allocations, funding lines, number, and 
skills of personnel needed, etc.). For operations that are large, complicated, or 
contain multiple stages, these boxes can contain references to more thorough 
fiscal assessment. 
Fiscal considerations may be the most difficult hurdle to inter-title 
cooperation, but is not beyond the grasp of planners and administrative staffs. In 
many cases, the statutory requirements go unutilized because of overly 
restrictive policy or an absence of any documentation on the type of cooperation 
being requested. In the short-term, these issues can primarily be solved through 
memoranda of agreement, but with the dynamics of cyberspace, there may be a 
need for a more comprehensive policy to address the difficulty associated with 
making fiscal determinations. 
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C. RESPONSIBILITY AND COMMAND AUTHORITY 
One area that has yet to be explicitly discussed is that of responsibility and 
command authority. The doctrine of the U.S. military approaches the complexity 
of operations by ensuring that their operators are able to derive their direction 
from a single source. The essence of this is seen in operational planning efforts 
that seek both “unity of command” and “unity of effort.”467 This is not strictly a 
military principle, however, nor is it a concern that only has cognizance in the 
Executive branch. The successes and failures of U.S. operations—both 
domestically and abroad—have led congressional legislators to create statutory 
requirements in the areas of responsibilities and command authority. 
Legislation is keen to outline the primary missions and responsibilities of 
each department. The DHS for example has the primary mission of preventing 
terrorist attacks against the United States and for investigating and prosecuting 
terrorism.468 In the latter case, jurisdictional conflicts are alleviated by clarification 
that this authority is not exclusively vested in DHS, “but rather in Federal, State, 
and local law enforcement agencies with jurisdiction over the [terrorist] acts in 
question.”469 This clarification in itself, however, presents a complication in that 
there is a recognition of competing and overlapping jurisdictions. The Executive 
branch has responded to these statutory ambiguities by developing the concept 
of the Lead Federal Agency (LFA) where there is significant overlap between 
authorities. The DOJ, for example, is the LFA for domestic crisis management 
and, in response to potential threats, is required to coordinate with federal, state 
and local agencies to develop procedures and guidelines. 
                                                 
467 See generally Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operations, Joint Publication 3-0 
(Washington DC: CJCS, August 11, 2011): xvi. See also id., Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the 
United States, Joint Publication 1-0 (Washington DC: CJCS, March 25, 2013): xxiii. “Unity of 
command is strengthened through adherence to the following C2 tenets: clearly defined 
authorities, roles, and relationships; mission command; information management and knowledge 
sharing; communication; timely decision making; coordination mechanisms; battle rhythm 
discipline; responsive, dependable, and interoperable support systems; situational awareness; 
and mutual trust.” 
468 6 USC § 111(b) 
469 Id. at § 111(b)(2). 
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The designation of an LFA, however, does not necessarily lead to unity of 
command and unity of effort. In the case of Hurricane Katrina relief efforts, the 
LFA was designated as FEMA, but relief efforts demanded the direction of 
federal law enforcement efforts, a task for which FEMA is not suited--nor does it 
have sufficient statutory authority to direct the employment of armed forces in 
certain tasks. Many of the statutory restrictions that led to unsuccessful response 
efforts in the wake of Hurricane Katrina were amended in the National Defense 
Authorization act of 2010, which eliminated many of the mutually exclusive 
aspects of Title-10/Title-32 as they pertain to Chain of Command and “allowed 
specially designated National Guard officers to command forces in both a Title 10 
and Title 32—designated as a Dual Status Commanders.”470 
Support roles, by contrast, neither require active participation, nor 
preclude it. Support to inter-title operations as provided by DOD in the form of 
equipment and facilities is an example of a passive support role that is founded in 
statutory authority.471 Authorities for passive support are primarily designed to 
provide necessary training, equipment, facilities, and personnel. When using 
passive support, consent from the supporting agency becomes a primary 
consideration since a lack of consent may pose problems in the area of funding 
or even preclude use of the support altogether. Conversely, in areas where 
active roles are authorized, there may be statutory mandates that require 
assistance or leave it as optional—as is typically the case when the support does 
not provide a unique capability to the operation or when its use adversely affects 
the supporting agencies ability to fulfill their primary mission requirements.472 
Ideally, leveraging the title code is about meeting the threshold for conducting 
                                                 
470 U.S. National Guard, “NGAUS Fact Sheet: Understanding the Guard’s Duty Status,” 
accessed March 14, 2016, http://www.ngaus.org/sites/default/files/Guard%20 Statues.pdf. 
471 See generally 10 USC § 374. 
472 e.g., id. at § 376 as it pertains to military support to law enforcement to the extent that the 
“provision of any such support does not adversely affect the military preparedness of the United 
States.” See also 6 USC § 148(e)(1) as it pertains to the NCCIC. In general, the NCCIC is 
responsible for coordinating cybersecurity responses “to the extent practicable” and the rendering 
of its services to not constitute a “right or benefit.”  
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action and the rules of evidence that apply in order to prosecute targets. This is 
threshold is generally for domestic responses than it is for foreign responses. 
Extensive legislation is already in place that allows for cooperation 
between agencies supporting various intelligence requirements, in support of 
counterterrorism, support to CIP, and in support of emergency response 
efforts.473 Even in these cases, however, there remains the possibility for 
operators to confuse the primary objective with their own organizational goals 
and to incorrectly assign lead authorities to the overall operation. Examples from 
Katrina relief operations demonstrated as much and cyberspace jurisdictions are 
no less convoluted. 
Many pertinent changes to cyberspace legislation have provided a modest 
remedy for many of these issues. A large portion of the policy interpretations for 
this legislation is currently classified and this thesis will not venture to comment 
on any “leaked” classified material that has yet to be declassified, regardless of 
the possibility of its presence in the private sector. While possibly helpful to 
discussion, any analysis of policy and procedure remains arbitrary. For the 
purposes of the framework, it will suffice to acknowledge that operations will 
require the designation of a lead authority or lead agency to provide foundational 
statutory authority to the breadth of the operation. Activities may draw on the 
authorities of other agencies in order to accomplish the operational objectives. 
As mentioned earlier, The Secretary of Defense possesses authorities 
under both Title 10 and Title 50. The extensive cyberspace capabilities and 
coordination authorities that reside with USCYBERCOM make it well suited to 
lead many federal operations against unconventional cyberspace threats that can 
be expected to be external in nature. Internal responses will likely preclude the 
DOD from establishing itself as the lead authority, since its operations will, in 
most circumstances, be governed by stipulations of the PCA—and other relevant 
legislation. The DHS is likely the most logical organization to lead internal 
                                                 
473 See generally EXAMPLES OF INTER-TITLE COOPERATION. Supra at Ch 3 s. (A)(2). 
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operations. It has an extensive capability for responding to domestic threats that 
is complimented by a leading role in coordinating cyberspace responses. There 
are intelligence operations that might be better served if led by one of the many 
agencies operating under Title 50, and the FBI is easily complemented by Title 
10 authorities in their requirements to prosecute international criminals who 
commit crimes pursuant to 18 USC. 
Table 3.   Title Authority and Its Relation to Lead and Support Roles 
Title Authority 
Authority Role (check all that apply) 
Lead Support 
6 USC   
10/32 USC   
14 USC   
18/28 USC   
50 USC   
SAD   
Under this format, planners can determine overall lead and support roles, and 
assign lead and support roles to each stage or aspect of operations. 
Table 3 represents the minimum authority considerations needed to make 
inter-title determinations in support of cooperative cyberspace operations. The 
entries in this table are initially blank and must be filled in by the planners, which 
can be done in a variety of ways. As with Table 2, simpler operations will likely 
support spaces being used to specify leading and supporting organizations, 
units, or sub-units. For operations that are large, complicated, or contain multiple 
stages, these boxes will likely refer to documents that outline all assigned forces 
and their specific employment. Under this format, planners can determine overall 
lead and support roles, and also assign lead and support roles for each stage or 
aspect of an operation. 
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Table 3 is primarily intended to clarify the overall leading and supporting 
roles over the course of the operation, however, it is important to recognize that 
participation can be a very dynamic aspect of operations—especially those that 
are longer in duration. Simply put, leading and supporting roles can change 
throughout the course of an operation. This table allows for this dynamic change 
by allowing organizations operating under a given title authority to annotate 
forces that will be in leading and supporting roles. In the case of domestic 
support to homeland security, for example, Title 32 operators may initially be in a 
support role under SAD authorities. As the operation progresses, there may be a 
need to shift the role of lead authority to Title 10. This shift can be in response to 
some event or a planned aspect of the operation. None of these shifts in 
authority precludes continuity of operations. Instead, they inform operators, fiscal 
appropriations, and oversight bodies as to the source of authority from which all 
subsequent orders will be issued. 
All of these shifts can be basically accounted for in the previous matrix, 
though for more complex operations, it is recommended that blocks simply refer 
to organizational units or sub-units with details annotated in attachments or 
references. The dynamics of these leading and supporting roles are critical at 
each stage of the operation and may be revisited or restructured as needed. This 
assists the operational planning process since it is altogether possible that 
agencies that are authorized to assist in the earlier stages of an operation might 
be statutorily precluded from assisting in the latter stages—and vice versa.474 
Before moving on to the final framework, it is worthwhile to briefly draw 
attention to the numerous legal systems in which inter-title teams will operate. 
When planning for inter-title operations, it is important to understand the legal 
implications for any violations that may occur. It is likely a concern for these 
disparate court systems that form the basis for many of the fallacies that demand 
                                                 
474 For more examples of lead and supporting authorities or dual-lead authorities, see 
generally APPENDIX C – Notable Examples of Lead and Supporting Authorities as They Pertain 
to Inter-Title Operations. 
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a prohibition against inter-title operations. Depending on the nature of the activity, 
or the sovereignty it affects, inter-title teams may be considered liable under one 
or more jurisdictions—depending on the nature and extent of a violation. The four 
most relevant court systems are shown in Table 4. 
Table 4.   International and Domestic Court Systems 
Court Body Governing Statutes 
International Criminal Court (ICC) Rome Statute475 
Military Tribunal Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) 
Federal Court System Federal Law 
State Court System State Law 
This table lists potential legal systems and governing statutes that may be 
applicable when conducting inter-title operations. 
In addition to these legal systems, governing authorities from foreign 
nations may be authorized by their own domestic legal systems to bring charges 
against all or some of the participants involved in inter-title cyberspace 
operations. Though not of immediate concern, complex extradition laws make 
this worthy of some consideration. The salient point here is that the level of 
liability to which inter-title operators are subject, may be different for each 
operation and it is an important consideration for each stage of action and to the 
operation as a whole. 
D. INTER-TITLE COOPERATION MATRIX 
In combining the isolated matrices from previous sections, the concluding 
framework incorporates demands for congressional oversight, considerations for 
fiscal appropriations, and the clear delineation of responsibilities and assignment 
of a lead authority. In its most basic sense, this framework is intended to 
leverage the unique capabilities of each organization in order to achieve national 
                                                 
475 Although the United States as not formally recognized the Rome Statute, the ICC is not 
prevented from bringing charges against the United States or its citizens. 
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security objectives that may exist beyond the capability of any one single 
organization to achieve on its own. The final framework (Table 5), while likely 
adequate for planning and executing inter-title cyberspace operations, is still 
subject to a number of underlying assumptions and presuppositions. 
One of these assumptions is that the operation is both legal and 
sanctioned by operational authorities. Far from being a prescription to enable 
organizations to advance their own objectives, the framework is built on 
cooperative agreements that have been entered into by authorities that are both 
competent and complicit—except were statutory authority authorizes forcible 
cooperation. Additionally, a major presupposition for this framework is that these 
operations are aligned to national security objectives. In the area of covert action, 
particularly, there is an emphatic prohibition against taking any action that is 
“intended to influence United States political processes, public opinion, policies, 
or media.” This may be a presumption for most, but the end state objectives of 
every operation must be cognizant of the potential for collateral effects at each 
stage of the operation. Another key presumption is linked to the relevant and 
diverse legal systems to which inter-title operations can be simultaneously 
subject. In light of previous violations—like those that characterized inter-title 
operations during the L.A. Riots—it is presumed that appropriate training has 
been conducted to the extent necessary based on the nature and extent of each 
agency’s participation. These training requirements should also reasonably 
account for potential contingency operations. 
An item that remains unsettled from the previous section is the process by 
which congressional oversight can be sufficiently satisfied. Intelligence oversight 
committees generally believe that the conduct of intelligence activities—
especially those involving covert action—carry great risks in the diplomatic arena 
and for national security. As such, a strong case might be made for advancing 
the intelligence committees as the final oversight reviewer. This, however, 
disregards concerns in fiscal reporting. It is more likely that the lead authority will 
be required to consolidate reporting and submit combined appropriations 
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requests through their relevant congressional committee—unlikely to be the 
intelligence oversight committees unless operations are primarily dependent on 
statutory authorizations from 50 USC. Aside from this argument, defaulting to the 
committee with the greatest potential for liability additionally fails to grasp that 
supporting title authorities fulfill a complementary role, no matter how important 
they are for operational success. Title 50 intelligence support to military 
operations is just one example of this. While Title 50 support may be critical to 
mission success, military forces may still choose to proceed with an operation 
even if they must proceed without the support of the intelligence committees. 
Stepping back from the desires of the oversight committees, it becomes 
clear that the consternation is, in large part, due to the fact that Congress insists 
on aligning their committees to broad areas of activity instead of to the title 
authorities themselves.476 To understand which committee has a more viable 
claim to final review, planners would be forced to take up the untenable position 
of attempting to apply every action to every possible statute—some actions being 
applicable to numerous statutes. Making this even more difficult is that the 
process is almost entirely incompatible with the format by which operations are 
planned. Instead, it is recommended that the statutory activities be vetted 
through their respective congressional committees and that final review be 
provided by the congressional oversight body that most closely aligns with the 
lead title authority in the operation. In the case of a Title 10 lead authority, the 
House and Senate Armed Services Committees would provide final review. In 
the case of a Title 50 lead authority, it would likely be the intelligence 
committees. In the case of a DHS-led operation, it may be more difficult to 
determine the committee with final review authority, but it would be significantly 
less complicated than the other alternative. As with many of the preceding 
arguments, this is one that primarily concerns policy. It is just as likely that the 
House and Senate will pass rules or legislation to adjust the way in which this 
process proceeds—irrespective of any recommendations outlined here. 
                                                 
476 Wall, 141. 
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Table 5.   Framework for Inter-Title Cyberspace Operations 
Title Authority Oversight Body 
Fiscal Responsibility 
(check all that apply) 
Authority Role 
(check all that apply) 
Funds Personnel Reimbursement Lead Support 
6 USC HSGAC/CHS (CS&T/T&I)      
10/32 USC SASC/HASC*      
14 USC CS&T/T&I (HSGAC/CHS)      
18/28 USC SJC/HJC      
50 USC SSCI/HPSCI✝      
SAD State Committee      
* Under executive control of the Commander in Chief, activities pursuant to relevant authorities are, in general, only limited by the 
president. 
✝ Current structures for congressional oversight make congressional approval, in general, a necessity for authorizing intelligence 
activities—to include covert activity. Note: Instructions for correctly filling out the framework are contained in preceding sections 
(Ch. 4 ss. (A),(B),(C)) with examples in the succeeding chapter (Ch. 5 ss. (A),(B)). 
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V. INTER-TITLE CYBERSPACE SCENARIOS 
With the matrix complete, this chapter demonstrates utilization of the 
matrix to enable inter-title cyberspace operations. As such, it is important to 
complement the framework proposal with a prominent feature of cyberspace 
operations, which is the fact that they generally tend to encompass limited 
aspects of larger operations. Operations often center around non-cyberspace 
actors who, for one reason or another, require a cyberspace capability in order to 
achieve their objectives. While there are certainly operations that have 
significantly higher degrees of cyberspace purity, an increasing number of 
operations either provide support to or are themselves supported by kinetic 
operations that originate in the physical domains. The following scenarios 
represent these two worlds. The first scenario is a counterproliferation scenario 
that makes use of both traditional and cyber-forces, while the second scenario is 
more purely cyber as it depicts an attack against Southern California’s electrical 
grid. 




Introduction:  A Maltesian-flagged merchant ship, Motor Vessel (M/V) NANA 
ONE is alleged by an intelligence source to be transporting a 
known shipment of drugs and several suspicious canisters 
with unknown contents to a distribution facility in San 
Francisco, CA. 
 
18 USC:  The vessel has been coordinating their shipments via email 
through an illicit criminal network with possible ties to terrorist 
groups based in the Indo-Pacific region. Intelligence sources 
have regular access to these correspondences and the FBI is 
seeking prosecution against some crewmembers of M/V 
NANA ONE under violations of 21 USC § 846 and 18 USC §§ 
1030,1956. 
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14 USC: The FBI and U.S. Coast guard have agreed to joint leadership 
responsibilities with the Coast Guard using its coastal forces 
and cyber cadre to lead the operation while M/V NANA ONE is 
underway followed by the FBI assuming the role of lead 
authority for all operations subsequent to the vessel mooring 
pier-side at the distribution facility. 
 
10 USC: The USCG does not have any medium or high-endurance 
cutters available to support this mission, and have requested 
the U.S. Navy to provide real time tracking and have 
transferred key personnel to the Navy warship in the event 
that a boarding of the vessel becomes necessary. All support 
requirements involve tracking and reporting between Honolulu, 
HI and San Francisco, CA. 
 
50 USC: Intelligence assets from the NSA are providing SIGINT 
support to all involved entities and clandestine cyberspace 
operators have been authorized to intercept and report on any 
communications that are outbound or inbound to the vessel. 
 
 
Relevant Information for the Inter-Title Framework 
 
Authorities:  10 USC / 14 USC / 18 USC / 50 USC 
 
Oversight: 10 USC: SASC / HASC  
 14 USC: CS&T / T&I 
 18 USC: SJC / HJC 
 50 USC: SSCI / HPSCI 
 
Fiscal Concerns: 10 USC: Personnel / Reimbursement 
 14 USC: Funds / Personnel 
 18 USC: Funds / Personnel 
 50 USC: Personnel 
 
Authority Role:  10 USC: Support  
 14 USC: Lead 
 18 USC: Lead/Support 
 50 USC: Support 
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(check/fill in all that apply) 
Authority Role 
(check all that apply) 
Funds Personnel Reimburs. Lead Support 







42 Active Duty 
7 Reservist 
9 Auxiliary 
No D11 Command Center  
- MSST SF 
- PACAREA TACLET 
  (embarked DDG-102) 
- CG PACCYBER 
18 USC SJC/HJC Yes (50%)4 
20 Agents, 
13 Support staff 
   - 4 Linguists 
   - 4 Intel Analysts 









50 USC SSCI/HPSCI None5 Yes5 No N/A Tactical Coordination Center (TCC)5 
1 Expended funds will derive from appropriated funds (funding line PAC-H-A17). Any incidentals will be funded by lead authorities: 14 USC 
(Funding line D11-PAC-PD3) and 18 USC (Funding line OCTF-1-3). 
2 Pursuant to 10 USC § 377 (REF A – DOD REQUEST FOR WAIVER APPROVAL LETTER). 
3 Expended funds will derive from appropriated funds (funding line D11-PAC-PD1). Fair share of incidentals and funding for embarked PACAREA 
TACLET will be provided for from funding line D11-PAC-PD3. 
4 Expended funds will derive from appropriated funds (funding line OCND-4-2). Fair share of incidentals will be provided for from funding line 
OCTF-1-3. 
5 Details contained in classified attachments (ATTACHMENT 1) 
* DISCLAIMER: All funding lines, references, attachments, and units in bold font are fictional. Any resemblance they may bear to actual 
organizational constructs is entirely coincidental. 
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Scenario Development 
 
Inter-Title: (10 USC) The U.S. Navy ship is tracking M/V NANA ONE with 
a shipboard radar within territorial waters and intends to 
provide continued surveillance of the vessel until it is moored 
at the distribution facility.478 
 
 (14 USC) Coast Guard coastal patrol boats provide additional 
surveillance of the vessel as it enters the San Francisco Bay, 
but their presence paired with the U.S. Naval warship prompts 
the master of M/V NANA ONE to report the increased activity 
to their criminal contact. 
 
 (50 USC) Intelligence operators report the outgoing 
transmission to the USCG and FBI. 
 
 (14 USC and 18 USC) After brief discussions, the USCG 
decides to block any further email correspondence to or from 
the vessel as it pertains to the drug shipment. An email 
regarding port services is forwarded on to the ship, but an 
email from the criminal contact is intercepted and delivery is 
barred. 
 
 (10 USC and 50 USC) The position of M/V NANA ONE is 
continually updated by the U.S. Navy ship and validated by 
SIGINT reporting collected through provisions of FISA. 
 
 (10 USC, 14 USC, 18 USC, and 50 USC) As the ships moors, 
the master of M/V NANA ONE dispatches another email to an 
address that has yet to be observed over the course of this 
investigation. As the USCG turns over lead authority to the 
FBI, the email addressed is checked against a state criminal 
repository. To investigate further, the FBI directs the USCG 
coastal forces to stand-down until notified otherwise. 
Meanwhile, local law enforcement databases return a match 
for a suspected drug trafficker operating out of Southern 
California. The FBI then directs USCG cyber operators to 
forward the message to the intended recipient. Within a few 
hours, the suspected drug trafficker and the master of the 
vessel are arrested by USCG forces and FBI agents during 
the exchange. Over 800lbs of marijuana are seized from the 
hold of the ship, and the suspicious containers were found to 
be holding liquid cocaine totaling more than 1200kg. 
                                                 
478 Pursuant to 10 USC § 374(b)(2) 
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B. SCENARIO 2: INTER-TITLE CYBERSPACE SUPPORT TO DEFENSE 
OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
Scenario Setup 
 
Introduction:  Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) is experiencing 
suspicious and potentially detrimental activity at numerous 
power plants in the portion of their electrical grid that ties in 
with Mexico’s grid near the U.S.-Mexican border. 
 
50 USC: Intelligence analysts receive indications of a potential cyber 
attack along California’s border with Mexico and generate an 
alert report through intelligence sharing channels. 
 
6 USC:  Indications of potential cyber attacks are received by the 
NCCIC and immediately forwarded through the HSIN-CI from 
which alerts are disseminated to PG&E Corporate 
Headquarters, the California State Governor’s Office, 
USCYBERCOM, US-CERT, ICS-CERT, and the Cyber 
National Guard Units responsible for supporting the California. 
 
32 USC: Cyber National Guard Units receive the alert and prepare to 
support operations. 
 
10 USC: USCYBERCOM National Mission Teams are in heightened 
alert and prepared to support operations. 
 
SAD: The state governor’s office receives the alert and following 
deliberations with the regional director for PG&E network 
management, NCCIC, USCYBERCOM and the Cyber 
National Guard Unit, officially authorizes State Active Duty to 
respond to what is almost certainly a cyber attack against 
California’s power grid. The responding organizations agree to 
a phased operational approach that has the potential to shift 
lead authority to any title authority except 50 USC. 
 
 
Relevant Information for the Inter-Title Framework 
 
Authorities:  6 USC / 10 USC / 32 USC / 50 USC / SAD 
 
Oversight: 6 USC:  HSGAC / CHS 
 10 USC: SASC / HASC  
 32 USC: SASC / HASC 
 50 USC: SSCI / HPSCI 
 SAD:  State Governor 
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Fiscal Concerns: 6 USC:  Funds / Personnel 
 10 USC: Funds / Personnel / Reimbursement 
 32 USC: Funds / Personnel 
 50 USC: Personnel 
 SAD:  Funds 
 
Authority Role:  6 USC:  Lead / Support  
 10 USC: Lead / Support 
 32 USC: Lead / Support 
 50 USC: Support 
 SAD:  Lead
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Table 7.   Scenario 2: Completed Framework for Inter-Title Cyberspace Support to Defense of Critical 
Infrastructure 
Title Authority Oversight Body 
Fiscal Responsibility 
(check all that apply) 
Authority Role 
(check all that apply) 
Funds Personnel Reimbursement Lead Support 
6 USC HSGAC/CHS Yes (100%)1 Yes2 No X3 X4 
10 USC SASC/HASC Yes (100%)1 Yes2 Yes5 X3 X4 
32 USC SASC/HASC Yes (100%)1 Yes2 No X3 X4 
50 USC SSCI/HPSCI None6 Yes6 No  X6 
SAD Governor Yes (100%)1 No No X3  
1 Details contained in ATTACHMENT 2 – FISCAL ASSESSMENT PLAN (in accordance with ATTACHMENT 1) 
2 Details contained in ATTACHMENT 3 – PERSONNEL SUPPORT & ASSIGNMENT PLAN (in accordance with ATTACHMENT 1) 
3 Details contained in ATTACHMENT 4 – LEAD ROLES AND AUTHORITIES (in accordance with ATTACHMENT 1) 
4 Details contained in ATTACHMENT 7 – SUPPORT ROLES 
5 Pursuant to 10 USC § 377 (in accordance with ATTACHMENT 2) 
6 Details contained in classified attachments (ATTACHMENTS 8 and 9) 
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Scenario Development 
 
Inter-Title: (SAD, 6 USC, 10 USC, 32 USC, and 50 USC) The state governor’s 
office is directing the Cyber National Guard efforts and coordinating 
backup restoration efforts with PG&E. Intelligence reporting 
indicates that the threat source may be originating from a remote 
location outside of California’s power grid, but analysis is 
inconclusive. The governor desires to direct restoration efforts, but 
now requires federal assistance as it is now clear that the scope 
and costs are more extensive than had originally been anticipated. 
The NCCIC has been coordinating all efforts thus far and has 
updated all parties to the governor’s request and the president’s 
subsequent approval to federalize the cyber-forces and allow the 
USCYBERCOM to provide assistance. 
 
 (6 USC, 10 USC, 32 USC, and 50 USC) The electrical grid 
continues to degrade and the DHS and USCYBERCOM have 
realized that the National Guard forces do not have the requisite 
training to use the advanced cyber capabilities necessary to isolate 
and neutralize the attacks. After significant deliberations between 
DHS, USCYBERCOM, and the president, an executive order is 
issued—against the governor’s wishes—to fully federalize the 
operation by way of a declaration of an emergency. 
 
 (6 USC, 10 USC, 50 USC) Instead of placing USCYBERCOM as 
the lead title authority, all parties agree that it would be in the best 
interest of the operation if DHS took over domestic operations to 
stabilize the power grid. US-CERT and ICS-CERT immediately set 
to work to diagnose the source and nature of the attacks. As efforts 
get underway, intelligence reporting reveals two key pieces of 
information. The first is that the attacks were originating in the Indo-
Pacific region. The second is that the attacks were being directed 
against Mexico’s power grid, which was affecting power along the 
border where the U.S. and Mexico share infrastructure. 
 
 (6 USC, 10 USC, 50 USC) In light of these new developments, lead 
authority is shifted to USCYBERCOM. The State Department is 
able to negotiate authorization from the Mexican administration for 
USCYBERCOM to operate in and through a limited number of 
Mexican networks and infrastructure in order to bring quick 
resolution to the problem. Using intelligence to support cyber fires, 
NMT operators make use of the extensive cyber-munitions to 
provide Defensive Cyber Operations, Response Actions (DCO-RA) 
actions against the cyber perpetrators and to restore the electrical 
grid to full operation.  
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE 
RESEARCH 
A. CONCLUSIONS AND SUMMARY 
There were many challenges associated with creating the preceding 
framework to support inter-title cyberspace operations. Much of the commentary 
of the first three chapters lays out the context for cyberspace operations and then 
commits a great deal of space to clarifying, revealing, and debunking much of the 
information and misinformation associated with inter-title operations. The material 
is arguably dense and much of the thoroughness is intended to corral objections 
that are only tangentially opposed to inter-title operations. With many of these 
objections having been addressed in Chapters I–III, Chapter IV is focused on the 
simpler task of building the framework that cyberspace operational planners can 
leverage to enable inter-title cooperation. Having set aside myth and 
misinformation, the framework recognizes that there are three major hurdles that 
planners must address in order to establish inter-title operations that are legally 
compliant. These three concerns have been identified as congressional oversight 
and compliance, fiscal requirements, and the assignment of responsibilities and 
command authority. These three areas are often held captive by a variety of 
congressional and executive policies, but they are nonetheless, viable avenues 
from the perspective of the United States Code. This is not to say that policy is 
irrelevant but simply an effort to understand the extent to which inter-title 
operations are permissible by federal law. As such, the following four points 
summarize crucial conclusions wrought from the previous five chapters. 
1. Understand the Limitations of Policy  
There are certainly consequences—even legal repercussions—for failing 
to follow policy and procedure. Because of this, planners are often hampered, not 
by legislation, but by policies masquerading as law. Understanding the difference 
between the two is crucial for planning and executing inter-title operations. This is 
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not to say that policy is unnecessary or an unwelcome guest in inter-title 
discussions. When compared with the legislative process, policy tends to have 
the advantage of being more flexible, and its potential for change is typically 
subject to shorter timelines. However, in the development of an operation, 
planners are likely to avoid courses of action that appear to conflict with a 
standing policy, even if the context for that policy is not understood. Worse yet, 
the absence of a clearly defined policy may dissuade approval authorities from 
pursuing a specific course even if its suggested actions are statutorily authorized. 
It is therefore of utmost importance to understand the limitations of policy 
and the legislative authorities from which they stem. This balanced approach will, 
on the one hand, enable planners to perceive situations were standing policies 
are irrelevant and seek out relevant legislation to reinforce operational plans. On 
the other hand, if overly restrictive policies are playing a substantial role in 
operations, an understanding of their derivative legislation can be used to justify 
temporary memoranda or waivers that will allow operations to proceed 
unimpeded. In order to be effective, however, operational planners need to be 
familiar with both policy and legislation. 
2. Comply with Congressional Oversight 
The overabundance of legislation at both the domestic and international 
level are often exacerbated by competing political agendas and power struggles 
between the governing branches of the U.S. government. The results vary, but it 
is not uncommon for the Executive Branch to be met by frequent and fierce 
congressional opposition when it attempts to wield power or overextend its 
authority. Congressional oversight committees are partly the result of this 
dynamic and partly responsible sustaining it. In the ongoing debates over 
jurisdiction amongst title authorities, the congressional call for compliance must 
be met. Marrying up the jurisdictions of the congressional committees with the 
jurisdictions of the title authorities is a difficult but necessary task in enabling 
inter-title cyberspace operations. Difficulties arise due to the complex 
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organizational structure of the House and Senate committees, which is not 
directly aligned with title authorities, but they can also be the result of 
disinformation and jurisdictional misperceptions that are resident within the 
committee system itself—as is often the case with Title 10 intelligence and Title 
50 intelligence activities. Despite the complexity, relevant congressional 
committees must be identified and operations must be reported or vetted by them 
as appropriate. The extent to which the congressional committee can approve, 
disapprove, or even defund an operation is dependent on a number of factors. It 
is therefore critical to first understand what is authorized through legislation and 
then to understand the extent to which each committee is able to validate or 
invalidate a given activity. 
3. Ensure Fiscal Integrity 
Previous discussions on fiscal requirements suggested that this step 
would likely be the most difficult. While the relative difficulties of satisfying each 
element of the framework will vary from operation to operation, ensuring fiscal 
integrity should generally be expected to be the most difficult. Ironically, the 
increasingly austere fiscal environment supplies much of the motivation for 
aggregating resources in order to remain both effective and relevant. Planners 
and staff members must not only understand the legislative authorities that are 
active in each operation, but also be capable of adequately linking them to a 
budget line item that has been approved by Congress. In cases where numerous 
funding lines are being pooled to support aspects of operations with jurisdictional 
overlap, planners must make “fair share” determinations. In addition to this, 
personnel must be allocated and reimbursement expenses must be identified. All 
of this must be done in accordance with title authorities and relevant legislation. 
As proposed in Chapter IV, many of these difficulties can be eased by 
establishing fiscal norms for inter-title operations through memoranda of 
agreement or a more robust policy that consolidates legislative requirements. 
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4. Establish a Competent Lead Authority 
Ideally, this should be the easiest requirement to fulfill, but it is often 
subject to limitations that are not immediately apparent. Identifying the lead and 
supporting title authorities—being certain to account for legislated limitations like 
those found in the PCA—is the first basic step for determining a competent lead 
authority. After this, however, there is a need to identify whether lead title 
authorities have the experience necessary to lead these types of operations or 
whether they have staffs available to coordinate inter-title activities. In addition to 
this, determinations must be made as to the surge capacity and sustainability of 
the lead title authority. Many agencies, organizations, and departments do not 
have the experience or the personnel to coordinate large or long-term operations. 
These aspects must be factored in when determining the nature and extent of 
supporting and leading roles for inter-title operations. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
With the completion of the inter-title framework, there remains a great 
need for further research to further clarify the best means by which a path can be 
clear to enable these operations to be planned and executed along reasonably 
shorter timelines. The following recommendations are areas that will lead to less 
obstructions and greater efficiency in mission planning and execution. 
1. Simplifying Congressional Oversight 
For all the countless papers published and innumerable task forces 
assembled, the disruptive organizational structure of congressional oversight has 
seen little change. An acceptable process for simplifying congressional oversight 
is in need of significant research and relentless advocacy. It is nearly undisputed 
that cyberspace poses an immense challenge and harbors numerous threats to 
U.S. national security. Efforts to address these threats effectively are often mired 
in disputes over which organization and congressional committee have 
jurisdiction. Overlapping jurisdictions in cyberspace are almost certainly a 
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necessity, but the complexity of the issue has led to inconsistent responses from 
congressional oversight committees. A security executive, Arif Alikhan, observes: 
Cybersecurity is not an issue about partisanship because many of 
the proposed bills have had bipartisan support. It’s really an issue 
of so many different committees that all have their particular 
interest and they can’t get together with a coherent plan to pass a 
law to help protect the United States against very real 
cyberthreats.479 
Contested jurisdictions of oversight, inconsistent methods of approval, and 
an inability to pass cyber legislation480 are all indicative of a system of 
congressional oversight that is in need of clarity and reform. 
2. In-Depth Fiscal Analysis for Supporting Inter-Title Operations 
Federal appropriations remain a prime example of the byzantine 
processes that are stereotypically associated with the U.S. government. To begin 
with, appropriations have no consistent vehicle through which they must be 
passed and find themselves spread across a number of bills that can have little 
or no relevance to the appropriation itself. Secondly, the purpose for proposing 
appropriations legislation and the means by which it is passed are sometimes 
indiscernible. In some cases, fiscal appropriations can result from annual 
legislation, while in other cases, continuing resolutions can perpetually authorize 
appropriations with no requirement that it ever be included in regular legislation. 
Understanding fiscal appropriations also requires comprehension of all relevant 
title authorities, acts and amendments—for which there may be one or many 
relevant appropriations. To complicate matters further, Authorization Acts often 
are employed to modify funding to a specific agency or programs of record.481 
For any one of the innumerable paths through which appropriations can be 
                                                 
479 DHS Congressional Oversight Task Force, 16. 
480 See supra at Ch. 2 s. (C)(4)(e). Under H.R. 3523, the Cybersecurity Act of 2015 
(containing CISA), was surreptitiously passed as part of an omnibus bill. The main tenets of 
CISA, however, were originally proposed by the HPSCI as early as 2011. 
481 See RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AUTHORIZATION AND APPROPRIATIONS 
MEASURES. CRS, The Congressional Appropriations Process: An Introduction, 10–12. 
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determined, there remains a need to align inter-title actions with the complex 
system of appropriations and to design understandable methods for inter-title 
disbursements. 
3. Inter-Title Planning Models 
Most planning models that acknowledge the need for inter-title 
cooperation, start from the perspective of a single organization and, as needs are 
recognized, external organizations are folded in through an elaborate network of 
command centers and agency liaisons. It follows an approach to planning that 
prioritizes an “inside-out” methodology and benefits from having most subject 
matter experts as resident within the organization. This approach is prevalent 
and has accompanied operational success for decades that have been 
characterized by clearly defined lanes and little interaction outside of one’s own 
agency or organization. The message from the 9/11 Commission, however, is 
that organizational isolation is more of a liability than an asset. It is therefore 
surprising that few planning models—possibly none—start with a broad inter-title 
framework and narrow the focus as roles and responsibilities of participating 
agencies are more clearly defined. 
Though inconclusive, cyberspace operations appear poised to benefit 
from an “outside-in” approach that assumes the participation of many authorities 
and discards or reduces inter-title roles as the planning process more clearly 
defines the boundaries of the operation. The DOD uses the Joint Operational 
Planning Process (JOPP) and the FBI uses the Domestic Investigations and 
Operations Guide (DIOG). Each agency has an equivalent planning guide, which 
assists agencies in consolidating allies and assets to aid in accomplishing 
organizational goals. Cyberspace operations, however, would likely benefit from 
a detailed inter-title planning process that is designed by a commission of 
planners throughout various organizations and operating under every major title 
authority. 
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C. A FINAL WORD 
Having completed this work, it is difficult to imagine that its conclusions will 
be fully accepted without protest or that it will be immediately incorporated into 
the planning process. Changing policy and attitudes toward federal action in 
cyberspace is made especially difficult given that most U.S. citizens—most 
executive and congressional employees for that matter—do not feel that they 
have enough information to make an informed decision about the matter. The 
fact of the matter is that cyberspace operations continue to be entrusted to a 
federal minority whose tactics, techniques, policies, and permissions are 
enumerated with a great deal of secrecy. 
The conclusions presented in this thesis do not portend an answer for 
these dilemmas, but instead, offer a legal solution for many of the supposed 
barriers to advancing U.S. national security interests in cyberspace. The stakes 
in cyberspace are high and the challenges to inter-title operations are many. The 
technological gap is likely closing between the United States and adversary 
nations. More than that, criminal organizations and even political activists are 
increasingly posing a threat to U.S. national security. With a myriad of threats 
converging upon numerous sectors of the United States, it is unlikely that federal 
agencies and organizations will be capable of providing resolution while 
operating under limited cooperation or in isolation from one another. 
While speaking at an Air Force Association (AFA) conference, retired Air 
Force General Chuck Horner said of cyberspace operations, “I learned this: Don’t 
ever ask permission. Just do it, and apologize afterwards.”482 This disturbing 
“just-do-it” mentality is something that operational planners can avoid by using 
the presented framework. Cyber planners and mission commanders have broad 
and sufficient statutory authorities under the allowances of the United States 
Code—among other federal legislation at large—to conduct inter-title operations 
                                                 
482 Jennifer Hlad, “Just Do It,” Air Force Magazine, March 10, 2016, 
http://www.airforcemag.com/DRArchive/Pages/2016/March%202016/March%2010%202016/Just-
Do-It.aspx. 
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without having to “ask permission” and without constructing a post-mission 
apology. Planners and commanders must educate themselves and develop 
plans that clearly communicate the role of each organization and the statutory 
authorities under which they will operate. In this way, inter-title cyberspace 
operations can be rescued from intimidation and grounded confidently within the 
framework of the law. 
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APPENDIX A. NOTABLE VIOLATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS TO THE POSSE COMITATUS ACT 
  
Adapted from: APPENDIX 1 and 2. Donald J. Currier, “The Posse Comitatus Act: A Harmless Relic from the Post-Reconstruction 
ERA or a Legal Impediment to Transformation,” research project in U.S. Army War College (Carlisle, PA: USAWC, 2003), 25–28, 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA413494. 
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Adapted from: APPENDIX 2. Currier, 27–28.
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APPENDIX B. QUICK REFERENCE GUIDE FOR THE STORED 
COMMUNICATIONS ACT 
 
Source: CCIPS, “Searching and Seizing Computers and Obtaining Electronic 
Evidence In Criminal Investigations,” 138. All references pursuant to 18 USC. 
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APPENDIX C. NOTABLE EXAMPLES OF LEAD AND 
SUPPORTING AUTHORITIES AS THEY PERTAIN TO INTER-
TITLE OPERATIONS 
  
Source: ALSA, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, And Procedures for Defense 
Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA), 11. The figure depicts the proposed structure 
for a dual status commander (DSC). It incorporates only SAD, Title 10 and Title 
32 despite the fact that Title 18 and Title 14 are often involved in Defense 
Support of Civil Authorities. 
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Source: Center for Army Lessons Learned, Catastrophic Disaster Response Staff 
Officer's Handbook, No. 06-8 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combined Arms Center, 
2006), 158, http://usacac.army.mil/sites/default/files/ publications/06-08.pdf. The 
figure depicts the Joint Operations Center (JOC), which is an “interagency 
command and control center for managing interagency preparation for, and the 
law enforcement and investigative response to, a credible terrorist threat or 
incident.” 
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